Ship Chartering
Ship Chartering involves renting the use of a Ship from a Shipowner by the Charterer, for transporting cargoes. Ship Chartering entails individuals working for a Shipowner, Ship Operator, Cargo Owner, or Trader striving to maximize the Freight revenues for a portfolio of ships and cargoes.
Grasping the subtleties of chartering is crucial for ensuring efficient and economical transportation of cargoes worldwide. We will provide the most thorough and detailed explanation of the Ship Chartering and Ship Chartering Process to date. We will categorize the Ship Chartering and Ship Chartering Process into the following subcategories:
- Understanding Charterparty and Bill of Lading (B/L)
- Implied Obligations in Charterparty
- Understanding Time Charterparty
- Understanding Voyage Charterparty
- Understanding Bill of Lading (B/L)
- Understanding Hague Visby Rules
- Understanding Rotterdam Rules
- Understanding Hamburg Rules
- Bill of Lading (B/L) issued under Charterparty
- Challenges in Combined Transportation
- Exceptions included in the Contract of Carriage
- Shipowner’s ability to Limit their Liability
- Freight
- Shipowner’s authority to enforce a Lien
- Resolving Disputes in Ship Chartering
- Breach of Charterparty
- What is Ship Chartering?
1- Understanding Charterparty and Bill of Lading (B/L)
When a Shipowner, either directly or via a Shipbroker, commits to transporting goods by sea or to provide a ship for such a purpose, this agreement is termed a Charterparty. These contracts can adopt various formats, though typically they fall into two categories: those formalized in Charterparties and those documented by Bills of Lading (B/L). When the Shipowner commits the entire capacity of his ship for a specific voyage or a defined time period, it usually constitutes a Charterparty. Conversely, if the Shipowner operates his ship within the liner trade, offering transport services to any interested party, the contract generally manifests as a Bill of Lading (B/L). It’s important to note that the categories of Charterparty and Bill of Lading (B/L) are not entirely distinct, as it’s common for a Charterer to lease a ship for a certain duration and then use it as a general carrier.
Charterparty is a freely negotiated contract, solely influenced by the Laws of Supply and Demand. The negotiating power of the parties (Shipowners and Charterers) hinges on the prevailing conditions of the shipping market. Nevertheless, both Shipowner and Charterer freely negotiate their terms without any legal restrictions. Typically, Shipowners and Charterers opt for a Standard Charterparty Form as the foundation of their contract, to which they often add Additional Clauses (Rider Clauses) tailored to their specific needs. These Standard Charterparty Forms have diverse origins—some have evolved over years linked to specific trades like grain, coal, or iron ore, while others are crafted by firms monopolizing particular sectors like oil transport. Many such forms have been created over the past century by documentary committees from organizations such as the United Kingdom Chamber of Shipping, BIMCO, and the Japanese Shipping Exchange, representing both shipowner and charterer interests.
The availability of these standard forms significantly benefits international trade, especially when Shipowners and Charterers are based in different countries and face language barriers. Familiarity with a Standard Charterparty Form prevents parties from being caught off-guard by unexpected clauses, allowing them to focus on core terms like Freight, Laytime, and Demurrage Rates. The global adoption of Standard Charterparty Forms also ensures uniform application of laws and their interpretation by courts. However, these benefits can diminish when parties merely use the standard form as a template for their contract. Based on their bargaining strengths, they may modify existing clauses and introduce new ones, resulting in a contract that barely resembles the original form. This often leads to confusion and promotes litigation.
There are primarily two basic types of Ship Charter:
- Voyage Charter
- Time Charter
Additionally, there is the Demise Charter or Bareboat Charter, which, although not technically a carriage charter, is a lease of the ship that transfers possession as well as management and navigation to the Charterer. Depending on whether the ship is chartered for a set time or one or more voyages, in both instances the Shipowner maintains control over equipping and managing the ship and commits to providing a transport service. In a Voyage Charter, the Shipowner pledges to transport a cargo between specific points. In contrast, in a Time Charter, the Shipowner makes his ship’s carrying capacity available to the Charterer for a defined period. A typical instance of a Voyage Charter occurs when a seller under a CIF contract, having agreed to transport goods to the buyer, charters a ship for the journey. Alternatively, a Time Charter is often employed by Carriers looking to expand their fleet temporarily without the costs associated with purchasing or operating a ship.
Before delving into the specifics of these two primary forms of Ship Charter, it is crucial to acknowledge the existence of various hybrid contracts that arise from the freedom of contractual negotiation. One such hybrid is the Trip-Time Charter (TCT), which involves a Time Charter for a ship specifically for a cargo voyage. Unlike a Voyage Charter where freight is typically charged per unit of cargo upon voyage completion, a Trip-Time Charter (TCT) ensures that the Shipowner is compensated for the entire duration of the voyage until the cargo is unloaded at its destination. A variant of this form is designed to safeguard the Shipowner in scenarios where the discharge port is remote and unlikely to provide subsequent cargoes, requiring the hire payment to continue until the ship returns to more frequented trade routes.
Another hybrid is the Consecutive Voyage Charter (CVC), where the ship, chartered for a specific time frame, is obligated to complete multiple voyages between designated ports during that period. An alternative, known as the Contract of Affreightment (COA), serves a similar purpose, involving the Shipowner’s commitment to transport specified quantities of a bulk commodity between certain ports over time, choosing the ships as he deems fit.
These two basic types of Ship Charter, the Voyage Charter and the Time Charter, are fundamentally different in their operation. While both ensure that the Shipowner remains in charge of the ship’s management, offering a transport service, their roles diverge significantly:
- In a Voyage Charter, the Shipowner agrees to move a specific cargo from one port to another. Here, the Shipowner assumes most operational responsibilities but is exposed to risks such as delays from uncontrollable factors, which might affect the fixed freight rate.
- In contrast, a Time Charter allows the Charterer extensive control over the commercial use of the ship within agreed limits, typically making the Charterer responsible for direct costs resulting from their directives, like fuel expenses, port charges, and loading/unloading costs. The Charterer must also cover any liabilities arising from the issuance of Bills of Lading (B/L) under their direction. In this arrangement, the Shipowner benefits from a more predictable revenue stream through a flat Hire Rate, regardless of operational delays unless they stem from factors attributable to the Shipowner, such as mechanical failures or crew issues, which might trigger an Off-Hire Clause.
The method of payment also distinguishes the two types. Voyage Charters often involve a lump sum payment for the entire journey or a rate based on the cargo amount. Time Charters, however, charge based on the time the ship is under the Charterer’s control, taking into consideration the essential duration for the operation and any potential delays that extend this period. This pricing model focuses negotiations on the expected time required to complete the transport, the allowed number of Lay Days for loading and unloading, and the Demurrage costs if these Lay Days are exceeded.
These structural distinctions not only define the operational responsibilities and financial liabilities between the Shipowner and Charterer but also shape the contractual landscape in maritime freight, catering to the diverse needs of global trade.
Bill of Lading (B/L) Contract
Charterers’ Bill of Lading (B/L) in Bulk Shipping
Challenges often occur when attempting to differentiate the impact of two types of Contracts of Carriage, particularly when both Charterparty and Bill of Lading (B/L) are utilized simultaneously. In such scenarios, Charterers transporting their goods on a chartered ship need confirmation of the quantity and condition of goods loaded. A Bill of Lading (B/L) provided to a Charterer under these conditions primarily serves as Receipts for the shipped cargo and as potential Documents of Title (DOT) if the Charterer opts to sell the goods while in transit. However, the Bill of Lading (B/L) does not verify the terms of the Charterparty between the Shipowner and Charterer, as their agreement is exclusively dictated by the Charterparty. Furthermore, the Hague Visby Rules do not govern the Contract of Carriage while the Bill of Lading (B/L) is retained by the Charterer, though these rules become applicable once the cargo is sold and the Bill of Lading (B/L) is transferred to a third party.
Time Charters typically grant the Charterer the authority to issue Bill of Lading (B/L) on behalf of third party Shippers and to submit them to the Ship Master for signature in exchange for an indemnity from the Charterer for any extra liabilities the Shipowner incurs as a result. This privilege is crucial, for instance, when a ship is chartered to enhance the Charterer’s fleet, thus allowing him to manage the ship’s commercial operations. In such cases, the Bill of Lading (B/L) becomes the primary contractual document concerning the Shipper, governing the Contract of Carriage just as if the ship were not chartered. Between the Shipper and Carrier, the terms of the Charterparty are irrelevant unless explicitly included in the Bill of Lading (B/L) contract. Nonetheless, there often remains the underlying issue of determining whether, under the Bill of Lading (B/L), the Shipowner or the Charterer should be considered the Carrier for the purposes of the Hague Visby Rules.
Bareboat Charterparty
The Bareboat Charter or Demise Charter, which is distinct from other charter types previously discussed, functions as a lease of the ship rather than a Contract of Carriage. This form of charter parallels hiring a self-drive car as opposed to using a taxi service. In a typical Time Charter, the Shipowner maintains control over the ship’s operations. However, under a Bareboat Charter or Demise Charter, the Charterer replaces the owner and, during the lease period, takes possession and full control of the ship.
In a Bareboat Charter, the Charterer staffs and outfits the ship and takes on all responsibilities for its Navigation and Management. Essentially, the Charterer acts as the Shipowner throughout the charter’s term, covering all operational costs and insuring the ship.
The Bareboat Charter or Demise Charter is particularly apt for government shipping operations, especially during wartime or other emergencies. In the private sector, it offers a Shipowner the opportunity to expand his fleet temporarily without the financial burdens of ownership, yet allows for complete control over the chartered ship. This charter type can also serve as a Hire-Purchase Agreement, securing the financing company while the ship’s purchase price is paid off in installments. Although Bareboat Charters or Demise Charters are less common than Voyage Charters and Time Charters, their usage has increased recently, notably in the oil tanker sector and for government leases.
As the Charterer in a Bareboat Charter or Demise Charter acts almost as the ship’s owner, they are considered the Carrier under the Hague Visby Rules. Thus, the Bareboat Charterer or Demise Charterer is accountable for any damage to the cargo and is liable under any Bill of Lading (B/L) signed by the Ship Master. Conversely, the Bareboat Charterer or Demise Charterer is entitled to any salvage the ship earns. Since the Shipowner does not possess the ship, he cannot place a lien over cargo as security for the Charter Hire.
What is the difference between Bareboat Charter and Demise Charter?:
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2- Implied Obligations in Charterparty
Alongside the Express Clauses agreed upon by the Shipowner and Charterer, every Charterparty is shaped against a backdrop of customary commercial practices, from which a series of obligations are implied. These are inherently incorporated into the Charterparty unless explicitly stated otherwise. Originating from the law merchant, these obligations yield consistent outcomes at Common Law, whether the Charterparty terms are specified within a Charterparty or documented through a Bill of Lading (B/L). However, an important caveat exists. Under Charterparties governed by the Hague Visby Rules, the range and application of these implied obligations are modified, and the capacity of both the Shipowner and Charterer to mutually exclude these obligations is significantly restricted.
2.1- Dangerous Cargoes
The express provision for transporting Dangerous Cargoes is outlined in the Hague Visby Rules, Article IV Rule 6. It states: “Goods of an inflammable, explosive, or dangerous nature, to the shipment of which the carrier, shipmaster, or agent of the carrier, has not consented with knowledge of their nature and character, may at any time before discharge be landed at any place, destroyed, or rendered innocuous by the carrier without compensation, and the shipper of such goods shall be liable for all damages and expenses directly or indirectly arising out of or resulting from such shipment. If any such goods shipped with such knowledge and consent shall become a danger to the ship or cargo, they may in like manner be landed at any place or destroyed or rendered innocuous by the carrier without liability on the part of the carrier except to General Average (GA), if any.”
This provision addresses two distinct scenarios. Firstly, if the Shipowner consents to the shipment of cargo unaware of its dangerous nature, they are entitled to offload, destroy, or neutralize the cargoes without compensation and hold the Shipper responsible for any resultant damages and expenses. The second scenario applies when cargo initially shipped with the Shipowner’s knowledge and consent subsequently poses a danger to the ship or other cargo. Here, the Shipowner may take similar preventive actions without owing the Shipper, except potentially for General Average (GA) contributions.
Significant clarity regarding this provision was brought by the House of Lords in The Giannis NK case. In this case, a cargo of groundnut extraction meal pellets shipped from Dakar (Senegal) to the Dominican Republic (DR) was found to be infested with Khapra beetle upon arrival. The stringent reaction from the health authorities necessitated the jettison of both the infected cargo and an adjacent cargo of wheat. The Shipowner then sought damages and indemnity under Art IV Rule 6 of the Hague Visby Rules against the Shippers of the groundnut cargo.
The House of Lords, upholding the trial judge’s finding that the infestation originated from the groundnut cargo, established two key interpretations:
- The term “Cargoes of a Dangerous Nature” should be broadly interpreted, not limited to goods inherently inflammable or explosive, nor only to those liable to cause direct physical damage to the ship or other cargo. The danger in this instance stemmed from the quarantine risks imposed by the destination countries, posing a physical threat to the other cargo.
- Liability under Art IV Rule 6 is strict. This ruling diverged from US courts, which advocated for a “No Liability Without Fault” approach based on another rule that absolves shippers of damage responsibility unless their actions, faults, or negligence directly cause the loss. However, the House of Lords viewed Art IV Rule 6 as an autonomous provision, imposing Strict Liability on Shippers for Dangerous Cargoes irrespective of fault or neglect.
Their Lordships emphasized a broad interpretation of “Cargoes of a Dangerous Nature” suggesting a minimum requirement of some indirect physical threat to the ship or other cargo. This perspective was supported by Judge Tomlinson J in the Bunge v ADM Do Brasil Ltd case, where he ruled that losses from a rat-infested shipment of soybean meal were not covered under Art IV Rule 6, as the rats posed no direct or indirect physical danger. He also affirmed that the term “Dangerous,” as used in this context, does not extend beyond the risk of physical harm, aligning with common law implications of the term.
The framework at Common Law has been bolstered by various statutes aimed at regulating the shipment of specific cargo categories. These laws generally establish protocols for marking, packing, and stowing cargoes, with compliance enforced through fines and other penalties. An early example of such legislation is found in the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (S446), which mandates that Shippers of certain listed cargoes must notify the Ship Master or Shipowner of their characteristics prior to shipment and clearly label the exterior of any package or container with the nature of the cargoes. Failure to comply results in a penalty of £100 for each violation. Additionally, if Unmarked Cargoes are loaded without the required notification to the carrier, the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (S448) allows the Ship Master or Shipowner to dispose of such cargoes overboard without facing any civil or criminal liability.
Subsequent legislation includes regulations set forth by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (S85), which aim to enact the safety measures outlined in the International Conventions for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The current Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods and Marine Pollutants) Regulations 1997 implement the 1974 SOLAS Convention and its 1978 Protocol, as amended. These regulations classify Dangerous Cargoes according to the IMDG Code (International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code) and other designated IMO (International Maritime Organization) publications, and they detail comprehensive standards for the documentation, marking, packaging, and stowing of such cargoes. Additionally, there are more specialized codes governing the transport of bulk cargoes like grain, iron ore, oil, and coal.
2.2- Seaworthiness and Cargoworthiness
In every Charterparty, it is an implied obligation to ensure the ship is Seaworthy, capable of facing and surviving the sea’s perils and other inherent risks during a voyage. In most Charterparties, this implied promise is bolstered by an Express Term to the same effect. For example, the preamble of the NYPE Form (New York Produce Exchange Form) mandates that the ship must be “tight, staunch, strong, and fully equipped for the service”. This obligation extends beyond the physical condition of the ship to include the crew’s competence and adequacy, the adequacy of fuel and supplies, and the necessary facilities for transporting the cargo.
At Common Law, the duty of the Shipowner to provide a Seaworthy Ship is absolute. If breached, the Shipowner is liable regardless of fault, implying not just an effort to make the ship fit, but a guarantee of its fitness. However, the obligation does not demand a flawless ship, but one that is reasonably suitable for its intended purpose. The requisite standard is not for a ship free of accidents or one that could withstand all possible dangers, but rather one that a prudent Shipowner would deem fit at the start of the voyage, considering all potential circumstances. This standard varies based on the voyage’s nature, the cargo type, and potential dangers along the route. Although this Common Law obligation can be waived by a specific clause in the Charterparty, courts typically interpret such clauses narrowly, as seen in the Nelson Line v Nelson case where a clause exempting the Shipowner from liability for damage “capable of being covered by insurance” did not exclude liability for damage due to unseaworthiness. To effectively exclude liability, such Clauses must be clearly and unambiguously stated. An example is The Irbenskiy Proliv case, where a Bill of Lading (B/L) Clause was broad enough to exclude all liability for unseaworthiness, despite the claimant’s argument against its validity.
Under the Hague Visby Rules, the Absolute Obligation at Common Law is replaced by a Duty to Exercise Due Diligence to ensure the Ship is Seaworthy. Thus, while the Carrier is no longer absolutely liable without fault, they remain responsible for their negligence and that of any party, including independent contractors, tasked with making the ship Seaworthy. This shift in liability comes with a rule that nullifies any attempts by the Carrier to further diminish or negate his obligation to provide a Seaworthy Ship.
Many modern standard Charterparty Forms now incorporate the Hague Visby Rules concerning Seaworthiness. For instance, the NYPE Form (New York Produce Exchange Form) uses a Clause Paramount to expressly integrate the provisions of the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936, and the Baltime Form negates the Shipowner’s liability for cargo loss or damage unless due to a lack of due diligence by the Shipowners or their Manager in preparing the ship for seaworthiness and readiness for the voyage.
These developments suggest that the Common Law Absolute Obligation to provide a Seaworthy Ship has been transitioned to a Duty to Exercise Due Diligence.
The obligation for the Shipowner to provide a Seaworthy Ship entails a dual responsibility. Firstly, the ship must be appropriately manned and equipped to handle the common perils it may encounter during its duties, and secondly, it must be Cargoworthy, meaning it should be in a suitable condition to carry the specified cargo.
Regarding the first aspect of Seaworthiness, the Common Law implied obligation covers not just the physical state of the ship and its equipment but also extends to the competence of the crew and the adequacy of stores and documentation. For instance, a ship would clearly be deemed Unseaworthy if it has faulty engines or a defective compass, or if cargo is stored in a way that makes the ship unstable. Similarly, the Shipowner would breach this obligation by hiring an incompetent engineer or other officers, taking insufficient fuel on board for the journey, or if the voyage’s documentation is lacking. However, once these legal prerequisites are met, the implied obligation does not extend to issues like recommended manning levels or employment conditions set by external bodies like trade unions.
In a Voyage Charter, the duty to ensure the ship is Seaworthy applies at the departure for the Charter Voyage. It does not matter if there were defects rendering the Ship Unseaworthy during the initial journey to the loading port or during the loading process, as long as these issues are rectified by the Time of Departure.
The obligation is considered fulfilled if the ship is Seaworthy at departure, regardless of subsequent events during the voyage or at intermediary stops. “The warranty is merely concerning the ship’s condition at a specific moment—departure. It does not guarantee continuous fitness throughout the voyage. Should any incident occur that damages the cargo, the Shipowner is liable unless the damage stems from a cause within the agreed exceptions.” This means that for a Consecutive Voyage Charter (CVC), the obligation to provide a Seaworthy Ship arises at the start of each voyage executed under the charter. Similarly, if a Voyage Charter is segmented by agreement between the Shipowner and Charterer, the duty to make the Ship Seaworthy recurs at the beginning of each segment. However, the scenario differs under a Time Charter where the obligation is only applicable at the Time of Delivery of the ship under the Time Charterparty, usually complemented by a Maintenance Clause requiring the Shipowner to “maintain the ship in excellent operational condition throughout the charter.”
The second aspect of the Seaworthiness obligation at Common Law concerns the ship’s Cargoworthiness. The Shipowner must ensure the ship is ready to receive the agreed cargo. This would not be met if, for example, the ship’s holds require Fumigating or Cleaning to be ready for cargo, if there’s a malfunction in the refrigeration system meant to transport frozen meat, or if the pumps are insufficient to handle excess water from the cargo. This warranty of Cargoworthiness is active from the start of loading. “The guarantee implies that when the cargo is loaded, the ship must be capable of handling it and the usual perils of the loading process, but there’s no ongoing guarantee once the cargo is aboard that the ship remains suitable through to departure, regardless of any incidents in the interim.” Therefore, in McFadden v Blue Star Line, when cargo was safely loaded but later damaged due to mishandling by the ship’s engineer, it was ruled that the damage post-loading did not violate the Cargoworthiness Warranty.
The inclusion of Hague Visby Rules in many modern Charterparty Forms might influence the operation of the implied Seaworthiness obligation. In Adamastos Shipping Co v Anglo-Saxon Petroleum, the Voyage Charter included a Clause Paramount incorporating the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 provisions, which were treated as if directly written into the Charterparty. Consequently, the majority of the House of Lords acknowledged the Hague Visby Rules’ provisions for all voyages under the Charterparty, irrespective of their geographical routes or cargo status. Some legal opinions suggest that under the Hague Visby Rules, the obligation to Exercise Due Diligence to ensure the Ship is Seaworthy should be considered for each voyage under a Time Charter. However, Mustill J expressed caution in The Hermosa case, noting that the typical terms regarding initial Seaworthiness and ongoing maintenance in most Time Charters do not easily align with the Hague Rules’ framework, which mandates Due Diligence for each voyage.
Proof of Unseaworthiness rests with the party alleging it, often supported by judicial inferences, such as seawater in the hold generally being treated as Prima Facie Evidence of Unseaworthiness. Once a breach is established, the claimant must prove that this Unseaworthiness caused the specific loss complained of. For instance, in International Packers v Ocean Steamship Co., cargo damage was attributed not to Unseaworthiness but to crew negligence in securing hatch covers.
Regarding remedies for breach, courts avoid rigid classifications into Conditions or Warranties, preferring to view the obligation to provide a Seaworthy Ship as an Innominate Term (Intermediate Term), as seen in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co v Kawasaki. This approach allows for responses proportional to the breach’s severity—permitting contract termination for severe breaches while limiting less serious breaches to damage claims. Thus, the remedy available depends on the breach’s impact on the Charterparty’s overall benefit, judged on a case-by-case basis.
In conclusion, the provisions for breach and remedies in Charterparty cases are nuanced, relying heavily on the specific circumstances of each case and the contractual terms agreed upon by the parties.
Where a breach is detected before the performance of the Charterparty has commenced, the Charterer may treat his obligations under the Charterparty as discharged if the breach significantly deprives him of the entire benefit of the Charterparty, and if the breach is unrectifiable within a reasonable time frame. For example, in the Stanton v Richardson case, the ship’s pumping equipment was insufficient for handling surplus water from a cargo of wet sugar. It was determined that the new pumps could not be installed swiftly enough, allowing the Charterer to repudiate the Charterparty.
Conversely, if the breach’s effects are less severe, the Charterer’s remedy is limited to seeking damages. The permissible duration for remedying the defect may vary depending on whether it’s a Voyage Charter or a Time Charter. A brief delay might frustrate the purpose of a Voyage Charter, whereas a Time Charter might tolerate a longer delay without being frustrated. This was exemplified in the Hong Kong Fir case where the Court of Appeal held that a ship’s unavailability for five months for repairs did not frustrate the purpose of a 24-month Time Charter.
Moreover, specific clauses in the Time Charter might provide the Charterer with additional options if the Shipowner fails to rectify a defect before the specified Cancelling Date. For instance, under Clause 22 of the Baltime Charterparty Form, the Charterer has the right to cancel the Charterparty unless the ship is delivered by a certain date, fully prepared for ordinary cargo service. This was effectively applied in The Madeleine case, where the Charterer was able to cancel due to the Shipowner’s failure to provide the required Deratisation Certificate by the Cancelling Date, as stated by Roskill J: “there was here an Express Warranty of Seaworthiness and unless the ship was timely delivered in a Seaworthy condition, including the necessary certificate from the Port Health Authority (PHA), the Charterers had the right to cancel.” Such a right to cancel does not necessarily depend on a breach of obligation by the Shipowners.
When the Unseaworthy state of the ship is discovered only after it has set sail, the mere acceptance of the ship does not imply that the Charterer waives his right to claim damages, nor does it necessarily waive the right to repudiate the Charter provided that the discovered breach is sufficiently serious. This holds particularly true for Time Charters. In the case of a Voyage Charter, if the breach is not noticeable before the ship departs, the Charterer might have limited chances to detect it before the ship completes its journey and the contract is fully performed.
The determination of what remedies are available to the Charterer in the event of a breach of this intermediate obligation by the Shipowner depends on whether the breach occurs before or after the ship has commenced its Charterparty performance. If before, the Charterer can treat his obligations under the Charterparty as ended if the breach fundamentally undermines the whole benefit of the Charterparty, and it is irremediable within a timeframe that would prevent the Charterparty’s purpose from being thwarted. If after, the Charterer is confined to damages unless the breach’s severity justifies repudiation.
In summary, the legal framework surrounding Seaworthiness in Charterparties is complex, shaped by the specifics of each case and the clauses of the Charterparty. Whether a Charterer can repudiate the Charterparty or is restricted to claiming damages often hinges on the nature of the breach, its timing, and the Charterparty’s specific terms.
2.3- Deviation
The Shipowner, whether managing a Liner Service or operating under a Charter, inherently commits to ensuring his ship does not stray from the agreed voyage while fulfilling the terms of the Charterparty. Deviation is typically described as “an intentional and unreasonable alteration of the voyage’s geographical course as outlined in the contract.” To establish if such a Deviation has taken place, one must first identify the intended route set by the Charterparty. Although some standard Charterparty Forms explicitly dictate the route, in their absence, it is generally assumed that the ship should take the shortest Geographical Route between the loading and discharge ports. However, this assumption can be challenged if the Shipowner presents evidence of the Customary Route used in the trade or the route historically taken by the specific shipping line. For instance, in the Reardon Smith Line v Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance case, a ship that was to travel from a Black Sea port to Sparrow Point deviated from the direct route to refuel in Constanza, attracted by the availability of inexpensive fuel. Evidence showed that it was common for ships in that trade to stop in Constanza, with 25% of ocean-going ships traversing the Bosphorus Strait adopting this practice. Consequently, the House of Lords ruled that there was no Deviation from the usual route. Lord Porter succinctly summarized the law:
“It is the obligation of a ship, especially on an ocean journey from one port to another, to follow the common route between those ports. Without contrary evidence, this route is presumed to be the direct geographical path, but it can be altered for navigational or other reasons. Evidence defining the typical route is always permissible unless a specific path is mandated by the Charterparty or Bill of Lading (B/L).”
An Unjustifiable Deviation occurs when the departure from the Contractual Voyage results from a deliberate decision by the Shipowner or the Ship Master. Therefore, there is no violation of this implied commitment if external factors like a storm misdirect the ship, or if navigational errors arise due to the Ship Master’s illness or a malfunctioning compass.
Justifiable Deviations at Common Law:
To prevent harm to the ship or its cargo: the Ship Master is obligated to use reasonable care and skill to ensure a successful voyage, which may include the right to Deviate from the set course to protect the ship and its cargo. Typically, the Ship Master is duty-bound to take such measures. Risks might stem from natural elements like storms, ice, or fog, or from political issues such as war or the threat of interception by enemy forces. However, the threat must be significantly enduring; a temporary hindrance like a tug shortage or a neap tide does not justify a major alteration in the voyage. A common example of a permissible Deviation occurs when the ship, for safety, must enter a port for repairs due to damages incurred during the journey. The cause of the damage, even if it is initial Unseaworthiness of the Ship, is usually irrelevant. For instance, in the Kish v Taylor case, a ship initially chartered to carry a complete load of timber from two Gulf of Mexico ports to the West Continent had to source additional timber from other Shippers after the Charterer failed to provide the full load. Some of this timber was stored on deck, making the ship Unseaworthy. After encountering severe squalls that jeopardized the ship’s safety by shifting the deck cargo, the Ship Master docked in Halifax for essential repairs before continuing to Liverpool to unload. Despite allegations of an Unjustifiable Deviation to Halifax, the House of Lords affirmed the Deviation’s legitimacy, attributing justification to the presence of danger rather than its origin. Lord Atkinson highlighted the policy implications: “The existence of danger, not its cause, defines the nature of a Deviation. Should a ship master, through his own fault or a breach by his owner, find his ship in jeopardy, is he compelled to proceed regardless of risk, or can he seek safety only at the risk of voiding the contract of affreightment?” In such cases, it is prudent to afford the Ship Master the benefit of the doubt since: “Nothing could, in my view, more likely increase the perils faced by life and property at sea than to compel a merchant ship’s master to choose between such alternatives.” It appears a Deviation might be justified even if the risk only concerns the ship and not the Cargo. Conversely, it’s unclear whether a duty to Deviate arises when only slight or partial damage to the cargo is likely. Although the Ship Master should consider both the ship and cargo interests, “I am not ready to assert that the moment it’s clear some damage will occur to part of the cargo, the captain must reverse course, potentially causing substantial expense.” The decision on whether a Deviation is justified under such conditions likely hinges on weighing the danger’s severity against the costs and disruptions of evasive actions.
To rescue human lives or a ship in Distress if lives are at risk: “Deviation to save lives is protected and does not lead to insurance forfeiture or liability for the goods,” according to the Shipowner regarding losses typically excluded under Perils of the Seas. Consequently, Deviation to contact a ship in Distress is permissible, especially if the distressed ship’s situation poses a life threat. Conversely, Deviation solely to save property does not receive the same protection and incurs usual Deviation consequences. In one case, a ship diverted to respond to a Distress Call had the opportunity to rescue the crew of a distressed ship but chose to tow it for salvage instead. Caught in a storm during this operation, the ship ran aground, losing its cargo. This Deviation for salvage purposes was deemed unjustified, and the Shipowners were held liable for the cargo loss, despite it being covered under Perils of the Sea in the Charterparty. The situation would have differed had the weather necessitated towing to save the crew’s lives.
Charterer’s default necessitates the Deviation: Deviation may be warranted to dock and unload Dangerous Cargo loaded without the Shipowner’s knowledge by the Charterer. Similarly, the Ship Master might need to Deviate to acquire additional cargo if the Charterer fails to fulfill his obligation to load a complete cargo.
Justifiable Deviations under the Hague Visby Rules:
In addition to the justifications recognized under Common Law, Article IV rule 4 of the Hague Visby Rules introduces two additional grounds: “Deviation in saving or attempting to save property at sea” and “Any Reasonable Deviation.” Courts in the United Kingdom have interpreted “Reasonable Deviation” quite narrowly, resulting in few reported cases where this principle has been successfully applied.
Liberty Clauses in Charterparty
Most Standard Charterparty Forms include a Liberty Clause that allows the Ship Master to Deviate for specified reasons. For example, Clause 3 of the Gencon Charterparty Form states: “The ship has liberty to call at any port or ports in any order, for any purpose, to sail without pilots, to tow and/or assist ships in all situations, and also to deviate for the purpose of saving life and/or property.” Liberty Clauses in different Charterparty Forms may permit Deviation for various reasons, such as Bunkering (Fueling), adjusting compasses or radio equipment, or for the boarding and disembarking of crew members.
Although these Liberty Clauses, if taken literally, could have extensive implications, they are mainly included for the Shipowner’s advantage. Consequently, courts often employ the principle of Contra Proferentem (which favors the interpretation against the party who drafted the ambiguous term) to interpret these clauses very narrowly. In the Glynn v Margetson case, for instance, oranges were shipped from Malaga to Liverpool under a Bill of Lading (B/L) that granted the Shipowner “liberty to proceed to and stay at any port or ports in any rotation.” Despite the clause’s broad wording, the courts ruled it did not shield the Shipowner when the ship docked at non-Geographical Route ports, resulting in damaged cargo upon arrival. Lord Esher, in a similar case, stated that such a Charterparty Term is usually understood to mean the ship may only stop at ports that are natural and customary on the specified voyage. Even if the clause says the ship can call at any ports, the usual interpretation is that the ship is only allowed to stop at ports along the Geographical Route; hence, the phrase “in any order” is often added. Regardless, Lord Esher noted that the ports must be substantially along the voyage’s course.
These principles of interpretation rely heavily on the skill of the draftsman and can be circumvented with precise language. For example, Clause 13 of the Nubaltwood Charterparty Form permits the Shipowner to call “at any port or ports whatsoever in any order in or out of the route or in a contrary direction to or beyond the port of destination.” Courts have fully enforced such Liberty Clauses, interpreting them as granting the ship freedom to navigate as desired, provided the voyage’s primary purpose is not thwarted.
A complication arises when Standard Charterparty Forms explicitly incorporate the Hague Visby Rules, which set the minimum protections for the Cargo Owner that cannot be diminished by mutual consent. How do these Liberty Clauses align with the requirement in Art IV Rule 4 that a Deviation, unless to Save Life or Property, must be reasonable? U.S. courts have adopted a stringent approach, validating Liberty Clauses in the Charterparty only as far as the Deviation remains Reasonable. English courts, however, view an Express Liberty Clause as delineating the contractual voyage’s boundaries rather than excusing departures by the Shipowner from this route. According to Hodson LJ, “the purpose of the Hague Visby Rules is not to define the contract of service’s scope but to stipulate the terms under which that service is to be performed.” It is likely the same interpretation would apply if a Bill of Lading (B/L) issued under a Charterparty explicitly includes a Liberty Clause from the charter.
At Common Law, any Unjustifiable Deviation from the prescribed route is seen as a fundamental breach of the Charterparty. “The departure from the voyage agreed upon is a breach by the Shipowner of his contract, a breach so serious that no matter how minor the Deviation, the other party to the contract may consider it a fundamental breach, thus freeing himself from all Charterparty Terms,” it is often stated. Traditionally, a Fundamental Breach differed from a condition because it entitled the Innocent Party to Repudiate his obligations under the Charterparty and sue for extensive Damages, ignoring any Exceptions or Limitation of Liability Clauses in the Charterparty.
Historically, this importance was due to Marine Insurance practices in the United Kingdom and the United States, where a Deviation would void cargo insurance coverage. The strict liability imposed on the Shipowner aimed to protect the Cargo Owner. Modern insurance practices have mitigated this issue; policies usually feature a Held Covered Clause allowing for coverage extension in case of Deviation for an Additional Premium (Extra Premium). Along with the introduction of broad Liberty Clauses into Charterparties, these changes have diminished the practical significance of the Deviation concept.
Recent judicial opinions, notably in the Suisse Atlantique and Photo Production v Securicor cases, have cast doubt on whether the strict interpretation of Deviation as a legal rule can persist. These rulings suggest that the concept of fundamental breach as a legal rule was a judicial mistake initially meant to shield consumers from Exclusion Clauses, a need which the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 has made redundant. In commercial contexts, a return to strict contractual interpretation allows parties to freely negotiate contracts and allocate risks.
What does this mean for the traditional understanding of Deviation? On one side, Lord Wilberforce in the Photo Production v Securicor case suggested that Deviation cases might be considered unique due to their historical and commercial contexts. Alternatively, as seen in The Antares case, the Court of Appeal believed Deviation should be integrated into standard contract law, where the entire contract terms, including Exceptions and Liberty Clauses, are evaluated to determine if they were intended to apply to a changed voyage. With such comprehensive tools available, the necessity of a legal rule specific to Deviation is questionable, as expressed by a modern legal scholar: “All the common law control methods are preserved, and these are enhanced by the necessity of reasonableness. The rules of interpretation still predominantly disadvantage the proferens. A skilled judge should easily be able to dismiss an undesirable exemption clause.”
Therefore, what is the Effect of Deviation on the Charterparty? Traditionally, in the event of an Unjustified Deviation, however minor, the Charterer has the option to either view the breach as a Repudiation of the Charterparty or to Waive the breach, leading to a limited recourse for Damages. A similar stance might be taken by a court that finds, upon interpretation, that the Charterparty terms do not apply to the altered voyage. However, this traditional stance should be cautiously regarded until the implications of the decision in the Photo Production v Securicor case are fully understood.
Despite Deviation being a Fundamental Breach of the Charterparty, the Charterer may choose to overlook it and continue to treat the Charterparty as valid since “even a fundamental condition can be waived by the cargo owner.” This approach is common in many instances where the Deviation causes minimal or no loss to the Charterer. In such cases, all Charterparty terms, including Exceptions and Limitation of Liability provisions, remain in effect. Additionally, the Shipowner retains the right to claim Freight and General Average (GA) contributions, while the Charterer’s recourse is limited to seeking damages for any loss due to the deviation that is not exempted by an exception.
A notable example illustrating the Charterer’s options occurred in the Hain SS Co v Tate & Lyle case. A ship was contracted to pick up a sugar cargo from two Cuban ports and one in San Domingo, as nominated by the Charterer. Due to a communication failure by the Shipowner’s Agents, the Ship Master was unaware of the San Domingo port nomination. After loading at the Cuban ports, the Ship Master headed to Queenstown for further instructions. Once the error was realized, the Ship Master was directed back to San Domingo to collect the remaining cargo. However, the ship ran aground leaving Queenstown, resulting in partial cargo loss, with the rest transferred to another vessel for the voyage to the United Kingdom. Before the ship reached its destination, the Bills of Lading (B/L) for the sugar were endorsed to Tate & Lyle, who received the cargo unaware of the Deviation. The court recognized the Deviation as a Fundamental Breach of the Charterparty, giving the Charterers the right to deem the Charterparty repudiated. However, fully aware of the circumstances, the Charterers chose to waive the breach by instructing the ship to return to San Domingo. As the injured party, “the cargo owner can choose to uphold the contract; and doing so fully informed of their rights binds them under general contract law.” Under these conditions, if the Charterers claimed, the Shipowners could invoke the Charterparty’s Perils of the Sea exception for protection. The situation for the Bill of Lading (B/L) Holders was different; they couldn’t waive rights without knowing of the breach. Following the principle set in Leduc v Ward, the Bill of Lading (B/L) Holders weren’t bound by the Charterers’ waiver, preventing the Shipowners from using the Bill of Lading (B/L) Exceptions to defend against any cargo claims from the Consignees.
The responsibility to prove a waiver rests with the Deviating Shipowner, and it’s seldom in the Consignee’s interest to waive the breach once the cargo has arrived, as “a waiver, to be effective and estop a party’s claim, must be unequivocal, definite, clear, cogent, and complete.” There is some uncertainty whether merely referring a dispute to arbitration as per a Charterparty Clause would constitute such a waiver. The prevailing opinion is that it would not.
2.4- Reasonable Dispatch
Every Charterparty inherently involves an obligation for the Shipowner or Carrier to fulfill his contractual duties with Reasonable Dispatch. If no specific timeframe is stated for a duty, an Implied Obligation exists to complete it within a Reasonable Time. For instance, a Voyage Charter typically implies that the ship will embark on the voyage and manage loading and unloading either at the agreed time or within a Reasonable Time. Similarly, in a Time Charter, it is expected that the Ship Master will carry out each voyage with the Utmost Dispatch. The evaluation of this duty is not strictly objective; rather, it considers what is reasonably expected of the Shipowner under the existing circumstances during performance. If the Charterparty’s language does not clearly or implicitly set a timeframe for fulfilling a contractual duty, the law presumes it should be done within a Reasonable Time. This principle applies broadly, not just to Charterparties. In various contracts, the requirement of a reasonable time is often interpreted to mean that the responsible party fulfills his obligations despite prolonged delays, provided these are due to uncontrollable factors, and there is no negligence or unreasonable behavior.
Similar to the Seaworthiness commitment, the duty to ensure Reasonable Dispatch is categorized as an Innominate Term (Intermediate Term). The type of remedy in any case depends on the impact of the breach. Although the affected party can always seek compensation in the form of Damages for any Unreasonable Delay, he can only Repudiate the Charterparty if the delay significantly thwarts its purpose. For example, in the Freeman v Taylor case, after unloading cargo in Cape Town, the Ship Master independently decided to transport mules and cattle to Mauritius on the way to Bombay. This diversion delayed the ship’s arrival in Bombay by about six or seven weeks, leading the court to conclude that the delay was substantial enough to Frustrate the charter’s objective. In instances of less severe delays, however, the affected party’s remedy will be limited to seeking Damages. Such claims might be excluded if the delay falls under an excepted peril.
2.5- Safe Port (SP) and Safe Berth (SB)
Whenever a Charterer has the authority to Nominate Port, whether under a Time Charter or Voyage Charter, it raises the question of whether the Charterer also has a duty to nominate a Safe Port (SP). The nomination right may manifest in one of two forms. Firstly, the Charterer may have the option to choose from a Range of Ports specified in the Charter, such as Iskenderun/Mersin/Antalya. In this scenario, there is no Implied Warranty of safety upon nomination because the Shipowner, by listing the ports in the Charterparty, is considered to have accepted any associated risks. Conversely, the Charterer may be allowed to nominate from various unnamed ports within a Specific Range, like Singapore/Japan. Here, a distinction is necessary between a Time Charter and a Voyage Charter.
For Time Charters, where the Shipowner provides the commercial use of his ship to the Time Charterer, an Implied Warranty concerning the Safety of any Nominated Port is typically assumed. As Donaldson J noted in The Evaggelos Th case, “I should make this implication because common sense and business efficacy require it in cases where the Shipowner relinquishes to the Charterer the right to decide the ship’s destinations and because this aligns with the majority of judicial opinions.”
However, the situation with Voyage Charters is more complex. Without clear precedents, recent cases have indicated that when a Voyage Charterer can Nominate from a Range of Unnamed Ports, such a warranty isn’t automatically implied but depends on the Specific Terms of the Charterparty and whether the implication is necessary for the Charterparty’s practical effectiveness.
In most charters, the necessity for an Implied Obligation is negated by an Express Term serving the same purpose. For instance, Clause 2 of the Baltime Charterparty Form 1939 states: “The ship shall be employed in lawful trades for the carriage of lawful merchandise only between safe ports or places where the ship can safely lie always afloat.”
What then defines a Safe Port (SP) for such warranties? According to case law, the essential concept of a Safe Port (SP) remains consistent whether it pertains to an Express or Implied Warranty, or whether it is related to a Time Charter or Voyage Charter. Sellers LJ provided a classic definition in The Eastern City case, stating: “a port will not be Safe unless, in the relevant period, the particular ship can Reach it, Use it, and Return from it without, barring some abnormal occurrence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by good navigation and seamanship.”
The period mentioned in the definition encompasses the entire duration the ship utilizes the port, from entry to departure. In some instances, this may extend to include risks in the port’s approaches, such as ice in the St. Lawrence obstructing safe access to the Port of Quebec. Exceptionally, it might even cover dangers on the open sea, like submarine activity near German Ports during wartime. Conversely, once loading or unloading operations are completed, the ship must safely exit the port. For instance, Manchester was deemed an Unsafe Port in a case where, after cargo discharge, a ship’s masts were too tall to pass under bridges on the canal linking the Port to the sea. However, the risk must be directly related to using the Nominated Port, as Devlin J pointed out in the Grace v General SN Co case, noting, “It is obvious in point of fact that the more remote it is from the port, the less likely it is to interfere with the safety of the voyage. The Charterer does not guarantee that the most direct route or any particular route to the Port is safe, but the voyage which he orders must be one which an ordinarily prudent and skilful master can find a way of making in safety.”
Most cases focus on the ship’s safety within the port itself, where the variety of risks covered by the warranty is evident. The most common danger in an Unsafe Port is the risk of Physical Damage to the ship, which might result from inadequate water depth or the presence of ice or periodic silting that obstructs port access. Alternatively, an exposed or rocky anchorage could make a Port Unsafe, especially one prone to sudden gales or other adverse weather. Moreover, political risks, like a blockade or hostilities, or organizational risks due to poor management by Port Authorities (PA), such as inadequate safety equipment or unsafe berths, could also render a Port Unsafe.
Determining whether a Port is Safe is a factual matter, contingent on the specific circumstances, including the type of ship, the tasks to be performed, and the prevailing conditions at the Port at the relevant time. A Port might be safe for one ship type but not for another, such as a Very Large Ore Carrier (VLOC) that cannot access many Ports safe for smaller vessels due to its deep draft. It’s acknowledged that using any port carries some risk, and a port isn’t considered unsafe simply because it may occasionally experience storms, provided that adequate weather forecasts are available and the Port’s organization allows a competent master to take necessary evasive actions. For example, in the case of The Khian Sea, the Court of Appeal deemed a Port Unsafe because, despite receiving adequate storm warnings, the Ship Master was unable to leave his berth due to two other ships anchored nearby. Lord Denning MR highlighted the necessary conditions under the Safe Port (SP) Warranty, including adequate weather forecasting systems, available pilots and tugs, sufficient sea room to maneuver, and an effective system to ensure that such room is always available.
However, not every hazard renders a Port Unsafe. Temporary Obstructions like high winds, neap tides, or silting require the Ship Master to wait a reasonable time until the danger subsides or is removed. Only if the resultant delay is inordinately long, to the extent of frustrating the Charterparty’s objective, does it breach the Safe Port (SP) Warranty. For instance, a Port on the Mississippi was not considered Unsafe despite a 21-day delay caused by fog and periodic silting downstream. Roskill LJ stated that a Charterparty cannot be abandoned due to “commercially unacceptable delay,” meaning a delay beyond a Reasonable Time. The delay must be so severe as to Frustrate the venture. Roskill LJ argued that substituting any other test for frustration would yield a measure exceedingly difficult to apply consistently.
The situation might differ if the port’s characteristics causing the Temporary Hazard existed at the time of its nomination and the shipowner is claiming Damages for Detention, not rescinding the Charterparty. In the recent case of Independent Petroleum Group v Seacarriers, a ship was detained for four days at the Port of Beira due to another vessel running aground and blocking the main channel. Arbitrators found that marker buoys were misplaced due to shifting sands and there was no adequate monitoring system. Although no physical damage occurred and no frustration was claimed, Toulson J still ruled Beira an Unsafe Port and awarded Damages for Detention, finding support in Lord Roskill’s words from The Evia (No 2), emphasizing ongoing risk due to existing conditions at the Time of Nomination.
This interpretation suggests that even without a delay causing frustration, the inherent risks posed by a port’s existing conditions can deem it prospectively Unsafe, as evidenced by the findings in the Independent Petroleum Group v Seacarriers case. Toulson J’s decision illustrates that a port’s inherent characteristics can pose a continuous risk, warranting a finding of unsafety even when the delay is not severe enough to frustrate the purpose of the Charterparty.
The contrast in judicial decisions regarding similar circumstances underlines the complexity of defining what constitutes an Unsafe Port. For example, while Beira was considered Unsafe due to inadequate monitoring and management of navigation risks, another Port might be deemed Safe under similar physical conditions if the local Port Authorities effectively manage these risks. The decisive factor in the Independent Petroleum Group v Seacarriers case was the failure of the Port Authorities in Beira to monitor and ensure the safety of the navigational channel, considered an ongoing breach of duty from the time the Port was Nominated.
Thus, the determination of a port’s safety often hinges on a combination of Physical, Organizational, and Situational factors. Each case is unique and must be assessed on its own merits, considering the specific characteristics of the Port, the ship’s requirements, and the prevailing conditions at the time of use. This approach aligns with the principle that the safety of a Port is not just about natural conditions but also about how well these conditions are managed and communicated by the Port Authorities.
In conclusion, the safety of a port is a multifaceted issue that requires consideration of both natural and managerial elements. Ports must not only be naturally suitable for the ships that use them but also well-managed to adapt to and mitigate potential risks. Effective management includes proper surveillance, timely and accurate weather reports, and ensuring that navigational aids are in good working condition. Only through such comprehensive measures can a Port be deemed Safe, supporting the seamless operation of maritime activities without undue risks to ships and their cargoes.
The precise scope of the undertaking by the Charterer primarily concerns the Safety of the Port when it is to be Used, not its safety at the time of Port Nomination. For example, a Port might be Unsafe at the time of Nomination in February due to ice, which disappears by its intended use in May. Conversely, a Port deemed Safe in September could be obstructed by ice by December.
Prior to the decision in The Evia (No 2) case, there was significant debate about the nature of this undertaking. One perspective held that the Charterer bore a strict contractual liability for any loss the Shipowner suffered due to Unsafe conditions at the Port, regardless of the foreseeability at the Time of Nomination. This view posited a continuous guarantee of the Port’s Safety, aligned with Time Charterparty Clauses that stipulate the ship must only sail between Good and Safe Ports (SP), proposing an equitable risk distribution. The opposing view limited the obligation to a warranty that the Nominated Port was Safe at the Time of Nomination and would remain so from the Ship’s Arrival to its Departure, focusing on the Port’s Inherent Characteristics at the Time of Nomination through an objective assessment without considering the Charterer’s knowledge.
This disparity was resolved in The Evia (No 2) by the House of Lords. The case involved The Evia, chartered to transport cargo from Cuba to Basrah under conditions that appeared safe. However, congestion delayed the ship’s docking and discharge, coinciding with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, trapping The Evia indefinitely. The arbitration deemed the Charterparty frustrated from October 1980, leading to an appeal based on the alleged breach of the Safe Port (SP) undertaking. The Lords concluded that the Warranty did not guarantee continual Safety but rather prospective Safety at the Time of Nomination. Lord Diplock stated that the contractual promise was concerned with the Port’s prospective safety during loading or unloading operations, clarifying that the Charterers would not be liable for unexpected or abnormal events like the war, which should be covered by the ship’s insurers instead.
Following this ruling, the correct test moving forward involves the prospective Safety of the Port at the Time of Nomination. However, if the Port becomes Unsafe while the ship is en route or after it has docked, a secondary obligation on the Time Charterer arises to Cancel the Original Port Nomination and redirect the ship to safety. In The Evia case, this obligation was applicable as long as the ship could still leave the Port.
The Evia decision introduced a nuanced test involving both Primary and Secondary Obligations, unexpectedly moving away from a Continuing Guarantee. It raises questions about the Charterer’s duty in identifying subsequent threats and whether the obligation to act is absolute, based on Due Diligence, or depends on the Charterer’s actual knowledge. Additionally, it remains unclear whether a Secondary Obligation can arise in a Voyage Charter, as traditionally, no variations in Port Nomination are allowed post-Nomination.
In a similar case, The Lucille found that Basrah had become Prospectively Unsafe just days before the war, suggesting the Charterer had breached the Safe Port (SP) undertaking by not redirecting the ship while it was still possible, thereby trapping the ship indefinitely. These instances highlight ongoing ambiguities regarding the extent of Charterer obligations under evolving circumstances and the conditions under which these obligations are activated.
These unresolved questions emphasize the complexity and evolving nature of Charterer obligations in ensuring the safety of Nominated Ports under varying circumstances. The decision in The Lucille case illustrates the critical importance of timely action by the Charterer to reassess and respond to rapidly changing conditions at a Port, which can swiftly transition from safe to unsafe.
The potential implications for Charterers are significant. They must maintain a vigilant and proactive approach to monitoring conditions at all Nominated Ports and be ready to make swift decisions to Re-nominate Alternate Ports when safety becomes an issue. This vigilance is particularly crucial in volatile regions or during periods of political instability that might affect Port safety.
Furthermore, the evolving legal interpretations suggest that while Charterers are not insurers of the unforeseeable and abnormal risks, they are expected to act on known risks in a timely manner to prevent potential dangers. This places a substantial burden on Charterers to stay well-informed about global events and local conditions that might impact Port safety.
Legal standards set by cases like The Evia and The Lucille also underscore the necessity for Charterers to have robust contingency planning and risk assessment strategies. These should include regularly updated risk assessments of all potential Ports of call and clear protocols for action when a Port’s safety status changes.
Moreover, the question of a Charterer’s obligation to act on subsequent threats to Port safety raises issues of due diligence versus actual knowledge. The distinction between these can be critical in determining liability and whether the Charterer has fulfilled their duty to ensure the safety of the Port. It might be argued that a higher standard of knowledge and responsiveness is required in today’s connected world, where information about Port conditions and security threats is more readily available.
Lastly, the notion of Secondary Obligations, as highlighted in these legal cases, adds an additional layer of responsibility on Charterers. It implies that not only must Charterers ensure the initial safety of a Port at the time of nomination, but they must also continuously monitor and reassess that safety up until the point the ship is no longer at the Port. This ongoing responsibility to react to changing circumstances and potentially withdraw the ship if necessary complicates the Charterer’s role and highlights the dynamic and often unpredictable nature of maritime operations.
The outcomes of these cases continue to shape the maritime industry’s legal landscape, stressing the importance of proactive safety management and the legal implications of failing to adhere to established safety undertakings. As legal standards evolve, Charterers must adapt to ensure compliance and protect their interests, emphasizing thorough due diligence, continuous monitoring, and decisive action in the face of emerging risks.
Safe Port (SP) vs Safe Berth (SB)
Whether a Port is specified in the Charterparty or to be Nominated by the Charterer, it is generally assumed that the Charterer will also have the right to Nominate a Berth or Berths within that Port. Often, the Charterparty explicitly mandates that the Charterer Nominate only Safe Berths (SB), for example, “1/2 Safe Berths Amsterdam.” In scenarios lacking such Explicit Provision, the obligation to Nominate a Safe Berth (SB) hinges on various factors. If the Charterer has expressly warranted the Port as safe, this warranty typically extends to the Berth, implying an obligation for the Charterer to Nominate a Safe Berth (SB).
However, if the Right to Nominate arises at a Port not expressly warranted as Safe by the Charterer, the Court of Appeal has recently determined that there is No Implied Obligation to Nominate a Safe Berth (SB). In the Mediterranean Salvage & Towage Ltd v Seamar Trading case, a Ship was chartered from Chekka (Lebanon) to Algiers (Algeria) carrying bulk cement. The Charterparty did not expressly warrant the Safety of the Port or the Berth. The Charterers nominated a Berth in Chekka where the Ship suffered severe damage due to an underwater obstruction. In addressing a claim for Damages for Breach of an Implied Warranty regarding the Berth’s Safety, the Court of Appeal ruled that such a warranty’s existence depends on the interpretation of the Charterparty’s terms. The Shipowners bore the burden of proof and failed to present any precedent where a warranty had been implied under similar circumstances. The issue revolves around whether the Charterers agreed to assume the risk of hidden dangers at the Berth, and the answer was found to be no.
Conversely, when the Charterer must Nominate a Safe Berth (SB) at a named Port not itself Expressly Warranted as Safe, the Nomination of the Berth does not imply anything about the Port’s Safety. This distinction’s practical implications are exemplified in The APJ Priti case, where a Charterer had the right to nominate “1/2 Safe Berths (SB)” at Bandar Khomeini (Iran), a Port named in the Charterparty but not warranted as Safe. The Ship sustained severe damage from a missile while en route to the Port. The Court of Appeal concluded that damages were not recoverable because the voyage to the Port did not fall under the Safe Berth (SB) Warranty, and there was no warranty, either Express or Implied, regarding the Port’s Safety. As Bingham LJ stated, “I do not accept that the Ship’s passage to and from a Nominated Berth should be treated as including any part of the voyage to and from the Port. It would only include movement within the Port to and from a Nominated Berth.”
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Frustration of Charterparty
Lord Radcliffe noted, “Frustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that without default of either party, a Contractual Obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract.” Non Haec in Foedera Veni (This is not what I promised to do).
Tracing back to its 19th century origins, the Doctrine of Frustration was initially justified on the basis of a term to be Implied to reflect the presumed intention of the parties. However, in more recent years, it has evolved to focus more on the interpretation of the terms of the Charterparty. It is noted that the Implied Term theory, while never serving as the basis for a court’s decision, has been used as a theoretical explanation. A more commonly accepted perspective is that of Lord Wright, who stated, “the court decides the issue and decides it Ex Post Facto based on the actual circumstances of the case. The data for decision are, on the one hand, the terms and construction of the Charterparty, interpreted in light of the existing circumstances at that time, and on the other hand, the events that have occurred. It is up to the court to determine the true position between the parties.”
In practice, while the doctrine can apply to all forms of sea carriage contracts, it is most often associated with Charterparty disputes in decided cases.
Types of Frustration of Charterparty:
- Impossibility of Performance
- Supervening Illegality
- Excessive Delay
In the realm of Charterparties, Frustration can manifest in several ways, including Impossibility of Performance, Supervening Illegality, or Excessive Delay. The determination of Frustration in each instance is a nuanced mix of Fact and Law. While ultimately, deciding whether a Charterparty has been Frustrated is a legal question, this decision must be made after evaluating the pertinent Facts. Consequently, while the invocation of the Doctrine of Frustration is a legal matter, determining whether a delay is extensive enough to qualify as Frustration involves factual assessment.
This distinction gains particular significance in judicial reviews of Arbitration Awards, where courts typically refrain from overturning an Arbitrator’s findings on factual grounds. In a recent judgment on this topic, Lord Roskill stated, “For the future, I believe that in cases otherwise suitable for appeal, the courts should only intervene with Arbitrators’ conclusions on issues such as those arising in Frustration cases in reasoned awards if they are demonstrated to have erred in Law by not applying the correct legal test or if, despite purportedly applying the correct legal test, they have reached a conclusion that no reasonable person could have arrived at, based on the Facts they have determined.”
Impossibility of Performance
The clearest instance of Frustration due to impossibility of performance occurs when a chartered ship is either Actually Lost or declared a Constructive Total Loss (CTL). Often, Time Charterparties include an Express Clause stipulating that Ship Hire paid in advance but unearned must be returned in such events. Conversely, the destruction of cargo that a Charterer intends to ship rarely leads to Frustration of the Charterparty. This is because the Charterer is typically seen as having an absolute obligation to provide a cargo. The only scenario in which a Charterer might be excused is when the contract is interpreted to mean an agreement to load a specific cargo, and that cargo is destroyed through no fault of the Charterer before loading begins. A similar outcome might occur if a ship is chartered to transport a specific commodity, and its export subsequently becomes prohibited by government decree.
Supervening Illegality
A Charterparty will also be Frustrated when changes in the Law make further performance illegal. This presupposes that the Shipowner and Charterer enter into a Charterparty believing that they can legally fulfill their obligations. If this foundational assumption fails, they are relieved from further duties under the contract. It seems irrelevant whether the illegality arises from modifications in English law or the laws of a foreign country where the performance is supposed to occur. Frustration also happens if the onset of war makes continuing the contract’s performance illegal. This could occur if a ship is owned or chartered by an individual who becomes an enemy alien, or if executing the Charterparty requires interactions with individuals in enemy-occupied territories. Under such conditions, the supervening illegality leads to an automatic termination of the contract, regardless of its specific terms or the initial intentions of the Shipowner and Charterer.
Excessive Delay
When the performance of a contract is postponed due to an event or change in circumstances, the Charterparty may become Frustrated if the resultant delay is so extended that it undermines the purpose for which the Shipowner and Charterer entered into the Charterparty. The determination of whether this criterion is met depends on the specifics of each case, though typically, a shorter delay might suffice to frustrate a Voyage Charterparty compared to what might be necessary to terminate a Time Charterparty. In the case of Jackson v Union Marine, the Shipowner agreed to pick up cargo at Newport (UK) promptly, with the understanding that “dangers and accidents of navigation excepted.” However, when the ship grounded in Caernarvon Bay on its way to Newport (UK) and sustained damage requiring six months to repair, all further liabilities under the Charterparty were nullified despite the Exception Clause. The court believed that the Shipowner and Charterer did not intend for this Exception Clause to account for such a significant alteration in the contract’s nature. It seems irrelevant whether the pertinent event occurs before the performance has started or after the Charterparty has been partially fulfilled, as long as its impact serves to Frustrate the intentions of the Shipowner and Charterer in entering the contract. A Frustrating event can manifest in various forms, such as the time needed to complete repairs following a collision, detention by a foreign government, or ongoing strikes.
From a review of decided cases, the most common cause of delay stems from the requisitioning of ships during emergencies or the trapping of ships at the onset of hostilities. In cases of requisitioning, the decision to claim Frustration often depends on the compensation offered by the government. If the compensation exceeds the Ship Hire Rate under a Time Charterparty, the Shipowner is likely to allege Charterparty Frustration. Conversely, if the compensation is lower, the Shipowner may not claim Frustration.
In the case of Tamplin SS Co v Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co, a tanker was chartered for five years to transport oil as directed by the Charterers. With three years remaining on the Charterparty, the tanker was requisitioned by the Admiralty, leading the Shipowner to claim that the Charterparty was discharged. However, the Charterer was willing to continue paying Freight and argued that the foundation of the Charterparty had not vanished since no specific commercial venture was contemplated. This perspective was upheld by the majority in the Appeal Court, possibly influenced by the notion that the Shipowner was seeking to evade the Charterparty to secure higher compensation from the Admiralty. Lord Finlay later noted that the legal principles expressed by the majority and the dissentients were the same, but they differed in applying these principles to the facts at hand.
A contrasting decision occurred in the Bank Line v Capel case, where a Charterer had chartered a ship for a year, but the ship was requisitioned by the government before delivery. Here, the Lords ruled that the Charterparty had been Frustrated, even though the ship was released after only three months. Lord Sumner noted that the short duration of the requisition was irrelevant because the initial expectation was that the requisition would last indefinitely, thus altering the entire nature of the charter.
Additional examples of delays leading to Frustration include numerous instances where ships were trapped unexpectedly by the outbreak of hostilities. Notably, a surge of litigation followed the closure of the Shatt al Arab in 1980 when the Iran-Iraq War began.
Whether an intervening event results in a delay significant enough to Frustrate the commercial purpose of the Charterparty must be determined based on the specific facts of each case. For Time Charterparties, this decision is typically made by comparing the duration of the interruption or delay to the total length of the Charterparty. This assessment is objective and must be made without the benefit of hindsight. As stated by Bailhache J, “the parties (Shipowner or Charterer) must have the right to claim that the Charterparty is terminated by Frustration as soon as the event upon which the claim is based occurs. The question then is what estimate would a reasonable businessperson make of the likely duration of the ship’s withdrawal from service, based on the information available to him at that time, including the cause of the withdrawal. It will be immaterial whether his prediction is later proven right or wrong by subsequent events.”
Therefore, in the Bank Line v Capel case, it was irrelevant that by the time the case went to trial, the requisition had only lasted three months. The determination of Frustration had to be based on the information available when the requisition started. Rights should not be left uncertain or dependent on future outcomes. A Charterparty either binds or it does not, and the law should allow the Shipowner and Charterer to ascertain their position immediately. What occurs later might help reveal what the real probabilities were if they had been reasonably predicted, but when the causes of Frustration have lasted so long or occurred under such conditions as to imply an unreasonable delay, the time to decide the fate of the Charterparty has come.
Burden of Proof in Charterparty Frustration
The burden of proving Frustration rests with the party alleging it. They must convince the court that an intervening event has made the performance of the Charterparty either impossible or fundamentally different from what was agreed upon at the contract’s inception. In evaluating the evidence presented, the court must consider several factors.
To establish Charterparty Frustration, it must be demonstrated that performance has become impossible or so fundamentally altered that enforcing the original terms of the Charterparty would be unjust to the Shipowner or Charterer. It is not mere hardship, inconvenience, or material loss that activates the principle of Frustration. There must also be a change so significant that the duty, if fulfilled, would differ substantially from what was originally contracted. For instance, in the case of Tsakiroglou v Noblee Thor, sellers were obligated to deliver Sudanese groundnuts CIF (Cost Insurance Freight) to Hamburg. Following the Charterparty agreement, hostilities in Egypt led to the closure of the Suez Canal. The only viable alternative for the seller was to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope (COGH) at significantly higher Freight Rates, leading them to claim Frustration. However, the Lords dismissed this claim, determining that although more costly, shipping via the Cape of Good Hope (COGH) was not commercially or fundamentally different from the intended route. Similar judgments have been upheld in cases where ships were Voyage Chartered and Time Chartered. Therefore, Frustration is likely to be considered only when a specific route specified in the contract becomes impassable or when the ship carries perishable cargo that might not withstand an alternative route.
Express Provision in the Charterparty
Originally, the Doctrine of Frustration was triggered by an unforeseen event that significantly altered the obligations outlined in the Charterparty. Initially, if a specific event was predictable and not addressed in the Charterparty, it was assumed that the Shipowner and Charterer had intended to establish an Absolute Obligation. However, subsequent cases have indicated that this presumption may be incorrect, and Frustration is generally not excluded unless the Charterparty explicitly covers the event in its Express Terms. For example, in the Tatem v Gamboa case, the Charterparty was deemed Frustrated when a ship chartered to evacuate refugees during the Spanish Civil War was seized by Nationalists, even though such a seizure was foreseeable.
Moreover, even when an Express Clause in the Charterparty covers a particular event, courts typically interpret these clauses stringently. This approach resembles the Contra Proferentem rule used in interpreting clauses that seek to exclude liability for a fundamental breach.
In the Jackson v Union Marine case, the Charterparty was found Frustrated when the ship ran aground, despite a clause excluding “Dangers and Accidents of Navigation.” The court reasoned that the Shipowner and Charterer did not intend for this clause to apply to such a significant alteration in the nature of the Charterparty. Similarly, in the Bank Line v Capel case, the House of Lords allowed the Shipowner to successfully claim Frustration, even though an Express Clause gave the Charterer, but not the Shipowner, the option to cancel if the ship “be commandeered by Government during this charter.” Lord Haldane expressed that when a Charterparty’s performance depends on the continued availability of the subject matter, and this availability unexpectedly ceases due to circumstances beyond the Shipowner’s control, the Shipowner is not bound unless it is explicitly stated that they have agreed to such terms. In this instance, Lord Haldane found no evidence of such an intention.
Self-induced Frustration of Charterparty
When the event alleged to have disrupted the performance of a Charterparty stems from the actions or decisions of one party, that individual cannot use their own fault as a defense under the Charterparty. For example, in the Maritime National Fish v Ocean Trawlers case, the Charterer had leased a fishing trawler knowing it required an otter trawl, which could not be used without a license from the Newfoundland (Canada) government. The Charterer, who operated four other ships with otter trawls, applied for five licenses but received only three. These were allocated to the other ships, and the Charterer then claimed that this particular charter was Frustrated due to the illegality of operating the trawler without a license. The Privy Council dismissed this claim on the grounds that the Frustration was self-induced, resulting from a conscious choice by the Charterer.
The responsibility to prove that Frustration is self-induced falls on the party asserting it, and there is some ambiguity regarding the scope of this concept. Clearly, a party cannot claim Frustration if the situation arose from a breach of the Charterparty on their part. For instance, if further performance of a Charterparty becomes impossible due to a breach of the Safe Port (SP) Warranty or the obligation of Seaworthiness, the defense of Frustration is not available to the party at fault. The same principle applies if the intervening event is due to Negligent Conduct, such as significant ship damage resulting from negligent actions by the Shipowner or crew members. However, it has been noted that self-induced Frustration involves a deliberate choice, and mere negligence might not suffice. Lord Russell highlighted that such cases “can range from the criminality of the scuttler who opens the sea-cocks and sinks his ship, to the thoughtlessness of a prima donna who sits in a draught and loses her voice. I wish to guard against the assumption that every destruction of corpus for which a contractor can be said, to some extent or in some sense, to be responsible, necessarily implies that the resultant Frustration is self-induced within the meaning of the phrase.”
3- Understanding Time Charterparty
The terms of a Time Charterparty differ considerably from those of a Voyage Charterparty due to their distinct functions. In a Time Charter, the Shipowner provides the ship for a specified period, during which the Time Charterer has the flexibility to use the ship for their own purposes within the agreed contractual framework. The Time Charterer, who manages the ship’s commercial operations, is responsible for the related costs and must indemnify the Shipowner against any liabilities arising from following the Time Charterer’s commercial directives. Although various Standard Time Charterparty Forms exist, they typically include certain Core Clauses.
The operational efficiency of the chartered ship is vital for the Time Charterer, as the success of the commercial venture relies heavily on this factor. Consequently, the Preamble of the Time Charterparty details the ship’s specifications, such as Speed, Loading Capacity (DWCC), and Bunker Consumption. The legal implications of these specifications and the remedies available for any inaccuracies vary. New York Arbitrators often treat specifications related to Ship Speed and Bunker Consumption as Continuing Warranties, implying that the ship is expected to maintain these capabilities throughout the Time Charter period. Conversely, English courts view these specifications merely as Warranties, which pertain to the ship’s condition upon delivery under the Time Charter. If these Warranties are breached, the usual Damages would be the difference between the market rate of Ship Hire for a ship that meets the specifications and the actual chartered ship. For a breach of the Ship Speed Warranty, an alternative remedy could be to designate the ship as Off-hire for the duration required.
A Clause in the Time Charterparty usually specifies the exact length of the Time Charter Period, which may be defined in days, months, or years. However, it is understood that the precise timing for a ship’s operations under a Time Charterparty cannot be perfectly aligned so that the ship arrives at the designated port for Redelivery exactly on the termination date. As a result, the ship may arrive Too Early (Underlap) or Too Late (Overlap), potentially causing disputes, particularly during periods of fluctuating Ship Charter Rates. Courts recognize this issue and generally allow a Margin of Tolerance (around 5%) around the stated duration unless explicitly addressed by the parties. If the Time Charterer returns the ship after the Time Charter Period but within the permitted Overlap, they must compensate at the usual Time Charter Rate. If the return exceeds the Overlap Allowance, it constitutes a Breach of the Time Charterparty, making the Time Charterer liable for Damages based on the current market Ship Hire Rates.
Ship Hire is payable for the entire Time Charter Period, irrespective of whether the Time Charterer uses the ship. On the other hand, an Off-hire Clause is commonly included to ensure that no Ship Hire is due when the ship is not fully available to the Time Charterer due to an accident or a deficiency for which the Shipowner is responsible. The Off-hire Clause details specific situations when the ship will be considered Off-hire, activating the clause simply upon the occurrence of the event, without needing to prove fault on the part of the Shipowner.
If the Off-hire Clause is activated, the Time Charterer is entitled to a reduction in Ship Hire to compensate for the time the ship was unavailable. Many Off-hire Clauses explicitly permit the Time Charterer to deduct the calculated amount from the subsequent Ship Hire payment. Even in the absence of explicit terms, courts generally allow such deductions from Ship Hire, provided they are made in good faith and based on reasonable grounds.
Ship Hire is the fee charged for using the ship, typically calculated as a fixed daily rate over a specified period, such as 30 days or a calendar month. Ship Hire is generally paid in advance, either monthly or semi-monthly. When ships are Time Chartered for extended periods, they face risks like currency fluctuations, changes in the shipping market, and the effects of inflation on operational costs incurred by the Shipowner. As a result, Shipowners and Time Charterers often include specific provisions in the Time Charterparty to address these risks. This usually involves a Currency Clause that fixes an exchange rate between the payment currency and another relevant currency, and an Escalator Clause that allows for periodic adjustments to the Ship Hire Rate based on predefined economic factors.
Under Common Law, time is generally not considered of the essence in Time Charters, meaning that a Shipowner cannot cancel the Time Charterparty for late payment of Ship Hire unless the delay undermines the purpose of the charter. Consequently, it’s common to include a specific clause in the Time Charterparty that grants the Shipowner the right to withdraw the ship in case of payment default. Initially designed to address non-compliance or recover the ship from a potentially bankrupt Time Charterer, this clause is now also used to take advantage of fluctuations in market Ship Hire rates. Ships are frequently withdrawn immediately upon payment default and then offered to the same Time Charterers at the higher prevailing market rates. Courts have interpreted these Withdrawal Clauses strictly and typically do not provide equitable relief to Time Charterers facing forfeiture. To mitigate this, an Anti-Technicality Clause can be added to the Time Charterparty, requiring the Shipowner to give a specified notice period before exercising the right to withdraw the ship.
Most Time Charterparties include a clause that grants the Time Charterer full use of the ship within agreed limits and requires the Ship Master to comply with the Time Charterer’s orders. The Time Charterer’s trading activities are defined by agreement and can specify types of cargo and geographic trading limits. It is typically required that the Time Charterer only use the ship between Safe Ports (SP) and Safe Berths (SB). A significant right given to the Time Charterer is the ability to issue Bills of Lading (B/L) which the Ship Master must sign upon request, even if the terms differ markedly from those of the Charterparty. As the Ship Master acts as the Shipowner’s agent when signing these Bills of Lading (B/L), the terms are enforceable against the Shipowner by any good-faith Indorsee of the Bill of Lading (B/L). The Shipowner is not protected from claims arising from cargo damage unless due to the Shipowner’s or Ship Managers’ lack of diligence in maintaining the ship’s seaworthiness or other personal acts or defaults. Without a proper incorporation Clause in the Bill of Lading (B/L), terms in the Time Charterparty binding the Shipowner and Time Charterer remain exclusive to their agreement.
Description of the Ship in Time Charterparty
Since the Time Charterer manages the ship’s Commercial Operation and is required to pay Ship Hire at a Fixed Rate throughout the Time Charter Period, the profitability of the operation largely depends on the ship’s characteristics and performance. Consequently, Standard Time Charterparty Forms typically start with a Preamble that provides a detailed description of the ship, including Ship Name, Flag, Ownership, Class, Gross Tonnage (GT), Net Tonnage (NT), Cargo Capacity (DWCC – Deadweight Cargo Capacity), Ship Speed, and Bunker Consumption. The venture’s success often relies on the accuracy of these details, as the Time Charterer is primarily responsible for ensuring the ship’s efficient performance. Therefore, it is crucial for the Time Charterer to obtain a comprehensive Ship Description and, if needed, arrange for a survey by qualified professionals. However, the Shipowner’s reputation often serves as a more reliable benchmark.
Although any part of the Ship Description could be critical in specific situations, such as the Ship’s Flag during wartime, most disputes tend to focus on Cargo Capacity (DWCC – Deadweight Cargo Capacity), Ship Speed, and Bunker Consumption. To minimize conflicts over minor discrepancies, these specifications are often qualified with terms like “About” or similar, allowing for a tolerance of approximately 5%. Additionally, when Ship Speed is mentioned, it is standard to include a clause such as “in good weather conditions,” which allows Arbitrators to disregard measurements taken on days with winds stronger than force 4 or 5 on the Beaufort Scale.
Specifications in a Time Charterparty are intended to be contractually binding, providing assurances from the Shipowner about the ship’s performance. However, their exact legal significance is still debated. The question is whether these specifications merely describe the ship’s capabilities at the time the Time Charterparty is signed or if they represent contractual commitments that the ship will maintain these capabilities throughout the Time Charter period, or at least up until Delivery to the Time Charterer.
In New York, statements about Ship Speed and Bunker Consumption are generally viewed as Continuing Warranties, requiring the ship to maintain these capabilities throughout the Time Charter period. Conversely, British courts have historically taken a narrower approach. For example, in the late 19th century, the Court of Appeal determined that a statement regarding a ship’s Classification was not a Continuing Warranty but only relevant at the time the Time Charterparty was executed. Recent judgments have softened this view somewhat. In the Cosmos Bulk Transport Inc v China National Foreign Trade Transportation Co case, Judge Mocatta J ruled that a Ship Speed Warranty pertains to the ship’s performance at the date of Ship Delivery under the Time Charterparty.
In this case, while the ship met the warranted Speed when the Time Charterparty was signed, its performance later declined due to mollusc encrustation on the hull while at a tropical port finishing a prior charter. Judge Mocatta J held the Shipowners accountable for the breach, asserting that “commercial considerations require that the description of the ship’s speed applies as of the date of the Ship’s Delivery, regardless of its condition at the Time Charterparty’s signing.” He extended similar reasoning to Bunker Consumption and Cargo Capacity (DWCC – Deadweight Cargo Capacity), distinguishing these from earlier cases related to Ship Classification Warranties. He reasoned that changes in Ship Classification, which are beyond the control of both parties, mean that the Shipowner should only be responsible for the accuracy of such statements at the time they were made.
The Shipowner is not generally required to guarantee the continuous accuracy of specifications throughout the Time Charter Period, though some Tanker Time Charterparty Forms may include such guarantees explicitly. Normally, unless the Shipowner undertakes actions like selling the ship—which could alter Ship Ownership and potentially the Ship Flag—specifications such as Ship Speed and Bunker Consumption are expected to remain consistent from the signing of the Time Charterparty to the ship’s Delivery.
The Time Charterer bears the responsibility of proving any non-compliance with these specifications, which can be difficult. A serious breach might allow the Time Charterer to terminate the Time Charterparty, but more frequently, the Time Charterer is restricted to seeking damages for the ship’s failure to meet the specified standards. Under contract law, damages are typically calculated by comparing the market charter rates for a ship that meets the specifications with the rate for the ship as delivered. This method can be complex in practice and may result in only nominal damages.
In the Cosmos Bulk Transport case, the court adopted a different approach for breaches of Ship Speed Warranty, permitting the Time Charterer to classify the ship as Off-hire for any additional time required on the voyage due to the breach.
Other provisions in the Time Charterparty may offer alternative remedies for discrepancies in the ship’s description. For instance, many Time Charterparties include a clause requiring “All Voyages with the Utmost Dispatch,” which can address issues with Ship Speed. Additionally, an Off-hire Clause might account for reductions in Ship Speed due to “defects in or breakdowns of any part of her hull, machinery, or equipment.” The New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) Form also provides a remedy for cases where bottom fouling affects the ship’s speed, permitting the Time Charterer to request that the ship be cleaned at the Shipowner’s expense.
Period of Ship Hire
A dedicated clause in the Time Charterparty will specify the duration of the Time Charter Period, which can be defined in terms of days, months, or years, or a combination of these. It is also becoming common for the Time Charter Period to be determined by the time required for a particular voyage or a round trip between named ports. Practically, Trip Time Charters (TCT) are handled like standard Time Charters, although the Time Charterer will be in breach if the ship is not sent on the agreed voyage.
However, it is recognized that precise scheduling to ensure the ship arrives at the Redelivery Port exactly on the termination date of the Time Charter is not always possible. Issues often arise when planning the final voyage under the Time Charterparty, particularly with whether it will result in an Underlap (finishing early) or Overlap (finishing late) relative to the designated time limit. The Time Charterer’s aim is to generate revenue, either through operating the ship in the Liner Trade or more commonly by sub-chartering it for specific voyages. The goal is to arrange voyages that maximize the ship’s profitability while ensuring its timely return to the Redelivery Port. Disputes are common during periods of fluctuating Ship Hire Rates, and are further complicated by varying Overlap Clause wording. When Ship Charter Rates are high, the Time Charterer will seek to maximize every moment of the Time Charter Period, while the Shipowner will want to regain control of the ship. When Ship Charter Rates drop, the situation reverses. Time Charterparties include clauses to manage these scenarios, and it is important to first evaluate the accuracy of the specified time limit and then the Ship Charter Rate applicable during any Overlap Period.
When a Time Charterparty specifies a fixed duration, such as “eight months” or “three years,” without further qualifications, courts typically interpret time as not being of the essence. They often allow for a reasonable Margin of Error, generally around 4% to 5%. Conversely, New York Arbitrators use the “Overlap/Underlap Rule” to determine if the Time Charterer can dispatch the ship on a final voyage under the Time Charterparty. According to this rule, the Time Charterer may opt for either an Underlap (finishing early) or Overlap (finishing late) to bring the Ship Redelivery as close as possible to the end of the Time Charter Period.
Including terms like “About” before the Time Charter Period, as seen in the New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) Form, acknowledges this reasonable allowance. Many Time Charterparties feature an Express Clause specifying acceptable leeway, such as “a period of 8 months, 15 days more or less at the Time Charterer’s Option” or “minimum 8/maximum 10 months.” These clauses define the maximum allowable flexibility, and Redelivery outside these bounds would be considered a breach. Additionally, estimates such as “duration about 17/18 months without guarantee” offer further flexibility, with liability for exceeding the 18 months depending on whether the initial estimate was made in good faith and based on reasonable grounds.
The Shipowner and Time Charterer can either explicitly or implicitly make time a critical element of the Time Charterparty. For instance, in the case of Watson v Merryweather, the Time Charterparty specified “Redelivery to Shipowners between 15 and 31 October,” which led to the conclusion that time was of the essence. Therefore, failing to Redeliver the ship by 31 October was deemed a breach of the Time Charterparty. Similarly, the absence of the term “About” before the Time Charter Period in the New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) Form implies that time is a critical factor.
If the ship is returned to the Shipowner before the end of the agreed minimum period, the Time Charterer generally does not receive a refund and is still required to pay the Full Ship Hire for the entire Time Charter Period. If such early Ship Redelivery is deemed a breach of the Time Charterparty, the Shipowner might need to mitigate losses by attempting to rehire the ship if commercially viable within the remaining Time Charter Period. However, this strategy can be risky, as demonstrated in the case of The Zenovia. In this case, the latest allowable Ship Redelivery Date was 22 November. However, as the Time Charter approached its end, the Shipowner received around 30 days’ notice of Redelivery, initially set for 6 November. Due to the swift completion of the Final Voyage and increasing Ship Charter Rates, an Additional Voyage was feasible before the Time Charter concluded. Consequently, the Time Charterer adjusted the Ship Redelivery Date to “About 20 November.” The Shipowner, who had already arranged a new Fixture based on the original earlier Redelivery Date, challenged the Time Charterer’s right to change the date and withdrew the ship from the Time Charter on 2 November. Judge Tomlinson determined that the Shipowner was liable for Damages due to wrongful repudiation of the Time Charterparty. He found no grounds to imply a term that the Time Charterer would avoid actions that might delay the earlier Ship Redelivery Date and did not find a sufficiently clear and unequivocal promise to establish an Estoppel.
In cases of Overlap, the Time Charterer’s liability depends on whether they are in breach of the Time Charterparty. If Ship Redelivery occurs within the allowed tolerance period and the Time Charterer is not in breach, they will be required to pay for the additional time at the standard Time Charter Rate. If Ship Redelivery occurs beyond this period, damages will be calculated based on the current market Ship Charter Rate.
Recently, courts have applied the Legitimate Final Voyage Test to determine if a Time Charterer has breached the Time Charterparty. According to this test, the Time Charterer is not in breach if, when dispatching the ship on its Final Voyage, it was reasonable to expect that the voyage could be completed within the Time Charter Period plus any allowable extension. The validity of the Final Voyage is assessed based on the circumstances at the time of departure, rather than when the voyage was ordered.
Even if the Final Voyage is deemed legitimate, the Time Charterer must still ensure timely redelivery of the ship. If unforeseen events prevent this, the Time Charterer will be held liable for Breach of the Time Charterparty, even if the delay is due to factors beyond their control. In such situations, the Time Charterer must continue paying Ship Hire at the agreed Charter Rate until redelivery and may also owe Damages if the Market Charter Rate exceeds the agreed rate during the excess period.
Certain Time Charterparty Clauses may relieve the Time Charterer from this liability by requiring the Shipowner to complete a Legitimate Final Voyage without responsibility for late delivery, provided the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the Time Charterer’s control. These Clauses do not typically allow for requiring the Shipowner to undertake an illegitimate Final Voyage unless explicitly specified. For instance, the Shelltime (Clause 18) form includes a provision: “Notwithstanding the stated charter period, should the ship be upon a voyage at the expiry of the period of this charter, charterers shall have the use of this ship at the same rate and conditions for such extended time as may be necessary for the completion of the round voyage on which she is engaged.”
In The World Symphony case, the Court of Appeal determined that the clause allowing the Time Charterer to order a Final Voyage, even if it extends beyond the specified Time Charter Period, takes precedence over the Time Charter Period clause. This means that during such a Final Voyage, the Time Charterer is entitled to use the ship at the normal Time Charter Hire Rate, despite any delay beyond the originally stipulated redelivery time.
In contrast, Lord Denning MR in The Dione case articulated a different stance. If the Time Charterer dispatches the ship on an Illegitimate Final Voyage—one that cannot reasonably be completed within the Time Charter Period—the Shipowner has the right to refuse this direction and request alternative instructions for a Legitimate Final Voyage. Should the Time Charterer fail to provide these alternative instructions, the Shipowner may consider it a fundamental Breach of the Time Charterparty, arrange a new charter, and seek Damages. If the Shipowner proceeds with the Illegitimate Final Voyage, they are entitled to receive payment for the Excess Period at the Current Market Charter Rate if it exceeds the agreed Charter Rate. In The Dione case, where the charter was for “6 months, 20 days more or less at the Time Charterer’s option,” the Time Charterer’s Final Voyage extended beyond the expected redelivery date of 28 September, with actual redelivery occurring on 7 October. Consequently, the Time Charterer was held liable to pay hire at the Time Charterparty Rate up to 28 September and at the Market Rate for the period thereafter.
When determining Damages for a Breach of the Time Charterparty, the applicable Market Ship Hire Rate should reflect the current rate for a Time Charter of Equivalent Length to the breached charter, rather than the rate for a theoretical Voyage Charter related to the Illegitimate Final Voyage. In The Johnny case, where a ship was chartered under a Baltime Time Charterparty Form for a “minimum 11/maximum 13 months” term that expired on 7 November 1974, the ship was sent on a Final Voyage to Karachi, Pakistan, on 19 September. This resulted in the ship being Redelivered 29 days late. The court ruled that the appropriate Market Hire Rate for the additional 29 days should be based on the Current Hire Rate for an 11/13-month Time Charter, rather than the rate for a Voyage Charter to Karachi, as the Shipowner had contended.
Ship Off-hire Clause
Standard Time Charterparty Forms generally include an Off-Hire Clause, which stipulates that the Time Charterer does not owe Ship Hire during periods when the ship is unavailable for use due to issues within the Shipowner’s responsibility. The specific conditions that lead to a ship being Off-hire and the duration for which Ship Hire is suspended vary depending on the wording of the Off-Hire Clause in each Time Charterparty form. For instance, the Baltime Time Charterparty Form (Clause 11A) states:
“In the event of drydocking or other necessary measures to maintain the efficiency of the ship, deficiency of men or owner’s stores, breakdown of machinery, damage to the hull, or other accident that hinders or prevents the working of the ship for more than twenty-four consecutive hours, no hire shall be payable for the time lost during the period the ship cannot perform the required service. Any hire paid in advance will be adjusted accordingly.”
Typically, the Off-Hire Clause will list the range of events that can cause a ship to be Off-hire. Sometimes, there may be multiple smaller Off-Hire Clauses covering specific issues, such as Ship Speed Deficiency or Drydocking, scattered throughout the Time Charterparty. This can lead to inconsistencies or contradictions unless these clauses are clearly cross-referenced to the main Off-Hire Clause. The Standard Off-Hire Clause is activated by the occurrence of one of the listed events, irrespective of any fault by the Shipowner.
Off-hire Clauses, being No Fault Clauses, are interpreted strictly by courts, and the Time Charterer must clearly demonstrate their entitlement to a suspension of Ship Hire. As Judge Bucknill LJ observed, “I think he must bring himself clearly within the exceptions. If there is a doubt as to what the words mean, then I think those words must be read in favor of the Shipowners because the Time Charterer is attempting to limit the Shipowners’ right to Hire.” The Off-hire Clause is not impacted by Exception Clauses or Force Majeure Clauses in the Time Charterparty. However, other clauses may specifically exclude the Off-hire Clause in certain situations, such as if the event causing the off-hire is due to the Time Charterer’s negligence. There is also some authority suggesting that the Off-hire Clause may not apply if the event causing the off-hire results from the Time Charterer’s breach of the Time Charterparty. Even if the ship goes Off-hire due to such a breach, the Shipowner might still seek damages for the loss of Ship Hire.
The Standard Off-hire Clause typically ends with the phrase, “or by any other cause preventing the full working of the ship.” This phrase generally covers only causes that directly affect the ship’s operational efficiency and excludes external delays not related to the ship’s physical condition or crew. For example, delays caused by blockages in the La Plata River or by a ship being overloaded for Panama Canal entry are not covered by the Off-hire Clause. Conversely, delays in obtaining Free Pratique due to health concerns about a crew member are considered closely related to the ship’s performance and thus qualify as Off-hire. The term “any other cause” is not generally interpreted under the Eiusdem Generis Rule, as it is often difficult to isolate a distinct category from the listed items. When the Off-hire Clause is modified to include “any other cause whatsoever,” the Eiusdem Generis Rule does not apply. Typically, the clause covers unforeseen events rather than those naturally resulting from the ship’s usage.
Typically, the Time Charterer cannot invoke the Off-hire Clause unless the ship is rendered unusable due to one of the specific events listed in the clause. For example, if an engine breakdown occurs at sea, it may render the ship Off-hire. However, if the same breakdown happens while the ship is discharging cargo in port and the ship remains functional for that task, it would not affect the Off-hire status. Likewise, if the Shipowner installs new equipment at the Time Charterer’s request while the ship is waiting for a Berth, the Off-hire Clause does not apply, as the Time Charterer still has access to the ship. The impact of the Off-hire Clause depends on its exact wording, and the courts’ strict interpretation can result in very different outcomes, even for clauses that seem similar.
The majority of Standard Off-Hire Clauses fall into one of two distinct categories:
- Period Clause
- Net Loss of Time Clause
A Period Clause defines the specific timeframe during which Ship Hire is suspended due to certain events. For example, if events such as crew shortages or drydocking trigger the Off-hire Clause, Ship Hire is suspended until the ship is fully restored to operational efficiency and can perform the required service. A partial restoration of the ship’s efficiency generally does not end the suspension. This type of Clause is relatively easy to apply as long as the events listed are clearly identifiable. For instance, in a situation where defective loading equipment caused time loss, it was ruled that the Period Clause applied for the entire duration the Time Charterers were deprived of using the equipment, irrespective of whether loading was delayed by strikes, adverse weather, or cargo issues.
In contrast, a Net Loss of Time Clause simply states that Ship Hire is not payable for the time lost due to specified events. As described in the Baltime Time Charterparty Form (Clause 11A): “no hire to be paid in respect of any time lost thereby during the period in which the ship is unable to perform the service immediately required.”
At first glance, this wording suggests that Ship Hire is not suspended solely due to the occurrence of a specified event but only if, and to the extent that, time is lost as a result. This distinction is crucial in cases where a ship remains partially efficient, such as when only one of several loading cranes breaks down or when there is a Ship Speed Deficiency.
With a Period Clause, the obligation to pay Ship Hire resumes once the ship is fully operational and the Time Charterer can use it as intended. Therefore, if a ship has to deviate for repairs, the Time Charterer will bear the costs associated with making up for lost time after repairs are completed, unless the Time Charterparty specifies otherwise. A similar outcome is observed under English Law with the Net Time Lost type of Off-hire Clause. Despite this clause including “Any Time Lost” as a result of the specified event, recent cases indicate a broader principle: time lost is not deducted once the ship’s full operational efficiency is restored.
In The Marika M case, the court determined that the Time Charterer could not deduct time lost while waiting for a berth after the ship, which had previously gone Off-hire due to running aground, was refloated. This delay was considered a direct consequence of the grounding. Specific terms addressing such scenarios can be included in the Off-hire Clause itself. For example, the Intertanktime 80 Time Charterparty Form (Clause 20) specifies: “Ship Hire shall cease to be payable from the commencement of such deviation for repairs until the time when the vessel is again ready to resume her service from a position not less favourable to Time Charterers than that at which the deviation commenced.”
Off-hire Clauses often include a De Minimis Provision, which becomes effective only after 24 or 48 hours have passed since the specified event. Once this period has elapsed, all lost time, including the initial 24 or 48 hours, is considered. Despite the suspension of Ship Hire payments during the Off-hire period, the Time Charterer remains responsible for other obligations under the Time Charterparty, such as paying for fuel, port services, or crew overtime during this time.
Sometimes, the Off-hire Clause may offer the Time Charterer the option to extend the Time Charter by an equivalent period. However, this option can be unfavorable to Shipowners, especially in a rising Charter Rates market or if a subsequent charter has already been arranged. Therefore, it is more typical for the Off-hire Period to be counted as part of the original Time Charter Term. If the Off-hire event results from a breach of the Shipowner’s warranty or other acts not covered by exceptions, the Time Charterer may also be entitled to claim damages in addition to suspending Ship Hire payments.
Payment for Ship Hire
An Express Clause in a Time Charterparty usually outlines the timing, location, and frequency of Ship Hire payments, specifying the currency in which these payments are to be made. Ship Hire amounts are typically set at a fixed rate for a defined period, which can range from 24 hours to 30 days or a calendar month. Instalments of Ship Hire are often scheduled to be paid monthly or semi-monthly. Given the extended duration of these payments, they are particularly vulnerable to inflation and fluctuations in currency value.
To address these risks, Time Charterparties often include Currency Clauses to establish a fixed exchange rate between the payment currency and other relevant currencies. Additionally, an Escalator Clause may be included to adjust the Ship Hire Rate in response to increases in ship Operating Costs. For example, the Baltime Time Charterparty Form (1939 – Clause 6) provides:
“Time Charterers to pay as hire per 30 days, commencing in accordance with Clause 1 until the Redelivery to the Shipowners. Payment of Ship Hire to be made in cash without discount, every 30 days, in advance.”
Typically, a Time Charterparty stipulates that Ship Hire must be paid in cash. In The Brimnes case, Judge Brandon commented that “these words must be interpreted against the background of modern commercial practice. So interpreted, it seems to me that they cannot mean only payment in dollar bills or other legal tender of the US. They must have a wider meaning, comprehending any commercially recognised method of transferring funds, the result of which is to give the transferee the unconditional right to the immediate use of the funds transferred.” This implies that banker’s drafts and payment slips are generally accepted as equivalent to cash. However, there is some debate over whether Payment Orders under the London Currency Settlement Scheme are considered equivalent to cash. Although Payment Orders are viewed as equivalent to cash in the banking sector, a customer cannot access the funds until the document has been processed.
Conversely, Judge Lloyd in The Afovos case held that payment via telex transfer from one bank to another should be considered payment in cash for this purpose. Judge Lloyd reasoned that “when payment is made by telex transfer from one bank to another for the account of a customer, the payment is complete when the telex is received and tested by the receiving bank; so if the Shipowners were to inquire at their bank, they would be informed ‘yes, the money has arrived for your account.’ It is not necessary for the funds to be credited to the Shipowners’ account or for them to be able to withdraw the funds. It is sufficient that the funds have been received for the Shipowners’ account.”
This perspective contrasts sharply with the approach taken by the House of Lords in The Chikuma case. In that instance, the Ship Hire instalments had been paid into the Shipowner’s bank in Genoa on the due date, but the telex transfer included a value date that was four days later. According to Italian banking practice, this meant the funds in the Shipowner’s account did not accrue interest until the value date, and withdrawing the money would have involved paying interest. This situation effectively constituted an overdraft facility that the bank was obligated to provide. The House of Lords thus determined that such a payment did not qualify as cash.
In The Brimnes case, where both the Shipowner and Time Charterer had accounts at the same branch of the same bank, the receipt of a telex instruction from the Time Charterer to transfer the Ship Hire instalment into the Shipowner’s account did not constitute a cash payment. The payment was only considered effective once the amount had been credited to the Shipowner’s account, allowing them to access the funds.
Additionally, Ship Hire payments must be made in advance at either monthly or semi-monthly intervals. Payments are required before the performance period begins and can be made on or before the due date. If the due date falls on a Sunday or a non-banking day, the payment must be made by the preceding banking day; otherwise, the Time Charterer will be in default. However, the Time Charterer has until midnight on the due date to make the payment.
Lord Hailsham LC in The Afovos noted that “it is a general principle of law that when a person is obligated to perform an act by a specific date, they have the entire day to fulfill their duty.” Therefore, the Time Charterer is not considered in default until the end of that day, even if payment can only be made during banking hours. Griffiths LJ also emphasized that it is preferable to fix such important obligations to a specific time, like midnight, rather than depending on the varying business hours of different banks, which could lead to confusion.
In the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, the final instalment of Ship Hire due under the Time Charterparty must be paid in full, even if the ship is redelivered before the end of the charter period. Any overpayment of Ship Hire will be refunded by the Shipowner once the ship is returned.
The requirement for timely payment of Ship Hire in advance is strictly enforced, and the Time Charterer is considered in default if payment is not made by the due date, regardless of whether the delay is just a few hours or minutes. The nature of the default—whether intentional or not—is irrelevant. As long as there are no exceptional circumstances excusing the delay, failing to make the payment on time is enough to constitute default, regardless of any deliberate or negligent behavior.
Deductions from Ship Hire
The Time Charterer may have the right to adjust the Ship Hire for various reasons, such as advances for Port Disbursements (PDA) made on the Shipowner’s behalf, deductions for Off-hire Periods, allowances for Ship Speed Deficiency, failures to meet Time Charterparty Specifications, or compensation for Damage to cargo. In such instances, many Time Charterers prefer to deduct these amounts from future Ship Hire Payments rather than risk the difficulty of obtaining an Arbitration Award from an insolvent Shipowner or a single ship-owning company located in a distant country. Conversely, Shipowners generally resist any interruptions to their cash flow.
Some Time Charterparties specifically allow the Time Charterer to make deductions from future Ship Hire Payments for Port Disbursements (PDA) or Off-hire Periods. In contrast, other Time Charterparties may prohibit deductions in the event of a disputed claim or may suspend Ship Hire payments due when the ship is Off-hire.
In the absence of an Express Right to Deduct from Ship Hire specified in the Time Charterparty, British courts have traditionally been hesitant to permit self-help measures. Historically, it has been established that claims related to cargo cannot be settled through deductions from Freight, and this principle was initially extended to deductions from Ship Hire. For instance, in the Seven Seas Transportation v. Atlantic Shipping case, Judge Donaldson determined that there is no general equitable right of set-off for time lost under an Off-hire Clause. Judge Donaldson’s reasoning was based on concerns about potential disputes if the Shipowner denied liability or contested the claim amount. Exercising a deduction right in such cases could lead to the risk of the ship being Withdrawn for non-payment of Ship Hire, especially if the claim turned out to be partially or entirely unjustified.
Conversely, Judge Parker in The Teno case proposed a different approach, arguing that it would be fundamentally unfair to allow a Shipowner to collect Ship Hire for a period during which they failed to provide the contracted services. Judge Parker supported the notion of an Equitable Right of set-off, allowing the Time Charterer to make deductions from future Ship Hire Payments to account for Port Disbursements (PDA) made on the Shipowner’s behalf and for periods when the ship was Off-hire due to machinery breakdowns. Additionally, Judge Parker extended this right of set-off to both total and partial withdrawal of the ship’s use.
In The Nanfri case, the Court of Appeal tackled the divergent opinions on deductions from Ship Hire payments. The Time Charterer had deducted an amount from a Ship Hire instalment due to an earlier alleged loss of speed by the chartered vessel. Lord Denning MR distinguished Ship Hire from Freight, stating that the prohibition against deductions from Freight does not apply to Ship Hire payments under a Time Charter. He emphasized that the rules for Freight and Hire are fundamentally different and should not be applied interchangeably.
Lord Denning MR noted that a clear distinction must be made between defensive rights of set-off and cross-claims or counterclaims. Only those cross-claims that are directly related to the plaintiff’s demand and closely connected with it can be deducted. Therefore, if a Shipowner wrongfully deprives the Time Charterer of the ship’s use due to a breach of contract, the Time Charterer is entitled to deduct an amount equivalent to the Ship Hire for the lost period.
Although the House of Lords has not yet reviewed this decision and has recently adopted a more stringent interpretation of Time Charter Clauses, the principles established in The Nanfri have been upheld by lower courts. Judge Mocatta supports this decision as consistent with commercial practice, though he notes that set-off is restricted to claims that directly challenge the Ship Hire demand. Claims related to cargo damage or unrelated issues are excluded, and the Time Charterer cannot deduct more than the Ship Hire due for the period during which the required services were not provided.
A Time Charterer is not permitted to make advance deductions from Ship Hire for Anticipated Off-hire Periods. In The Li Hai case, where a Ship Hire instalment was due while the ship was scheduled for routine drydocking estimated to last around eight days, the trial judge ruled against allowing such advance deductions. The judge noted that allowing deductions based on estimates rather than actual events would create cash flow issues and lead to potential disputes.
When deductions from Ship Hire are allowed, courts recognize that it would be unfair to penalize the Time Charterer for minor errors in calculating the exact deduction amount. A reasonable estimate made in good faith is acceptable. The precise figures can be determined later either through mutual agreement between the Shipowner and Time Charterer or, if an agreement cannot be reached, through arbitration. If it turns out that the Time Charterer has deducted more than necessary, the Shipowner can recover the excess amount. This approach maintains the integrity of the express right to deduct as provided by many Off-hire Clauses, without undermining it by penalizing minor
Right to Withdraw Ship for Non-payment of Ship Hire
Under Common Law, time is generally not considered of the essence in a contract, which means a Shipowner cannot repudiate the Time Charterparty and withdraw the ship solely due to late Ship Hire payments, unless there is clear evidence of the Time Charterer’s intent not to perform. This could be evidenced by an explicit repudiation of obligations or a pattern of repeated non-payment. However, many Time Charterparties include a specific contractual right for the Shipowner to withdraw the ship. For example, the Baltime Time Charterparty Form (Clause 6) stipulates:
“In the event of payment default, the Owners have the right to withdraw the Ship from the Charterers’ service, without protest and without court intervention or other formalities, and without prejudice to any other claims the Owners may have against the Charterers under the Charter.”
Similarly, the New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) Form (Clause 5) allows the Shipowner to act in the event of “failure to make punctual and regular payment of hire.” These clauses were initially designed to exert pressure on persistent defaulters or to recover the ship before the Time Charterer’s insolvency led to bankruptcy proceedings. During times of fluctuating market rates, such clauses have been advantageous for Shipowners with long-term Time Charters at fixed rates. By invoking these clauses and withdrawing the ship for a payment default, Shipowners have been able to recharter the vessel at current market rates, occasionally even offering it back to the original Time Charterer.
In the vivid words of Lord Denning MR, “When market rates for ship charters are rising, Shipowners meticulously monitor Ship Hire payments. A minor lapse by the Time Charterer—a few minutes late or a few dollars short—triggers swift action from the Shipowners. They issue a Notice of Withdrawal and demand full payment of Ship Hire at the current peak market rate. Although the ship is seldom actually withdrawn, arrangements are often made for it to continue operating as if nothing occurred. The ensuing dispute is typically resolved through arbitration or court to assess the validity of the Notice of Withdrawal. Despite the seeming sharp practice, the courts view this as a hard-nosed business tactic rather than dishonesty.”
These clauses grant Shipowners considerable leverage but can also lead to contentious disputes. While the right of withdrawal is frequently exercised in response to payment defaults, it is often used strategically to either pressure Time Charterers into compliance or to reposition the vessel to take advantage of higher market rates.
In practice, invoking these clauses often results in negotiations between the Shipowner and the Time Charterer, and disputes are usually settled before arbitrators or in court, focusing on whether the Notice of Withdrawal was justified under the Time Charterparty terms. Despite potential disputes, courts generally consider these practices as part of normal business operations rather than evidence of bad faith.
Moreover, Ship Withdrawal Clauses are designed to protect the Shipowner’s interests by ensuring that significant payment issues are resolved promptly. The right to withdraw the ship provides a mechanism to address non-payment effectively and safeguard the Shipowner’s financial interests.
While the strict enforcement of withdrawal clauses may appear severe, it underscores the high stakes in managing ship charter agreements and the need for adherence to agreed terms. The interplay between enforcement and practical business considerations continues to influence how these clauses are applied and interpreted in Maritime Law.
A Time Charterer defaults if they fail to pay a Ship Hire instalment on time, or if payment is partial on the due date. This highlights the importance of determining whether the Time Charterer has an implied right to make Deductions from Ship Hire under certain circumstances. Ship Hire Payments must be made on or before the specified date to be deemed Punctual Payments or In Advance Payments. If payment is due on a day when banks are closed, it must be completed by the end of trading on the preceding business day. These requirements are enforced rigorously, regardless of whether the delay in Ship Hire Payment is by days or mere hours. A Late Ship Hire payment made before the Shipowner has exercised their Right to Withdraw the ship will not rectify the default unless the Shipowner chooses to accept the payment as timely and Waive the Breach. The Court of Appeal’s contrary decision in The Georgios case was specifically overturned by the Lords in The Laconia. Clear Notice of Withdrawal must be given to the Time Charterer or their Agents; notice to the Ship Master is insufficient. While no specific wording is mandated, the Time Charterer must be informed that the Shipowner views the Non-payment of Ship Hire as a termination of the Time Charterparty.
A Shipowner may lose their Right of Withdrawal if they waive the Breach. To prove waiver, the Shipowner’s actions must clearly and unequivocally show that they accepted Late Ship Hire Payment as if it were on time, or that the delay in rejecting the payment could reasonably lead the Time Charterer to believe it was accepted. Receipt of late payment by an Agent does not constitute a waiver unless the Agent has Explicit Authority to make such decisions on behalf of the Shipowner.
In The Laconia case, where Ship Hire payment was due on a Sunday, the Time Charterer’s bankers delivered a payment order for the correct amount under the London Currency Settlement Scheme to the Shipowner’s bank at 3 p.m. the next day. After receiving the payment order, the bankers were instructed to refuse the money and return it to the Time Charterer’s bank. The House of Lords determined that the Shipowners were still entitled to Withdraw the Ship. The bankers were only performing a ministerial function and lacked the authority to make commercial decisions about the continuation or termination of the Time Charterparty. “It was not within the bankers’ Express or Implied Authority to make business decisions regarding late Ship Hire payments without specific instructions. The bankers followed instructions to reject the payment and returned it to the Time Charterers the next day, which was considered a reasonable timeframe.”
Accepting a portion of the Ship Hire on or before the due date does not waive the Shipowner’s Right to Withdraw the Ship if the full amount is not paid by midnight on the due date. In the case of The Mihalios Xilas, the Time Charterers had the right to deduct Bunker (Fuel) Costs and Shipowner’s Port Disbursements (PDA) from the final month’s Ship Hire. However, the Time Charterer mistakenly thought that the ninth month was the final month and intended to deduct $31,000 from the Ship Hire instalment due on 22 March without disclosing the basis for these deductions. On 20 March, the Shipowner objected to the proposed deduction but did not instruct their bankers to reject the remaining Ship Hire, which was paid on 21 March. The Shipowner later discovered that the Time Charterer was treating the ninth month as the final month and requested further details and supporting vouchers, which were not provided. The Shipowner then withdrew the Ship on 26 March. The Time Charterer claimed damages for Wrongful Withdrawal, arguing that by accepting the payment on 21 March, the Shipowner had waived their Right to Withdraw the Ship. The House of Lords ruled that accepting part of the Ship Hire on 21 March did not constitute a waiver since the Time Charterer had until the end of trading on 22 March to make the full payment, and no default had occurred at that time. Lord Diplock observed that “waiver requires knowledge” and agreed that the Shipowners were entitled to a reasonable period to verify the situation with the Time Charterer and the Ship Master before deciding to withdraw the Ship. Consequently, the four-day period from 21 March to noon on 26 March was considered a reasonable timeframe. Additionally, retaining the advance Ship Hire payment during this period did not amount to an unequivocal waiver of the right to withdraw.
Subsequent cases have established that a delay of four to five days past the Ship Hire Payment due date is typically deemed reasonable and does not constitute a waiver of the breach. Judge Lloyd in The Scaptrade case observed that “the minimum time reasonably necessary will depend on the specifics of the case. In some situations, it may be appropriate for Shipowners to take time to evaluate their position, as withdrawing from a Time Charter is a significant decision that should not be made lightly. In other cases, Shipowners might reasonably seek legal advice. It would be unjust to expect Shipowners to act immediately or to consider themselves at risk for granting a short grace period to Time Charterers.”
Moreover, there is precedent suggesting that if a Shipowner consistently fails to enforce strict legal rights regarding Ship Hire payments, this could establish a pattern that prevents them from exercising the Right of Withdrawal for future breaches by the Time Charterer. However, the Shipowner must give adequate notice of their intention to revert to strict legal enforcement in such cases.
In the Tankexpress v Compagnie Financière Belge des Petroles case, a seven-year Time Charter required Ship Hire to be paid in cash, monthly in advance, with a provision allowing the Shipowner to withdraw the ship “in default of such payment.” Initially, the Time Charterer consistently mailed a cheque to the Shipowner’s London bank two days before the payment was due, and the Shipowner accepted this method for two years without complaint. When the payment for September 1939 was delayed due to the outbreak of war, the Shipowner attempted to exercise their Right to Withdraw the Ship. The House of Lords ruled against the Shipowner. Lord Porter remarked, “In this situation, it is evident that the method of contract performance was adjusted by an arrangement to send payment to Hambros Bank by cheque posted in time to reach London by the 27th of the month. While Shipowners could have insisted on strict performance after providing proper notice, they could not abruptly change the accepted method of performance without first notifying the Time Charterers and allowing them the opportunity to comply as required.”
On the other hand, a distinction must be made between an accepted mode of performance and a scenario where the Shipowner repeatedly accepts Late Ship Hire Payments without objection. In such cases, this behavior does not generally indicate that the Shipowner will forgo their Right to Withdraw in the event of a future late payment. In The Scaptrade case, the Court of Appeal found that estoppel did not arise even though six out of 22 installments were paid late. Judge Robert Goff remarked, “It is not easy to deduce from the mere acceptance of late payments in the past that the Shipowners have unequivocally represented that they will not exercise their strict legal right of withdrawal for future late payments, especially since the circumstances of earlier late payments may differ from those of the present.”
There was initially hope that the Equitable Doctrine of relief against forfeiture could soften the impact of a strict withdrawal clause. However, this doctrine received limited support in The Laconia case. Lord Denning MR observed in the Court of Appeal, “On reflection, I do not think equity would intervene in such a commercial case. It would leave the parties to determine their rights by law. Commercial matters require certainty, timeliness, and speed, which equity does not provide.” In the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce agreed, noting the clear distinction between Charterparty contracts and land leases, where the Equitable Doctrine was developed. Lord Simon suggested there might be rare cases where a failure to make punctual payment due to an accident could unfairly disadvantage the Time Charterers, making it unconscionable for the Shipowners to withdraw. However, he acknowledged such cases would be extremely rare. This potential exception appears to have been definitively ruled out by The Scaptrade case, which held that courts do not have jurisdiction to grant equitable relief in these situations. Robert Goff LJ’s judgment in the Court of Appeal underscores the current judicial stance:
“In commercial transactions, it is essential that parties know their legal position if an event affecting their rights occurs. The Court should avoid creating obstacles to determining this position, as prompt action may be necessary and have significant consequences. The policy favoring certainty in commercial transactions opposes equitable intervention, which could lead to uncertainty, disputes, and litigation. Thus, extending such jurisdiction would interfere with the exercise of contractual rights and is not deemed appropriate.”
The courts’ hesitance to apply Equitable Relief in these cases is partly due to the presence of Anti-Technicality Clauses, which can be included in a Time Charterparty with mutual consent. These clauses generally require the Shipowner to give specific notice to the Time Charterer before invoking the Withdrawal Clause in case of a Ship Hire payment default. For instance, in The Libyaville case, the Time Charterparty included a clause stipulating that, “in the event of a failure to make punctual and regular payment, Shipowners must provide Time Charterers with two banking working days’ written notice to correct the failure.” Courts have strictly enforced these Anti-Technicality Clauses, ruling that an inquiry about a missed Ship Hire installment does not qualify as notice of intent to withdraw. Additionally, notice under such a clause cannot be issued before midnight on the due date, so any notice given before midnight but after banks have closed on the due date is deemed ineffective.
Judge Griffiths, in The Afovos case, highlighted the practical reasons behind this strict adherence: “Ship Hire payments are often processed via telex through various banks, and delays can occur due to oversights. Once the Time Charterer has instructed their bank to make the payment, they lose control over the transaction as it passes through the banking system. Therefore, Shipowners must notify Time Charterers if payment has not been received. Early notification before the deadline might not convey urgency, causing the Time Charterer to expect the payment to be credited on time. Conversely, notification after the deadline ensures the Time Charterer understands the breach and has a clear 48-hour window to remedy the situation.”
When the Shipowner exercises the right to withdraw the ship due to default in Ship Hire payment, it results in the termination of the Time Charterparty. The Shipowner cannot temporarily withdraw the ship to compel payment unless explicitly permitted by the Time Charterparty. Such an action would constitute a breach of the Time Charterparty, for which the Shipowner would be liable for damages. Additionally, the Shipowner cannot engage in other actions, such as revoking the Time Charterer’s authority to sign a Bill of Lading (B/L) or instructing the Ship Master not to sign a pre-paid Bill of Lading (B/L). In The Nanfri case, such conduct was deemed a repudiatory breach, allowing the Time Charterers to terminate the agreement.
Practical challenges arise when a ship is withdrawn after cargo has been loaded. Recent cases have established that in such scenarios, expenses related to bailment during the unloading period, as well as the cost of bunker (fuel) used for discharge, can be claimed. If a Bill of Lading (B/L) has been issued prior to the withdrawal, especially to parties other than the Time Charterer, the withdrawal would generally be contingent on completing the voyage covered by that Bill of Lading. Typically, after a Notice of Ship Withdrawal is issued, Shipowners and Time Charterers often reach an agreement to continue the charter under the original terms. If the Notice is deemed valid, the Time Charterer will pay the increased market charter rate; if invalid, the original charter rate remains.
The immediate effect of withdrawing the ship is the termination of the Time Charterparty, and the Shipowner is not entitled to any Ship Hire for the remaining charter period. Furthermore, the Shipowner cannot retain any unearned Ship Hire that was paid in advance. Damages for the unexpired portion of the Time Charter can only be claimed if the default in Ship Hire payment is considered a repudiation of the Time Charterparty by the Time Charterer. As time is generally not of the essence in a Time Charter, a default in Ship Hire payment rarely amounts to repudiation. Consequently, a Shipowner intending to withdraw the ship usually relies on the Withdrawal Clause specified in the Time Charterparty.
Indemnity Clause in Time Charterparty
Most Time Charterparties include an Indemnity Clause that grants the Time Charterer the full use of the ship during the charter period and requires the Ship Master to follow the Time Charterer’s orders and instructions.
A significant right provided by such an Indemnity Clause is the Time Charterer’s authority to issue Bills of Lading (B/L), which the Ship Master must sign upon request. These Bills of Lading can be enforced by third-party holders against the Shipowner, even if their terms differ considerably from those in the Time Charterparty. In return, the Time Charterer agrees to indemnify the Shipowner for any additional liabilities arising from these actions.
An example of this type of clause is found in the Baltime Time Charterparty Form (Clause 9): “The master shall conduct all voyages with the utmost efficiency and provide customary assistance with the ship’s crew. The master shall comply with the charterers’ orders regarding employment, agency, or other arrangements. The charterers shall indemnify the owners against any consequences or liabilities arising from the master, officers, or agents signing bills of lading or other documents, or complying with such orders, as well as any irregularities in the ship’s documents or for overcarrying goods.”
Judge Devlin aptly highlighted the rationale behind including such an Indemnity Clause: “If the Shipowner is to give up his freedom of choice and place the Ship Master under the Time Charterer’s orders, it is only fair that the Shipowner should receive full indemnity in return.” This specific Indemnity Clause is designed to cover any additional costs or liabilities that arise from making the ship available to the Time Charterer. These liabilities might result from the Time Charterer’s instructions regarding the ship’s use or from the Ship Master signing Bills of Lading (B/L) as requested by the Time Charterer.
For example, the Shipowner can seek compensation for physical damage if the ship is sent to a hazardous port or tasked with carrying dangerous cargo. The Shipowner is also protected against financial liability to third parties if cargo is released without presenting the relevant Bill of Lading (B/L) upon the Time Charterer’s instruction. Moreover, if the Ship Master signs a Bill of Lading (B/L) with terms more onerous than those specified in the Charterparty—such as omitting Charterparty exceptions or falling under the Hague-Visby Rules—the Shipowner is indemnified against any extra liability incurred.
While it might initially seem that this Indemnity Clause would allow the Shipowner to recover all additional costs or liabilities arising from the charter, there are several limitations on the Shipowner’s right to such recovery under this clause.
Firstly, under a Time Charterparty, the Shipowner remains accountable for navigation and ship management. Therefore, the Shipowner cannot seek compensation for losses arising from negligent navigation or issues of unseaworthiness, even if these occur while executing the Time Charterer’s instructions. These responsibilities are inherent to the Shipowner’s role. Judge Lloyd in The Aquacharm explained: “Not every loss during a voyage is recoverable. For instance, Shipowners cannot claim damages for heavy weather simply because an alternative route ordered by the Time Charterers might have avoided it. The connection is too remote. Likewise, routine navigation costs, such as ballasting, cannot be claimed even if they arise from the Time Charterer’s orders.”
Secondly, while the Ship Master must follow the Time Charterer’s instructions within a reasonable period, they are not obliged to comply with orders that exceed the Time Charterer’s authority. A clause requiring the Ship Master to obey the Time Charterer’s orders does not extend to directives that go beyond the Time Charterer’s legitimate power. Therefore, if the Ship Master is instructed to go to an obviously unsafe port or to sign a Bill of Lading (B/L) that contradicts the Time Charterparty terms, the Shipowner cannot use the Indemnity Clause to recover resulting losses. However, the courts typically acknowledge the Ship Master’s difficult position and generally afford them the benefit of the doubt, provided their actions were reasonable and made in good faith.
Lastly, causation must be addressed. The mere fact that a loss occurs while following the Time Charterer’s orders does not automatically prove that the loss was directly caused by, or is a legal consequence of, such compliance. Without concrete evidence establishing this causation, there is no entitlement to indemnity. For example, an Indemnity Clause does not cover losses caused by crew negligence. Likewise, indemnity will not apply if a cargo, such as coal, emits methane gas that ignites due to unrelated repair work. In such cases, the court may find that the cargo’s loading was not the direct cause of the explosion. The essential question is whether the loss to the Shipowner was an unavoidable outcome of following the Time Charterer’s instructions.
Recent judgments have shown that, in the absence of an Express Term, a Right to Indemnity might be implied when a Shipowner places the Ship Master under the Time Charterer’s orders. This implication is based on Business Efficacy: if the Time Charterer requires full control over the ship, voyages, cargoes, and Bill of Lading (B/L) terms, the Shipowner should be entitled to indemnity for any resulting losses or liabilities. However, no implied indemnity will apply if the Shipowner has expressly or implicitly agreed to assume the risk at the Time Charterparty’s formation. Any implied indemnity will also be limited by the same constraints as an express indemnity and will be excluded if there is a conflicting provision in the Time Charterparty.
Redelivery of the Ship under Time Charterparty
In a Time Charterparty, it is common for the agreement to specify that the ship must be redelivered to the Shipowner at a designated port or within a specified range of ports in good condition, “ordinary wear and tear excepted.” If the Time Charterer fails to meet this obligation due to a breach of their duties under the Time Charterparty, they are liable for damages. This liability also extends to any damage to the ship for which the Time Charterer is responsible under the Employment and Indemnity Clause.
There is some debate about whether this clause imposes a strict obligation on the Time Charterer to return the ship in good order. Since the Shipowner typically agrees to maintain the ship in an efficient condition throughout the Time Charter Period, it can be argued that the Time Charterer’s responsibility might be limited to damage they have directly caused or damage resulting from their instructions.
Even with the requirement to return the ship in good condition, the Shipowner cannot refuse to accept redelivery due to unresolved defects. As stated by Lord Denning MR, this requirement is “not a Condition precedent to the right to redeliver, but only a stipulation providing a remedy in Damages.” Therefore, if repair costs exceed the ship’s value after repairs, the Shipowner must accept redelivery and seek damages instead of withholding ship hire until repairs are completed. Both legal and commercial considerations necessitate that the Time Charterparty concludes even if the ship’s condition upon redelivery is unsatisfactory.
The concept of “Ordinary Wear and Tear” is determined by the specific use for which the ship was chartered. For instance, in a case concerning the refitting of a liner used for troop transport during World War I, Lord Buckmaster commented:
“It is challenging to understand how a Time Charterparty for a ship specifically hired to transport troops and similar cargo can overlook the expenses incurred during its operation.”
If a ship is chartered for a specific type of trade and operates without negligence, any damage resulting from such use should be considered Fair Wear and Tear.
The Time Charterer’s final obligation is to return the ship to the port or location specified in the Time Charterparty. If the ship is returned to a different location, the Shipowner is entitled to continue using the ship at the charter rate of hire until it reaches the proper redelivery point. This voyage to the redelivery location is considered part of the chartered service. To compensate for this breach, the Time Charterer must pay the Ship Hire the Shipowner would have earned had the voyage been completed as originally agreed. Practically, this means damages are calculated based on the net profit from a hypothetical voyage to the agreed redelivery point under the Time Charterparty, minus any net profit from alternative employment during the time needed to complete the hypothetical voyage.
4- Understanding Voyage Charterparty
Introductory Clauses in Voyage Charterparty
All Standard Voyage Charterparty Forms will incorporate an Introductory Clause that identifies the contracting Shipowner and Voyage Charterer, the ship, and the designated voyage. The principal concern of the Voyage Charterer regarding the ship’s description is its Cargo Capacity (DWCC Deadweight Cargo Capacity), as any shortcomings in the ship’s performance are the responsibility of the Shipowner. Cargo Capacity is typically stated in terms of DWCC (Deadweight Cargo Capacity), which indicates the maximum cargo weight the ship can transport when loaded to its allowable Draught. DWCC (Deadweight Cargo Capacity) denotes the peak weight of cargo a ship can handle but does not guarantee the ability to transport that specific amount of any cargo, as the Stowage Factor (SF) of the selected cargo plays a crucial role. Therefore, although the ship can manage the weight of a dense cargo like iron ore, it might lack the necessary stowage space for an equivalent weight of a voluminous cargo like scrap or grain. In such cases, it is usually more beneficial for the Voyage Charterer if the Cubic Capacity (Bale or Grain Capacity) of the cargo space is detailed. Typically, the mentioned DWCC (Deadweight Cargo Capacity) in a Voyage Charterparty excludes bunkers, stores, etc., needed for the journey. However, many Standard Voyage Charterparty Forms, like GENCON 1994, do not clarify this aspect. Regarding voyage specifics, the Voyage Charterparty may specify the Loading Port and Discharging Port, or the Voyage Charterer might have the privilege to Nominate such ports, either from an outlined list or a defined geographic region.
Freight Clause in Voyage Charterparty
Voyage Charterparty typically documents the agreed Freight rate, the cargo’s unit of measurement, and the timing and location of Freight payment. Calculating Freight is generally straightforward, but it’s crucial for the Voyage Charterparty to specify whether the calculation should be based on the cargo’s shipped quantity or the amount discharged. This distinction is vital because when cargo is weighed at both loading and discharge, discrepancies often occur due to errors in weighing equipment or natural factors. For instance, some cargoes may lose weight due to spillage or evaporation, while others might gain weight from moisture absorption during the journey.
To circumvent these issues, quoting Freight as a Lump Sum for the entire voyage, regardless of the shipped quantity, is often more effective. This approach is typically chosen when adequate weighing facilities are unavailable at the ports or when the Shipowner and Voyage Charterer are unsure of the available cargo amount. Opting for a Lump Sum is particularly beneficial when shipping bulk cargo, and the Voyage Charterer is obliged to provide a Full and Complete Cargo (FCC). In such cases, any deficiency results in the payment of dead freight. Standard Voyage Charterparty Forms also stipulate whether Freight is payable in Advance upon signing the Bill of Lading (B/L) or only upon delivery at the Discharging Port. To safeguard the Shipowner’s interests, a Lien Clause is often included, granting the Shipowner a lien on the cargo until Freight payment is completed. It’s also common to require part of the Freight to be paid in Advance with the remainder due upon cargo delivery. Additionally, Rider Clauses usually address the currency for Freight payment, a critical consideration for the Shipowner during periods of fluctuating exchange rates, particularly if voyage expenses are expected in a different currency.
One final point that needs clarification is whether the quoted Freight rate encompasses the costs of loading and unloading the cargo (cargo handling costs), or if these are additional expenses for the Voyage Charterer. Typically, the term FIOST (Free In Out Stowed Trimmed) applies to the Shipowners in Voyage Charters. When bulk cargoes are handled at private wharves, or when port handling charges are challenging to predict in advance, it is more practical to quote Freight on Net Terms, leaving the cargo handling costs to be covered directly by the Voyage Charterer. Even in situations where Gross Terms are applied and the port handling charges fall under the Shipowner’s responsibility, the Shipowner may safeguard his interests with a clause stating that he is liable for port handling charges only up to a certain rate per tonne of cargo. If the costs exceed this rate, the Voyage Charterer becomes responsible for the additional expenses.
Cargo Clause in Voyage Charterparty
When a Cargo Seller charters the ship for delivering an export order, the cargo’s type and quantity are typically specified precisely, for instance, 120,000 metric tonnes of coal. Conversely, if the aim of the Voyage Charter is a broader trading venture, the Voyage Charterer might have the option to choose from a designated range of cargoes, such as soybean and/or corn, or might even be allowed to transport “any lawful cargo.” In these scenarios, the Voyage Charterer is generally required to ship a Full and Complete Cargo (FCC), which is the maximum quantity of a particular cargo that the ship can accommodate. If a specific amount like 50,000 metric tons is set, it is customary to include a permissible variation of plus or minus 5 percent, under terms like MOLOO (More or Less Owner’s Option) or MOLCO (More or Less Charterer’s Option). Should the Voyage Charterer fail to provide the stipulated quantity of cargo, they will be obliged to pay compensation for the deficiency in the form of Dead Freight (DF).
Laytime Clause in Voyage Charterparty
The Laytime Clause is a crucial element in a Voyage Charterparty, detailing the period allocated for loading and unloading the cargo. These designated “Lay Days” are provided free to the Voyage Charterer, considered as part of the Freight payment. If these Lay Days are exceeded, the Voyage Charterer must compensate the Shipowner, either through predetermined Liquidated Damages (known as Demurrage) or Unliquidated Damages (referred to as Damages for Detention). Additionally, the term LAYCAN, which stands for “Laydays Commence and Cancelling Date,” is used to define the time frame within which a ship must arrive at the loading port for a specific Charterparty.
During the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Voyage Charterparty, the Voyage Charterer aims to secure an adequate number of Lay Days to accommodate unforeseen delays during the loading or unloading processes, while the Shipowner prefers to limit these days to free up the ship for other engagements sooner. Given the financial stakes, it is critical for the Laytime Clause to be precisely articulated to avoid potential litigation.
Defining the exact moment when Laytime begins is a complex issue. The standard approach requires two conditions: first, the ship must become an Arrived Ship by reaching the specified destination in the Voyage Charterparty, which could be a Berth, Port, or Dock. Secondly, the Shipowner must issue a Notice of Readiness (NOR) to the Voyage Charterer. If port congestion prevents the ship from reaching its designated destination and becoming an Arrived Ship, the Shipowner bears the risk of delay unless a clause has been negotiated into the Charterparty that counts time waiting for a berth as Laytime. Once the ship is acknowledged as an Arrived Ship, Laytime starts running within a specified period after the issuance of the NOR.
As Laytime begins to count against the Voyage Charterer from a specified moment, it’s crucial that the Voyage Charterparty offers a reasonably precise prediction of when the ship will arrive at the loading port. This allows the Voyage Charterer to ensure that the cargo is ready for loading. However, it is rare for a Shipowner to commit to a specific arrival date, except in cases where the ship is already idle at the loading port. Typically, Voyage Charterparties are negotiated well in advance, and Shipowners are hesitant to specify exact arrival dates due to potential unforeseen contingencies that may occur.
The usual practice is for the Voyage Charterparty to specify an expected date for the ship to be ready to load at the loading port and to pair this with a Cancelling Date. If the ship has not arrived by this Cancelling Date, the Voyage Charterer has the option to terminate the Voyage Charterparty (this period is referred to as LAYCAN – Laydays Commence and Cancelling Date). Naturally, the Shipowner prefers as long a period as possible between these two dates to accommodate potential delays, while the Voyage Charterer aims for the shortest possible interval to reduce storage costs at the port.
The second aspect of Laytime concerns its duration. Both the Shipowner and Voyage Charterer typically agree on a specific number of days or hours allowed for the loading or unloading operations. This practice is much more effective than using vaguer terms like “Fast As Can (FAC)”, “Custom of Port”, or “Customary Quick Despatch (CQD)”, which often lead to disputes. An alternative approach is to specify a loading rate, such as 15,000 metric tons per day, allowing the Laytime duration to be calculated once the total cargo weight is known. Additional details may include whether the specified Laytime is to run continuously or if it will be suspended on Sundays, Public Holidays, or in cases of Bad Weather. These details are subject to negotiation between the Shipowner and Voyage Charterer.
Additional Clauses address situations where the loading or discharging operation exceeds the specified Laytime. In such cases, the Voyage Charterer must compensate for the extra time, and it is common to include provisions in the Voyage Charterparty for the payment of Demurrage at a predetermined rate for this additional time. Demurrage is considered agreed Liquidated Damages for contract breach and is recoverable by the Shipowner without the need to demonstrate a loss. The Demurrage Rate is typically set in relation to the current Freight Rates, and courts generally do not intervene in its enforcement unless the recoverable amount is deemed exorbitant and disproportionate to the potential maximum loss caused by the delay. If found excessive, the Demurrage Clause may be invalidated as a penalty, although this does not apply when the Demurrage Rate is notably low and unreflective of potential losses.
If there is no Demurrage Clause, or if the fixed period for Demurrage (e.g., 7 days) has expired, the Shipowner is entitled to claim Unliquidated Damages for Detention as compensation for losses incurred due to the delay.
To motivate the Voyage Charterer to expedite the loading process, the Voyage Charterparty might include provisions for the payment of Despatch Money by the Shipowners for any Laytime saved. Typically, the rate for Despatch Money is set at 50 percent of the agreed Demurrage Rate, known as DHD (Despatch Half of Demurrage). It is crucial for both the Shipowner and Voyage Charterer to clearly specify whether Despatch Money is payable for All Time Saved (ATS) or only for Working Time Saved (WTS).
Other Clauses in Voyage Charterparty
The Voyage Charterparty Clauses described above provide a foundational structure for the Voyage Charterparty; however, additional provisions are often included to address various aspects such as the Shipowner’s responsibility for cargo care, conditions allowing the ship to deviate from the agreed route, and clauses that address the impact of external factors like Ice, War, or Strikes on fulfilling contractual obligations. These clauses can differ significantly across various Standard Voyage Charterparty Forms and are often customized by the Shipowner and Voyage Charterer to suit specific needs and circumstances. This customization ensures that both parties tailor the contract to address potential risks and responsibilities uniquely associated with each voyage.
Performance of the Voyage Charterparty
The execution of a Voyage Charterparty is structured into four distinct stages:
A- Preliminary Voyage
B- Loading Port Operation
C- Carrying Voyage
D- Discharging Port Operation
Typically, the responsibility for stage 1 (Preliminary Voyage) and stage 3 (Carrying Voyage) lies solely with the Shipowner. In contrast, stage 2 (Loading Operation) and stage 4 (Discharging Operation) are collaborative efforts involving both the Shipowner and the Voyage Charterer, although the control primarily rests with the Voyage Charterer. The Voyage Charterparty documents detail the specific responsibilities of each party for these stages. A crucial concern for both parties is determining who bears the risk of loss due to delays that are beyond the control of either the Shipowner or the Voyage Charterer.
Voyage Charters are particularly vulnerable to delays caused by factors such as adverse weather, mechanical issues during the voyage, or logistical problems like strikes or the lack of available berths upon arrival at a port. Generally, unless otherwise stipulated in the Voyage Charterparty, the risk of unforeseen delays is borne by the party responsible for the stage during which the delay occurs. It is possible, however, for the Shipowner and Voyage Charterer to negotiate clauses that shift this risk, such as exceptions that suspend the running of Laytime during strikes.
Accurately determining when one stage ends and another begins is critical, especially when defining the start of Laytime. While the termination of the Loading and Discharging stages can usually be clearly identified, courts have struggled to establish a straightforward method for marking the completion of the voyage stages and the commencement of Laytime. Consensus dictates that three criteria must be met for Laytime to begin: the ship must have reached its designated destination and become an Arrived Ship, a Notice of Readiness (NOR) to load must be issued, and the ship must be physically ready to load. The challenge lies in defining what constitutes an “Arrived Ship,” a term that requires precise legal and practical definition to avoid disputes and ensure clarity in contractual obligations.
Arrived Ship in Voyage Charterparty
To determine when a ship qualifies as an Arrived Ship, it’s crucial to understand that there are three main types of Voyage Charterparty, based on the specified loading point:
1- Port Charterparty
2- Berth Charterparty
3- Dock Charterparty
For Berth Charter and Dock Charter, the situation is quite clear: a ship becomes an Arrived Ship only upon entering the designated Berth or Dock. In both scenarios, the Shipowner bears the risk of any delays in reaching the specified Berth or Dock. The same principle applies when the Voyage Charterer, who has the express right to Nominate the Berth or Dock, chooses a busy one, resulting in inevitable delays. Courts have ruled that this right would be of minimal value to the Voyage Charterer if they had to consider the Shipowner’s convenience before making such a nomination. However, developing a criterion for an Arrived Ship under a Port Charterparty presents more challenges due to the larger area involved and the varied definitions of a Port, whether viewed from a Geographical, Administrative, or Commercial perspective. After several conflicting earlier decisions, clarity was provided by the House of Lords in the case of the Johanna Oldendorff. In this instance, the Voyage Charterer, under a Port Charterparty, had nominated the port of Liverpool/Birkenhead. When the ship reached the Port, no Berths were available, and it was directed to anchor at the Mersey Bar, located some 17 miles from the Dock Area but within the Administrative limits of the port. The critical issue was whether the Johanna Oldendorff was an Arrived Ship at the Mersey Bar, or whether Laytime only commenced 16 days later when the ship finally entered a Berth. In their review, the House of Lords criticized the earlier reliance on a ship’s arrival within the Commercial Area of a Port, as in the case of The Aello, arguing that such an area was too vague and led to unnecessary legal uncertainties without considering practical commercial implications. They favored a more practical approach, outlined in the following propositions:
The ship must be within the Geographical and Legal area of the Port as commonly understood by its users. Therefore, a ship cannot be considered an Arrived Ship if the Port Authorities (PA) order the ship to remain outside this area. The decisive criterion is whether the ship is immediately and effectively at the disposal of the Voyage Charterer, meaning the ship can swiftly move to the Berth when informed that one is available. Given the advancements in radio communication and the increased speed of modern ships, a ship could meet this criterion even if anchored some distance from the designated Berth, as it would typically receive advance notice of when the Berth is expected to be available.
The ship is assumed to be effectively at the disposal of the Voyage Charterer when anchored in a usual waiting area for a Berth at that Port, with the burden of proving otherwise resting on the Voyage Charterer. If the ship is anchored elsewhere, the Shipowner has the opportunity to demonstrate that it is still effectively at the disposal of the Voyage Charterer, though the proof responsibility in this scenario shifts to the Shipowner.
Since the Mersey Bar was within the Administrative Limits of the Port of Liverpool/Birkenhead and served as the normal anchorage for ships awaiting a Berth at that Port, the Johanna Oldendorff was deemed an Arrived Ship.
Within four years, the House of Lords had another opportunity to reconsider their stance in the Maratha Envoy case. The Voyage Charterer had nominated Brake, a river port on the Weser, as the loading port. However, with no Berths available, the ship was instructed not to proceed upstream but to wait at the Weser Light. Positioned in the Weser estuary about 25 miles downstream from Brake, this was the customary waiting spot for ships the size of the Maratha Envoy due to the absence of suitable anchorages on the river itself. Reviewing the criteria for an Arrived Ship as set out in the Johanna Oldendorff case, the Court of Appeal believed the key factor was whether the ship was immediately and effectively at the disposal of the Voyage Charterer. They argued that being outside the strict Port Limits should not preclude a ship from being considered an Arrived Ship, provided it was at the usual waiting place and at the Charterer’s disposition. Nevertheless, on appeal, the House of Lords quickly dismissed this view, reaffirming the standards set in the Johanna Oldendorff. Thus, the Maratha Envoy was not an Arrived Ship while at the Weser Light, as it lay outside the Port of Brake’s limits.
This decision, while clarifying the legal position, has not been universally accepted in the shipping industry and does not align with the more adaptable approaches seen in other jurisdictions. Any practical test for an Arrived Ship should definitively establish the point at which the risk of time lost transfers from the Shipowner to the Voyage Charterer. A potential drawback of the Johanna Oldendorff criteria is their lack of a robust method for pinpointing the Port Area in particular cases, despite the entire test depending on this definition. Although Lord Diplock claimed that applying the Oldendorff test has posed little difficulty, it might be easier in practice to identify a port’s Usual Waiting Place rather than its precise limits. Furthermore, it could be argued that for such purposes, the Shipowner should be seen as having met his obligation under a Port Charter when he has brought the ship as close as feasible to its destination at a congested Port, where the ship is anchored at a location from which any further advance into a vacant Berth is controlled by the Port Authorities (PA). In such situations, it raises the question whether it was ever the intent of the Shipowner and Voyage Charterer that the risk of additional delays should solely depend on whether the PA directs the ship to wait inside or outside the port limits.
Voyage Charterparty Terms Shifting Risk of Delay
When considering the legal stance under Common Law regarding delays due to port congestion that aren’t covered by provisions in the Voyage Charterparty, the approach of Shipowners can significantly vary. Often, to mitigate the risk of such delays, Shipowners prefer to opt for a Port Charterparty rather than a Berth Charterparty or Dock Charterparty because it’s relatively easier for a ship to be deemed an Arrived Ship in the face of port congestion under a Port Charterparty. Alternatively, Shipowners may insist on incorporating specific clauses in the Voyage Charterparty to transfer the risk of delays due to port congestion.
One commonly employed method is the inclusion of “Time Lost Waiting for Berth Clauses,” which aim to shift the risk of delay. For instance, a typical clause found in the Gencon Voyage Charterparty specifies that “Time lost in waiting for Berth to count as Loading or Discharging time.” This clause essentially shifts the risk of delay from the moment the ship could have docked if a berth had been available. Thus, under a Berth Charterparty, this would cover any waiting time in the port until a berth becomes available. In the context of a Port Charterparty, it would apply to waiting times both outside and inside the port, even if the ship does not meet the Johanna Oldendorff criteria of being “immediately and effectively” at the disposal of the Voyage Charterer. The key factor here is whether the primary cause of delay is the non-availability of a berth.
Originally, the Time Lost Waiting for Berth Clause was primarily associated with Berth Charterparties. However, due to its effectiveness, it was later adopted in Port Charterparties, leading to potential confusion. This confusion arises from the possible overlap between waiting time and Laytime provisions; a ship could be an Arrived Ship and still be waiting for a berth. For many years, courts prioritized the Time Lost Clauses independently of the Laytime provisions, requiring the Voyage Charterer to pay for all time lost, regardless of whether it occurred on a Sunday or public holiday, or whether a Laytime exception might otherwise have been applicable.
This interpretation was eventually challenged and corrected by the House of Lords in The Darrah, which overruled previous decisions. It was clarified that whether the Time Lost Waiting for Berth Clause stipulates that all time lost waiting for a berth counts as Loading Time or Laytime, the result remains consistent: all such time lost is treated as Laytime, as if the ship were actually in the berth and at the disposal of the Charterer for loading or discharging operations. Lord Diplock noted that in calculating Time Lost in Waiting for a Berth, any periods that would have been excluded in the computation of permitted Laytime if the ship had been in a berth should also be excluded. Thus, when Waiting Time and Laytime overlap (i.e., the ship is an Arrived Ship while still waiting for a berth), Laytime provisions take precedence, and the Time Lost Clause is considered redundant.
Congested Ports
In ports known for frequent congestion, or where the normal waiting area lies outside the port limits, standard clauses are often included in contracts to specify that Laytime begins from the moment a ship reaches a designated point but is unable to proceed due to lack of available berths or other obstacles. Such clauses are applicable even if the ship has not yet become an Arrived Ship. For example, in the case of Compañia Naviera Termar v Tradax Export, the Voyage Charterparty stipulated that if the ship could not berth at Hull due to congestion, “time to count from next working period after ship’s arrival at Spurn Head anchorage.” Similarly, in the Weser Light situation of The Maratha Envoy, the existence of a Time Lost Clause for the Port of Brake, though not included in the Voyage Charterparty, influenced the House of Lords to uphold a strict interpretation of the Arrived Ship status.
Whether in Berth or Not (WIBON)
The Whether in Berth or Not (WIBON) clause addresses situations where a ship, under a Berth Charterparty, reaches its destination but finds no berth available. This clause allows the Shipowner to issue a valid Notice of Readiness (NOR) to load as soon as the ship arrives at the port, assuming other conditions for a valid NOR are met. Roskill LJ noted that the WIBON clause effectively transforms a Berth Charterparty into a Port Charterparty for the purpose of applying the Johanna Oldendorff criteria and initiating Laytime.
An attempt to broaden the application of the WIBON Clause occurred in The Kyzikos case, where a ship was delayed by fog for three days upon entering the discharging port, preventing it from reaching an available berth because the Pilot Station was closed. However, the judiciary unanimously held that there was no precedent in earlier case law to support this extension. They concluded that the WIBON Clause should only apply when no berth is available, not when a berth cannot be reached due to adverse conditions like bad weather.
Reachable Berth
Many Voyage Charterparties incorporate a clause mandating the Voyage Charterer to nominate a reachable berth upon the ship’s arrival at its destination. In The Angelos Lusis case, it was determined that such a clause shifts the risk of delay to the Voyage Charterer if they fail to nominate a vacant berth due to port congestion. Although initial decisions have suggested that the clause’s applicability isn’t limited to physical obstructions but also extends to scenarios where a berth is available but not reachable due to adverse weather conditions or fog.
Under this clause, the ship doesn’t need to qualify as an Arrived Ship in the strict technical sense. It is sufficient that the ship has reached a point, either inside or outside the port, where it would be delayed without a berth nomination. From that point, the Voyage Charterer assumes the risk of any delay, and is liable for damages for breach of the Voyage Charterparty if they fail to nominate a reachable berth.
However, if the ship also qualifies as an Arrived Ship at that point, causing Laytime to commence, then the Voyage Charterer is not obliged to compensate twice for the same period. This was illustrated in The Delian Spirit case, where it was ruled that once Laytime began, the Voyage Charterer could offset the time saved at the loading port against the initial time lost while unable to nominate a reachable berth. Conversely, if the ship is not an Arrived Ship at that point, the two periods—the time saved at the discharging port and the time lost waiting for a berth nomination—run independently. Thus, time saved later cannot be used to offset the earlier delay due to the inability to nominate a reachable berth.
Ship Readiness to Load or Discharge
Before Laytime can commence, three conditions must be met: the ship must first become an Arrived Ship at the designated Loading Port. Additionally, the Shipowner must issue the prescribed Notice of Readiness (NOR) to load, and the ship must actually be Ready to Load. Absent a specific provision in the Voyage Charterparty, English law does not mandate that the Ship Master provide a Notice of Readiness (NOR) to unload to the consignee at the Discharging Port.
Notice of Readiness (NOR)
The primary function of a Notice of Readiness (NOR) is to inform the Voyage Charterer that the ship is prepared to commence loading, thereby marking the beginning of Laytime Calculation. Under Common Law, the Notice of Readiness (NOR) can be issued in any form, as long as it is effectively communicated; however, if the Voyage Charterparty specifies a certain Notice of Readiness (NOR) form, like a written Notice of Readiness (NOR), that specified form must be adhered to. From a practical business perspective, giving an advance Notice of Readiness (NOR) of expected readiness is advantageous for the Voyage Charterer, and many Standard Voyage Charterparty Forms stipulate the provision of such a Notice of Readiness (NOR) at a predetermined time before the ship’s arrival. For example, the Polcoalvoy Voyage Charterparty (Clause 2) mandates at least ten running days’ written notice of the approximate date of readiness to load.
Conversely, many Voyage Charterparty Forms focus on certainty, with Common Law requiring a simple Notice of Actual Readiness to load. This Notice of Readiness (NOR) is valid only if it concerns an Arrived Ship that is truly ready to load at the time the Notice of Readiness (NOR) is given. English Law is strict in this area, rendering a Notice of Anticipated Readiness ineffective, even if the ship was in fact ready to load when the Notice of Readiness (NOR) was issued. Complications can arise if, despite an invalid Notice of Readiness (NOR), the ship proceeds to berth and either load or discharge cargo without issuing a subsequent valid Notice of Readiness (NOR). According to strict legal standards, without a valid Notice of Readiness (NOR), Laytime does not begin, meaning the Shipowner not only forfeits any claim for Demurrage but might also be required to pay the Voyage Charterer Despatch Money for the entire period of agreed Laytime. While this outcome adheres to legal standards, it often doesn’t reflect commercial realities.
However, the courts have been reluctant to conclude that a premature Notice of Readiness (NOR) automatically becomes effective once the ship is ready to discharge and begins the discharge with the cooperation of the Voyage Charterers. Simply being aware of the ship’s readiness to discharge is not sufficient for the Voyage Charterers. There needs to be something more, such as an implied or express agreement to forego the requirement for a Notice of Readiness (NOR), or a waiver or estoppel that binds the Voyage Charterers to forego the need for a subsequent valid Notice of Readiness (NOR).
The Court of Appeal found that the conditions were satisfied in The Happy Day case, where the ship, despite missing the tide and being unable to enter the Port, issued a Premature Notice of Readiness (NOR) to discharge. The ship berthed the following day and began discharging. The legal questions before the court were whether a subsequent Notice of Readiness (NOR) was necessary to start Laytime, and if not, when Laytime should begin. In this instance, the Voyage Charterer was fully aware of the ship’s arrival and its readiness to discharge. Moreover, through their Port Agents, the Voyage Charterer had accepted instructions to discharge the ship without any reservations about the validity of the Notice of Readiness (NOR) they had previously received. Under these circumstances, Judge Potter believed that “the doctrine of waiver may be invoked and applied in such a case, and the commencement of loading by the Charterer or Receiver without rejection of or reservation regarding the Notice of Readiness (NOR) can properly be treated as the additional factor which Lord Justice Mustill suggested was necessary, alongside mere knowledge of Readiness on the part of the Charterer, to justify a finding of Waiver or Estoppel.” On the facts of the case, the Notice of Readiness (NOR) that had been tendered was deemed to have been accepted when discharging began.
A broader interpretation of this issue is hinted at by Judge Rix’s comment in The Front Commander case, stating, “If a Charterer uses a ship, known to be ready at the time of use, which has been tendered to Charterer by a Valid Notice of Readiness (NOR), or by an invalid notice whose invalidity is known, the Charterer must expect time to run against him subject to any express contrary agreement.” This case involved a Voyage Charterparty that included a Specific Laycan Clause. The ship arrived at the loading port, issued a Notice of Readiness (NOR), and began loading a day before the earliest loading date specified in the Laycan provision. Despite this, and even though the Voyage Charterer had sent multiple emails during the loading voyage urging the Shipowner to issue a Notice of Readiness (NOR) and start loading as soon as possible after arriving at the loading port, the Voyage Charterer argued that Laytime should not start until the earliest Layday specified in the Laycan Clause. Rejecting this argument, Judge Rix in the Court of Appeal emphasized that “the Charterer not only consented to an early tender of Notice of Readiness (NOR), berthing, and commencement of loading but gave orders to that effect.”
In some European jurisdictions, the issues associated with anticipatory Notices of Readiness (NOR) are mitigated because such notices are considered effective as long as the ship is ready by the time the Notice of Readiness (NOR) expires. Many Voyage Charterparties additionally stipulate that Notices of Readiness (NOR) must be given during specific office hours, for example, between 0800 and 1700 hours. This raises the question of whether a Notice of Readiness (NOR) issued outside these hours is completely void, necessitating the issuance of a second Notice of Readiness (NOR) within the designated time frame. Recent legal rulings have determined that, as long as the ship is ready to load at the time an invalid Notice of Readiness (NOR) is given, there is no valid reason why such a notice shouldn’t become effective from the time stipulated by the Voyage Charterparty for it to be issued.
Should it later be discovered that the ship was not Ready to load, then the Notice of Readiness (NOR) would be wholly ineffective, and Laytime would not commence. Conversely, if the Voyage Charterer proceeds to load without issuing a Protest Letter (PL), thereby waiving the default, they cannot later challenge the readiness of the ship unless there is evidence of fraud.
Under English Law, there is no requirement for a Notice of Readiness (NOR) at the Discharging Port, as it is the responsibility of the consignee to monitor the ship’s arrival. This practice likely originates from Liner Contracts where notifying a multitude of consignees could unduly burden the Shipowner, especially if the Bill of Lading (B/L) has been transferred during the voyage. However, this rule is more challenging to justify in the context of Voyage Charterparties. As Judge Donaldson noted, “once his cargo has been loaded, the Voyage Charterer may be expected to take an interest in the movements of the ship which the Voyage Charterer would not have prior to loading.” To circumvent issues related to identifying the ultimate consignee, the Voyage Charterparty can require the Ship Master to issue a Notice of Readiness (NOR) to specified Port Agents at the Discharging Port.
Actual Readiness to Load
Whether a ship is Ready to Load is determined by several factors, including the ship’s position, its physical ability to receive the cargo, and compliance with all Port Health Authority (PHA) and documentary requirements. Regarding the ship’s physical position, it is now established that a Notice of Readiness (NOR) to load can be issued even if starting the Loading Operation is impossible because the ship is not in Berth. Thus, if other conditions are satisfied, a ship may be considered ready to load once it qualifies as an Arrived Ship under a Port Charterparty or when the Voyage Charterparty specifies that Laytime begins to run “Whether the ship is in Berth or Not” (WIBON).
From a physical perspective, a ship is not Ready to Load unless it is cleared and prepared in all its Cargo Holds to allow the Voyage Charterer complete control of every part of the ship allocated for cargo, except for the space reasonably required for Ballast to maintain stability. The Voyage Charterer must have immediate access to all the Cargo Holds, and therefore, the ship is not Ready to Load as long as even a small amount of previous cargo remains in any Cargo Hold that needs to be discharged, or if over-stowed cargo must be removed to access the Voyage Charterer’s cargo.
Another aspect of the ship’s Physical Readiness includes its Cargoworthiness, meaning that “the ship must be fit to receive the agreed cargo.” Therefore, Cargo Holds must be clean and free from contamination, the ship’s gear must be operational, and any special equipment required for specific cargoes must be available and set up. However, if the Voyage Charterer is given a choice among a range of cargoes, the ship may legally be considered Ready to Load even if it is not specifically fit to receive the particular cargo chosen by the Voyage Charterer.
The requirement for a ship to be Ready to Load, however, is moderated by the principle of De Minimis, which suggests a somewhat less stringent test for Port Charterparties compared to Berth Charterparties. For ships at Berth, it is generally required that they be fully prepared to receive cargo before issuing a Notice of Readiness (NOR). However, it has been established that an Arrived Ship under a Port Charterparty may issue a Notice of Readiness (NOR) even if the hatches have not yet been removed or the discharging gear rigged, provided that these tasks can be completed by the time the ship berths.
The final component of Ship Readiness involves compliance with Port Regulations, including satisfying Port Health Requirements and securing the necessary documentation. In this regard, several of these prerequisites are often seen as mere formalities. Shipowners have been permitted to issue a Notice of Readiness (NOR) even if they have not yet received Free Pratique (WIFPON Whether In Free Pratique Or Not), or a local police permit to move upriver. However, such a Notice of Readiness (NOR) would likely be rendered ineffective if the Ship Master does not obtain the required documentation by the time, or shortly after, the ship berths.
A- Preliminary Voyage
Voyage Charterer’s Nomination of Loading Port
The loading port may be explicitly specified in the Voyage Charterparty, or the Voyage Charterer may be given the right to nominate a port from a specified geographical area, such as “One Safe Port (SP) East Coast of India,” or from a list of ports named in the Voyage Charterparty. When the port is specified in the Voyage Charterparty, the Shipowner has an absolute obligation to proceed to that port, barring usual exceptions, and there is no implied warranty by the Voyage Charterer regarding the safety of the port.
If the Voyage Charterer has the right to nominate the port, they must make their choice either within the time specified or within a reasonable timeframe. Should the Voyage Charterer fail to do so, the Shipowner cannot withdraw the ship but must wait for further instructions unless the delay becomes so extended that it results in the frustration of the Voyage Charterparty. However, the Voyage Charterer is liable for any losses the Shipowner incurs due to delays in receiving port nomination instructions. Once the Voyage Charterer has made their selection, the chosen port is treated as if it had been originally specified in the Voyage Charterparty, and this choice is irrevocable.
In choosing a port, the Voyage Charterer has broad discretion within the indicated range and is not required to consider the convenience of the Shipowner. Consequently, the Voyage Charterer may nominate a port that is busy or affected by strikes, and the Shipowner has no basis for complaint unless the resultant delay is so prolonged that it frustrates the purpose of the Voyage Charterparty. For instance, in the case of Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Ministry of Agriculture, the Voyage Charterer nominated the Port of Vancouver during a strike by elevator operators. The strike prevented loading for over six weeks, yet the court determined that the delay was not unreasonable enough to frustrate the Voyage Charterparty. Not only was the Voyage Charterer within their rights to nominate a strike-affected port, but they could also invoke a strike clause in the Voyage Charter to avoid liability for demurrage incurred during the waiting period. It was noted that Voyage Charterparties are seldom frustrated by strikes as they are inherently unpredictable and could be resolved suddenly. Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that in specific scenarios, courts may be inclined to limit an entirely unfettered choice of port. In a recent case where the Voyage Charterer had the right to nominate “1/2 Safe Ports (SP) all India,” the court ruled that the Voyage Charterer was not entitled to nominate ports in a non-geographical order.
The right to nominate a port in a Voyage Charterparty is typically paired with a clause mandating that any nominated port must be safe. This requirement is a natural extension of the right to nominate, ensuring the Shipowner’s interests are adequately safeguarded. Recent legal interpretations have indicated that, in the absence of such a clause within the Voyage Charterparty, Common Law does not automatically impose a similar obligation. If the Voyage Charterer fails to nominate a safe port, the damages recoverable may include actual physical damage to the ship, losses due to delays, and extra costs incurred from having to unload the cargo at an alternative port. Additionally, if an obstruction prevents the Voyage Charterer from loading a full cargo, they may also be liable for claims of Dead Freight (DF).
The Shipowner’s primary duty during the preliminary or carrying voyage is to transport his ship to the port specified in the Voyage Charterparty or nominated by the Voyage Charterer. However, this obligation is often modified by the clause “or so near thereto as the ship may safely get.” If this clause is invoked successfully, the contractual voyage is deemed complete upon the ship’s arrival at an alternative port. Consequently, the Shipowner may then claim the full Freight, and the consignee is responsible for the costs associated with transporting the cargoes to the originally intended destination. Due to the significant implications of this clause, it has been interpreted narrowly, leading to substantial litigation over when it can be applied and the suitability of any Alternative Port chosen by the Shipowner.
The cases demonstrate that a Shipowner can only rely on the Voyage Charterparty clause “or so near thereto as the ship may safely get” when there is an obstruction or hazard of a permanent nature, or one that would cause an unreasonable commercial delay, preventing entry into a Port. Temporary obstacles like high winds or unfavorable tides do not warrant invoking this clause. For example, in the Metcalfe v Britannia Ironworks case, a ship destined for Taganrog could not enter due to ice blocking the Sea of Azov, expected to last until April. However, the Shipowner was not allowed to invoke the clause to unload at a nearby port at the mouth of the Sea of Azov, as the court considered the ice a temporary obstacle. This ruling was influenced by the fact that Taganrog was explicitly named in the Voyage Charterparty, and it was expected that the Shipowner should have been aware of the typical winter conditions in the Sea of Azov.
Conversely, in The Athamas case, when pilotage authorities on the Mekong River prevented the ship from proceeding to Phnom Penh due to strong currents, the Court of Appeal permitted the master to use the clause to justify unloading at Saigon after determining that safe passage would not be possible for an additional five months.
Concerning the choice of an Alternative Discharging Port, conflicts of interest between the consignee and the Shipowner frequently arise. The consignee aims to have the cargo unloaded as close to the intended destination as possible to reduce additional transport costs, while the Shipowner favors a nearby Safe Port (SP) with suitable discharging facilities. To address this, courts have applied the Ambit Test, requiring that the chosen Alternative Port be within a reasonable proximity to the original port. This test aims to restrict the broad interpretation of the “so near thereto” clause, which, if taken literally, could permit a Shipowner to unload at the loading port if a permanent obstruction prevented departure.
The Ambit Test was rigorously applied in the Metcalfe case, where a port at the mouth of the frozen Sea of Azov was not considered within the ambit of Taganrog, some 300 miles away. However, more recent cases have indicated a more flexible approach to the Ambit Test, recognizing that “distance is relative” and that Voyage Charterers and Shipowners are assumed to possess standard commercial knowledge and understand that some regions have fewer ports. For instance, a distance of 250 miles might be reasonable in the South China Sea, where ports are sparse, unlike the densely ported North Continent.
In terms of the clause “so near thereto as the ship may safely get,” the term “safely” relates specifically to the safety of the ship, not the cargo. This includes not only physical obstructions and weather conditions but also political risks and delays due to port congestion.
To enhance the Shipowner’s protections, various modifications can be added to the Voyage Charterparty clause. Including the words Always Afloat (AA) shields the Shipowner from potential damage due to grounding, enabling the Shipowner to unload at the nearest Safe Port (SP) in case of significant delays. The modification “at all times of the tide Always Afloat” (AA) further broadens this protection by removing the necessity for the Shipowner to wait for a favorable tide.
Voyage to the Loading Port under Voyage Charterparty
It is uncommon for a ship to be in Berth at the Loading Port and ready to fulfill the Voyage Charterparty upon chartering. Typically, the ship is some distance away from the Loading Port and engaged in a prior Voyage Charter. Therefore, the ship must make a Preliminary Voyage to the designated Loading Port as stipulated in the Voyage Charterparty. This journey marks the initial phase of fulfilling the Voyage Charterparty, setting the stage for potential conflicts of interest between the Voyage Charterer and the Shipowner.
The Voyage Charterer requires at least an approximate Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) of the ship at the Loading Port to coordinate the availability of the cargo. An accurate Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) is crucial for the Voyage Charterer to avoid unnecessary storage expenses if the cargo is ready too early or additional Demurrage costs if the cargo arrives too late. On the other hand, the Shipowner is cautious about committing to a specific arrival time to evade liability for a Breach of the Voyage Charterparty should unexpected delays occur.
The basis for any Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) is the information about the ship’s current location and its availability from prior commitments. Most Standard Voyage Charterparty Forms contain a Clause that specifies the ship’s position at the time the Voyage Charterparty is signed. The courts place significant emphasis on the accuracy of this data. A notable discrepancy in the reported position of the ship constitutes a Breach of Condition in the Voyage Charterparty, providing grounds for the Voyage Charterer to terminate the agreement. In the absence of a precise commitment from the Shipowner, Common Law presumes an obligation for the Shipowner to embark on the Preliminary Voyage with Reasonable Dispatch. Failure to fulfill this duty allows the Voyage Charterer to seek Damages for any losses incurred due to the delay. However, the Voyage Charterer is not permitted to rescind the Voyage Charterparty unless the breach substantially frustrates the voyage’s intended purpose.
Expected Readiness in Voyage Charterparty
The Voyage Charterer typically desires greater accuracy, yet Shipowners often hesitate to commit to a precise arrival time at the Loading Port or a definite date for starting the Preliminary Voyage. Setting such specific timelines could make timing a crucial element of the Voyage Charterparty, and any deviation from the agreed schedule could be seen by the courts as a Breach of Condition, permitting the Voyage Charterer to terminate the Voyage Charterparty.
To mitigate this, most Voyage Charterparty Forms include a clause that requires the Shipowner to provide an estimated readiness date, accompanied by another clause that allows the Voyage Charterer to cancel the Voyage Charterparty if the ship does not arrive by a subsequent specified date (LAYCAN). These clauses collectively establish the earliest and latest dates by which the Voyage Charterer may need to begin loading and must accept the ship for loading, respectively. The Voyage Charterer benefits from minimizing the interval between these dates to reduce unnecessary storage expenses, while the Shipowner favors a longer duration to reduce the risk of losing the Voyage Charter should the ship be delayed on its Preliminary Voyage. The span of this interval often depends on the period between signing the Voyage Charterparty and the anticipated arrival at the loading port.
A statement from the Shipowner about the expected readiness date does not guarantee that the ship will be ready to load by that date. Thus, if the ship arrives later than this date, it does not inherently represent a Breach of the Voyage Charterparty, nor does it entitle the Voyage Charterer to Damages. Absent an Express Cancelling Clause, the Voyage Charterer cannot terminate the Voyage Charterparty unless the delay is extensive enough to frustrate the purpose of the contract. However, the Shipowner is expected to have an honest and reasonable belief that the ship will be ready by the specified date. If the Shipowner is aware that the ship will not reach the Loading Port by the designated date or has no reasonable basis for such a belief, it constitutes a Breach of Condition in the Voyage Charterparty, enabling the Voyage Charterer to repudiate the agreement. For example, issuing an unqualified Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) without verifying conditions at the relevant Port would be unreasonable if such checks could have disclosed potential problems like adverse weather, port closures, or berthing difficulties.
Cancellation Clause in Voyage Charterparty
Absolute Right to Cancel Voyage Charterparty
The Right to Cancel on the specified date (Cancellation Date) is an absolute right held by the Voyage Charterer and can be executed regardless of whether the ship’s delayed arrival is due to the Shipowner’s fault or an exception covered by the agreement. While such exceptions may shield the Shipowner from claims for Damages, they do not inhibit the Voyage Charterer from utilizing the Cancelling Option. Moreover, the inability to Nominate a Loading Port does not restrict the Voyage Charterer from canceling the Voyage Charterparty.
In the case of Mansell Oil Ltd v Troon Storage Tankers, the Voyage Charterparty provided the Voyage Charterer the ability to Nominate a Port within the Ghana/Nigeria range and also included an option to cancel the Voyage Charterparty if the ship was not delivered by a designated date. Before the start of the Voyage Charter, the Shipowner was obligated to perform significant structural modifications to the ship, which were not completed by the Cancellation Date. The Shipowner contested the Voyage Charterer’s attempt to cancel, arguing that the failure to Nominate a Loading Port was a Condition precedent to exercising the cancellation option. The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument on two fronts. Firstly, there was no explicit clause in the Voyage Charterparty that declared the Nomination of a Loading Port as a Condition precedent to cancellation, nor was there any rationale to imply such a clause. Secondly, implying such a condition would be futile since the ship was physically incapable of fulfilling any nomination at the time of cancellation.
Previous Voyage Charterparty
B- Loading Port Operation
Responsibilities of Voyage Charterer and Shipowner
The traditional division of responsibility for loading operations at Common Law between the Shipowner and the Voyage Charterer follows the Alongside Rule. According to this rule, it is up to the Voyage Charterer to bring the cargo alongside the ship, within reach of the ship’s tackle, at which point it becomes the Shipowner’s duty to load it on board. Conversely, during discharging operations at the destination port, the consignee must receive the cargo once it has been placed over the side by the Shipowner and is free of the ship’s tackle. This Alongside Rule effectively delineates responsibilities, assigning the costs of land-based operations to the Voyage Charterer and those conducted on board to the Shipowner. However, in modern shipping practices, this rule often does not reflect reality, as loading and unloading operations both ashore and aboard are typically carried out by stevedores. Moreover, bulk cargoes are usually handled not by the ship’s tackle but by shore-based equipment like elevators, grabs, or cranes, which are often owned or controlled by the Voyage Charterers. In such scenarios, the Voyage Charterparty might stipulate that cargoes are carried on Free In Out (FIO) terms, meaning that the Voyage Charterer will manage and finance both the loading and unloading operations.
Absent an explicit agreement to the contrary, Common Law applies the Alongside Rule, making the Voyage Charterer responsible only for the costs of moving the cargo to where the ship’s tackle can reach it. If the ship cannot berth in a particular port, this responsibility extends to covering the cost of lighter vessels needed to transfer the cargo to the ship’s side. The Voyage Charterer also bears the risk of any delays during this task, and according to the principle set in Grant v Coverdale case, cannot claim protection from exceptions applicable only to the ship loading operation.
Providing the Cargo
Typically, the Voyage Charterparty specifies the type and quantity of cargo the Voyage Charterer is to supply at the Loading Port, though how the Voyage Charterer procures this cargo falls outside the charter’s scope. The Shipowner’s concern is merely whether the cargo will be available at the Loading Port when needed. The Voyage Charterer has an absolute obligation to supply the cargo, and no excuse, such as inability due to crop failures, government export restrictions, or transport delays due to strikes or bad weather, is acceptable. Most Voyage Charterparties include Exception Clauses for delays in loading, but these generally cover only the actual process of loading the ready cargo, not delays in providing the cargo. This was underscored in Grant v Coverdale, where despite cargo being delayed due to ice blocking transport from a warehouse to the loading dock, the court held that the Exception Clause only pertained to the loading operation and did not cover delays in transporting cargo to the loading point. However, if storage facilities at a port are some distance from the loading berths, transporting the cargo between these points is considered part of the loading process and covered by the Exception Clauses. This was evident in cases involving container storage outside dock areas or wheat transported from distant warehouses to the loading port.
If difficulties in procuring a specific cargo are anticipated, the Voyage Charterer can mitigate the risk of failing to meet their obligations by ensuring the inclusion of a clearly worded Exception Clause in the Voyage Charterparty.
The cargo specified in the Voyage Charterparty is usually clearly defined, whether it involves a particular type, such as 50,000 tonnes of grain, or a range of possible cargoes, such as wheat, barley, or rice, from which the Voyage Charterer is free to select. Sometimes the agreement allows for any lawful cargo. The Voyage Charterer is obligated to supply cargo of the specified type(s), and attempting to load a different type constitutes a significant breach of the Voyage Charterparty, giving the Shipowner the right to terminate the agreement. If the Shipowner accepts a substituted cargo, it is implied that the Voyage Charterer will pay the current rate of Freight for that type of cargo as specified in the Voyage Charterparty.
When the Voyage Charterparty allows a choice among a range of Alternative Cargoes, the Voyage Charterer has the freedom to select from these options, even though the Freight Rates may vary for different cargoes. The Voyage Charterer is also required to load a full cargo from the available options. If certain cargoes later become unavailable, the Voyage Charterer must choose an alternative from the specified range. The intention to load a particular cargo does not constitute a definitive selection, and the Voyage Charterer cannot claim frustration of the Voyage Charterparty if the chosen cargo is unavailable. Even if the failure to load the selected cargo is covered by an Exception Clause, the Voyage Charterer remains obligated to load an alternative cargo. As Judge Viscount Radcliffe stated, “If a Voyage Charterer has undertaken to ship a full and complete cargo made up of alternative cargoes as in the terms, the Voyage Charterer’s obligation is to have ready at the Loading a complete cargo within the range of those alternatives. Consequently, the fact that the Voyage Charterer is prevented from loading one of the possible types of cargo by a cause within the Exceptions Clause, even though that is the type that the Voyage Charterer has himself selected and provided for, is not an answer to a claim for Demurrage (D).” This duty of selection, with its corresponding responsibility, continues until the final ton is loaded onto the ship. However, if the Voyage Charterer is prevented from loading their original choice of cargo, they are entitled to a reasonable period to make alternative arrangements.
In rare cases, a Voyage Charterer may have a true choice between different cargoes. For instance, in Reardon Smith Line v Ministry of Agriculture, the ship was chartered to carry “a full and complete cargo of wheat in bulk,” with the Voyage Charterer having the option to substitute up to one-third of the cargo with barley for an additional Freight charge. When a strike prevented the loading of any wheat, the House of Lords determined that the Voyage Charterer could rely on the Strike Clause in the Voyage Charterparty and was not obliged to load an alternative cargo of barley. The wording of the Voyage Charterparty provided the Voyage Charterer with a genuine choice between the two cargoes, and in the event that one type of cargo was unavailable, the Voyage Charterer was not required to load the other.
Cargo Amount
The allocation of responsibility for cargo provision in a Voyage Charterparty typically specifies how much cargo the Voyage Charterer must supply. When a ship is chartered for a specific export order or other defined consignment, the cargo description in the Voyage Charterparty will be precise, such as “1,000 Toyota Corolla cars,” clearly outlining the Voyage Charterer’s obligations. However, it is more common for Standard Voyage Charterparty Forms to include a clause that mandates the Voyage Charterer to provide a Full and Complete Cargo (FCC). This obligation is assessed based on the actual capacity of the ship rather than the capacity stated in the Voyage Charterparty, should there be a discrepancy. For example, in a case where a ship chartered to load a Full and Complete Cargo (FCC) of iron ore was guaranteed by the Shipowner to carry “50,000 tons, Excluding Bunkers (Fuel),” it was later found that the ship could safely carry 52,000 tons of this cargo. The Court of Appeal then held the Voyage Charterer responsible for shipping a cargo of 52,000 tons. It is important to note, however, that the DWCC (Deadweight Cargo Capacity) refers only to the Ship Holds and other parts of the ship typically used for cargo carriage. The Voyage Charterer is not required to provide ballast or fill spaces in cabins, Bunkers, or on Deck unless specifically agreed in the Voyage Charterparty.
To increase precision, the obligation to load a Full and Complete Cargo (FCC) often comes with a Voyage Charterparty Clause that specifies Maximum and Minimum quantities (MIN/MAX). Courts have interpreted this as obligating the Voyage Charterer to load either a Full Cargo or up to the specified Maximum amount, whichever is less. This also serves as a warranty by the Shipowner that the ship can carry the stipulated amount. A variation of this is the More or Less Owners Option (MOLOO), where the Ship Master declares a cargo amount between the specified Maximum and Minimum at the start of loading, setting the exact quantity to be loaded.
Some modern Voyage Charterparty Forms specify exact cargo quantities, either in tonnage, cubic capacity, or another measure, often with an allowance like “10% More or Less,” or qualified by terms such as “About.” Courts typically interpret “About” to allow a variance of 3% to 5%. If the Voyage Charterer fails to load the agreed cargo amount, it results in lost Freight for the Shipowner, and the Voyage Charterer could be liable for Damages in the form of Dead Freight (DF). The Voyage Charterer might also face additional expenses, such as needing extra ballast to compensate for cargo shortages, which are generally recoverable as Damages for Breach of Voyage Charterparty.
A particular challenge arises when the Voyage Charterer is entitled to ship a variety of cargoes of different shapes and sizes. The Voyage Charterer must ensure no Broken Stowage (BS) remains, filling gaps between items with other cargo to avoid liability for Dead Freight (DF) unless the loading method is a local custom.
If the Voyage Charterer fails to provide the agreed cargo upon the ship’s arrival at the Loading Port, the Shipowner must wait until Laytime expires. Even then, the Shipowner is not entitled to Withdraw the ship unless it is evident that the Voyage Charterer has no intention of loading a cargo or the delay would Frustrate the objective of the Voyage Charterparty. However, if the Voyage Charterer Expressly or By Conduct refuses to load, the Shipowner may treat this as an anticipatory Breach and Withdraw the ship before the Lay Days expire. The Shipowner must then take reasonable steps to mitigate losses, especially if other cargoes are available from different Shippers at that port. If the Shipowner does not accept the refusal as final, the Voyage Charterparty continues, and the Shipowner will have no claim if the Voyage Charterer later decides to load a cargo or if a supervening event Frustrates the further performance of the Voyage Charterparty.
Laytime
Laytime, as defined in the Voyage Charterparty, is the allotted timeframe within which the Loading or Discharging Operation must be completed. This period is fully at the disposal of the Voyage Charterer, who is deemed to have compensated for it through the Freight. Judge Salmon described Laytime as “a sort of bogey for the course.” Should the Laytime be surpassed, the Voyage Charterer is obligated to compensate the Shipowner through either Demurrage (D) or Damages for Detention (DFD). It is in the best interest of the Voyage Charterer for the Laytime to be as lengthy as possible to accommodate any unexpected delays. Conversely, it is economically beneficial for the Shipowner to ensure the Ship’s quick turnaround. To encourage quicker operations, the Ship might offer an incentive to the Voyage Charterer in the form of Dispatch Money (DM), should the Loading Operation conclude ahead of schedule.
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Laytime Calculation
Laytime can be specified in the Voyage Charterparty in various forms, such as a Specific Number of days or hours, or tied to a Fixed Rate of loading or discharge. At times, the phrasing of the Laytime Clause may be more General, such as when the Voyage Charterer commits to load the cargo with Customary Dispatch (CD), Customary Quick Despatch (CQD), or As Fast As the Ship Can Receive (AFA). These more General phrases are taken to mean that the Voyage Charterer must load the cargo within a Reasonable Time, in accordance with the customs of the port, and is expected to maintain Reasonable Dispatch throughout the Loading or Discharging Operation.
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Running Days (RD), Working Days (WD), Weather Working Days (WWD)
When Laytime is defined as a specific number of Days or Running Days (RD) within a Voyage Charterparty, the courts interpret this to mean uninterrupted 24-hour periods, unless specific days are excluded, such as Sundays and Holidays Excepted (SHEX) or Saturdays, Sundays, and Holidays Excepted (SSHEX). Without these exclusions, Laytime runs continuously through weekends, holidays, and other non-working periods like Saturday afternoons, even if work on those days at the Port is atypical. This formula is essentially an abstract method for computing Average Loading Time, and legality of work on those days within a particular Port is irrelevant. Traditionally, such periods are considered Calendar Days beginning at midnight.
Alternatively, Laytime can be delineated as Working Days (WD), which are days when work normally occurs at the Port, excluding Sundays and holidays (SHEX) or Fridays and holidays (FHEX) in Muslim countries. A Working Day (WD) encompasses the entire day, so it counts towards Laytime even if the Voyage Charterer does not plan to load or is unable to due to Bad Weather, unless an exception applies. The operational hours for loading on a Working Day (WD) are determined by the Port’s customs, and Saturdays typically count as full days despite potential half-day customs.
Weather Working Days (WWD) refine this further by excluding from Laytime calculation any working day that would have been disrupted by Bad Weather if loading had been planned. The intent of the Voyage Charterer during such Weather Working Days (WWD) is irrelevant; a day’s classification as a full or partial Weather Working Day (WWD) depends solely on the weather conditions themselves. If only part of the day is affected by Bad Weather, Laytime is adjusted accordingly. The term “Weather” is broadly defined and includes conditions like rain, gales, and ice that hinder loading. However, Weather must impact the loading process directly, not just the ship’s safety—thus, a ship moved from a Berth by the Harbour Master (HM) due to impending bad weather does not affect its designation as a Weather Working Day (WWD).
In contemporary Standard Voyage Charterparty Forms, Laytime might be calculated based on a specified daily loading or discharging rate, such as 10,000 tons per Weather Working Day (WWD). The number of Lay Days is calculated by dividing the total cargo amount by the stated daily rate, treating any resulting fractional day appropriately rather than granting an additional full day as in the past. This Laytime calculation can be specified further as a Daily Rate Per Hatch (PH) or Daily Rate Per Workable Hatch (PWH). In the Daily Rate Per Hatch (PH) scenario, the total rate is the product of the daily rate and the number of Ship Hatches. The concept of a Working Hatch refers to a Ship Hatch that is active because it either covers a Hold being loaded or unloaded. Once a Hold is filled or emptied, its Hatch is no longer considered “Workable.” The Average Daily Quantity (ADQ) of cargo loaded or unloaded cannot be determined until operations begin and will vary as these proceed. If all Ship Hatches remain Workable throughout the operation, then the Laytime calculation is straightforward, based on the time taken to load or unload the largest hold.
Laytime Suspension
How do interruptions from hindrances and obstructions affect Laytime during the Loading or Discharging Operations? If no specific Laytime is established or if the Voyage Charterer must load with Customary Dispatch (CD), it appears that any interruption that significantly disrupts the operations, provided it is beyond the Voyage Charterer’s control and he has otherwise conducted the operations with Reasonable Dispatch, will pause Laytime. Interruptions could include Strikes, Port Congestion preventing berth availability, or the ship being detained.
However, if Laytime is clearly specified in the Voyage Charterparty, the Voyage Charterer has a stringent duty to adhere to the designated timeframe and must manage the risks of any interruptions unless these are specifically addressed by Exception Clauses in the Voyage Charterparty or are due to the Shipowner’s actions. Consequently, the Voyage Charterer could be liable for additional costs due to delays from Port congestion, Strikes involving the Shipowner’s Stevedores, the need for additional Ballast to stabilize the ship during loading, or temporarily relocating the ship for safety reasons in Bad Weather. Yet, delays directly attributable to the Shipowner’s fault or actions taken purely for the Shipowner’s advantage, such as moving the ship away from a berth to refuel, would not count against the Voyage Charterer. Most Voyage Charterparty agreements include Exception Clauses that suspend Laytime for typical delays such as Port congestion, Strikes, Bad Weather, civil disturbances, or any other unforeseen events beyond the Voyage Charterers’ control.
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Completion of Loading Operation and ETC (Estimated Time of Completion)
Laytime is entirely at the Voyage Charterer’s disposal, as Laytime is considered paid for within the Freight. The Voyage Charterer has the liberty to use this time as seen fit, without the Shipowner being able to object, provided the designated Laytime is not exceeded. The manner in which the cargo is Loaded and Discharged is decided solely by the Voyage Charterer. The pace at which these operations are conducted is irrelevant to the Shipowner; only the total duration matters.
This principle was notably applied in the Margaronis Navigation Agency v Peabody case, where a ship was chartered to Load a Full and Complete Cargo (FCC) of maize at a rate of 1,000 tons per Weather Working Day (WWD), with Sundays and Holidays Excepted (SHEX). The Voyage Charterer directed the Stevedores to cease operations on Friday, December 27, after loading all but 11.81 tons of the required 12,600 tons, aiming to secure a January Bill of Lading (B/L). Loading resumed the following Tuesday and concluded within 40 minutes. Although the operation finished within the agreed Laytime, the Shipowner sought Damages for Detention (DFD), arguing that the Voyage Charterer had Detained the ship unnecessarily. The Court of Appeal, affirming the Arbitrator’s ruling, found that a shortfall of about 12 tons was not commercially insignificant given the precision of the loading equipment used, thereby justifying the temporary Detention of the ship until the cargo’s completion.
Conversely, after the completion of the Loading, the Voyage Charterer cannot Detain the ship if the Laytime has not elapsed. In the Nolisement (Owners) v Bunge y Born case, despite the Loading finishing 19 days before the Lay Days expired, the Voyage Charterer delayed for an additional three days in submitting the Bill of Lading (B/L) due to indecision over the Discharging Port. This resulted in the Voyage Charterer being liable for Damages for Detention (DFD) for two days. This scenario highlights the inconsistency in penalizing the Voyage Charterer for Detaining the ship post-Loading if they could maintain control by retaining a small amount of cargo.
It is essential to note that the Loading Operation includes not only bringing the cargo aboard but also its Stowage, typically the Shipowner’s responsibility. This process is considered part of the Loading and must be completed within the Lay Days, requiring the Voyage Charterer to deliver the cargo to the ship in time for Stowage.
With the end of the Loading Operation, the risk of delay due to unforeseen hindrances like ice or bad weather shifts back to the Shipowner, who then bears any associated costs.
Demurrage (D), Damages for Detention (DFD), and Despatch Money (DM)
Demurrage (D)
If the Voyage Charterer detains the ship beyond the agreed Lay Days, the Voyage Charterer is in Breach of the Voyage Charterparty. However, most Voyage Charterparties include a Clause allowing the Voyage Charterer to keep the ship for extra days to finish the Loading or Discharging Operation by paying a Fixed Daily Rate, known as Demurrage (D), which serves as Liquidated Damages.
Traditionally, this Extra Period (Demurrage) was legally described as Lay Days that must be paid for. This is misleading because it hides the fact that, although the Voyage Charterer is in Breach of the Voyage Charterparty, the Voyage Charterer is allowed, upon payment of the agreed Daily Rate, to detain the ship to potentially fulfill the broken Voyage Charterparty and thus reduce further Damage. Nonetheless, it is an unusual situation because, despite the Breach, the Shipowner cannot rescind the Voyage Charterparty and withdraw the ship during the Demurrage Period unless the Voyage Charterer’s failure to load constitutes a repudiation of the Voyage Charterparty, or the delay is so significant that it Frustrates the purpose of the Voyage Charterparty. This rule applies whether the Voyage Charter specifies a fixed number of days on Demurrage or no time limit is expressed, such as 5 days for the Loading Operation, followed by Demurrage at $10,000 per day.
At Common Law, Demurrage (D) is considered Liquidated Damages, and a Demurrage Clause (DC) is solely a construct of the Voyage Charterparty, functioning as a provision for agreed Damages for Detention (DFD) of the ship beyond the agreed Lay Days. The stipulated amount is recoverable by the Shipowner regardless of proof of Damage and represents the maximum amount recoverable for loss due to the Detention. Demurrage (D) thus covers losses of Freight under subsequent Voyage Charterparties affected by the delay or from the consequent decrease in the number of Voyages possible under a Consecutive Voyage Charterparty (CVC). However, Demurrage (D) does not limit claims for losses arising from other causes than Detention, such as failure to Load a Full Cargo.
Like any provision for Liquidated Damages, a Demurrage Clause (DC) can be invalidated by the courts as a penalty if the Daily Rate is set excessively high compared to the greatest possible loss that could result from the Breach of Voyage Charterparty. In such cases, the courts would deem the Shipowner adequately compensated by recovering the Shipowner’s Actual Loss. A similar principle does not seem to apply in reverse when the Daily Rate is unreasonably low. In such cases, the Shipowner cannot recover his Actual Loss but is limited to the specified Demurrage Rate, even if the delay was deliberately caused by the Voyage Charterer for his own benefit. Such a scenario could be prone to abuse when costs and Freight Rates are rising, leaving the Shipowner without an effective remedy if excessive delay causes the Shipowner to lose a subsequent Voyage Charter.
The actual Demurrage Rate (DR) will be specified in the Voyage Charterparty and is typically a Fixed Rate aligned with the current Freight Rates at the time the Voyage Charter is concluded. Since such Fixtures are often arranged well in advance, the figure may not reflect prevailing Freight Rates by the time Demurrage (D) becomes payable. Liability for Demurrage (D) payment starts immediately after the expiration of the Lay Days and continues uninterrupted through Sundays, Holidays, and other periods usually excluded from Laytime, such as Bad Weather Working Days (WWD). The guiding principle for Demurrage is “Once On Demurrage, Always On Demurrage.” For this reason, Laytime Exceptions generally do not apply to a Demurrage Period (DP) unless Expressly stated in the Voyage Charterparty. For instance, in a case where the House of Lords denied a Voyage Charterer the use of a Strike Exception after Laytime had ended, Lord Reid explained that “the Shipowner might well say: true, your breach of contract in detaining my ship after the end of Laytime did not cause the Strike, but if you had fulfilled your contract the strike would have caused no loss because my ship would have been on the high seas before it began: so it is more reasonable that you should bear the loss than that I should.”
However, the “Once On Demurrage, Always On Demurrage” rule can still apply even if the event covered by the Exception happens before Laytime expires. An Exception can be Expressly Stipulated in the Voyage Charterparty to cover the Demurrage Period (DP), such as when it is stated that Demurrage (D) is to be paid at $1,000 Per Hour unless detention arises from a Lock-out, Strikes, etc. Similarly, Demurrage (D) will not accrue during a period where the delay is due to the fault of the Shipowner or results from actions taken by the Shipowner for his own convenience. Demurrage (D) will, however, accrue where the delay is accidental and not due to the fault of either Shipowner or Voyage Charterer. Even when the delay results from a Breach of Voyage Charterparty by the Shipowner, Demurrage may still be payable if the length of such Delay is beyond the Reasonable contemplation of the parties as a possible consequence of the Breach.
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Damages for Detention (DFD)
If the Voyage Charterparty does not include a provision for the payment of Demurrage (D), the Voyage Charterer will be liable for Damages for Detention (DFD) for any period the Voyage Charterer detains the ship beyond the expiration of the Lay Days. In this situation, Damages are at large and will be determined by the court based on the Actual Loss suffered by the Shipowner, following the standard principles for Remoteness of Damage in the Voyage Charterparty. Damages for Detention (DFD) also apply where a Voyage Charterparty specifies a fixed number of days for Demurrage (D) payment, and those days have passed. In this latter case, the court typically assesses Damages at a rate equivalent to the agreed Demurrage Rate (DR), although either the Shipowner or Voyage Charterer can argue that the Demurrage Rate (DR) does not reflect the Actual Loss suffered by the Shipowner.
The Shipowner cannot withdraw the ship during any period for which Demurrage (D) payment has been agreed unless the delay frustrates the purpose of the Voyage Charterparty. Once the specified Demurrage Period (DP) has ended, the Shipowner is not obliged to stay in Port to complete the Loading Operation and is not limited to seeking Damages for Detention (DFD). If part of the cargo is loaded, the Shipowner may depart and claim compensation as Dead Freight (DF), or if no cargo is shipped by the Voyage Charterer, the Shipowner may cancel the Voyage Charterparty and pursue Damages at large. However, if the delay occurs at the Discharging Port, the Shipowner has little choice but to complete the Discharging Operation and claim Damages for Detention (DFD).
Despatch Money (DM)
Although Laytime is at the free disposal of the Voyage Charterer, the Voyage Charterer is not entitled to any reward under Common Law for completing the Loading or Discharging Operation in less time than allocated. Since it is often beneficial for a Shipowner to have the ship available as soon as possible, an incentive is frequently provided by including a Despatch Money Clause in the Voyage Charterparty. This clause allows the Voyage Charterer to receive payment at an agreed Daily Rate, typically set at Half the Demurrage Rate (DHD: Despatch Half Demurrage), for time saved. However, disputes often arise regarding the calculation of Despatch Time. The key question is whether Despatch Money (DM) is payable only for Laytime Saved or if it also covers Sundays, Holidays, and other periods typically excluded from Laytime calculations. There is a strong argument that Time Saved should be considered as Time Saved to the ship, similar to how time lost on Demurrage (D) is seen as time lost for the ship. Nevertheless, legal decisions have been inconsistent on this matter, and much depends on the specific wording of the Despatch Money Clause in the Voyage Charterparty. At one extreme, the clause might state that Despatch Money (DM) is payable for All Time Saved, while at the other, it might specify payment only for Laytime Saved.
Typically, the periods for which Demurrage (D) or Despatch Money (DM) are payable are calculated separately at the Loading Port and the Discharging Port. Consequently, it is of little benefit to the Voyage Charterer to receive Despatch Money (DM) at one Port if they incur Demurrage at the other Port, given that the Demurrage Rate (DR) is usually set at twice the rate of Despatch Money (DM). The Voyage Charterer would prefer to offset time saved at the Loading Port against time lost at the Discharging Port or vice versa. This can be achieved in two ways: either by stipulating that Laytime shall be Reversible Laytime or that the time for Loading and Discharging shall be Averaged Laytime. When Laytime is Reversible Laytime, the Voyage Charterer can combine the time used at each Port and subtract these periods from the Overall Laytime until it is exhausted. Allowances will be made for Sundays, Holidays, and other periods excepted from Laytime calculation. Under Averaged Laytime, the amount of Laytime used at each Port is calculated separately, and Time Saved at one port is set against excess time used at the other Port. The main difference between the two Laytime Calculations is that in Averaged Laytime, the Voyage Charterer might receive credit for Time Saved, such as on Sundays, which would not have counted as Laytime. It appears that the Voyage Charterer has the option to invoke such provisions and will be presumed to have chosen not to do so if they claim Despatch Money (DM) at the Loading Port.
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C- Carrying Voyage
Once the Loading Operation is complete, responsibility for fulfilling the Voyage Charterparty shifts to the Shipowner. The Shipowner must proceed with Reasonable Dispatch (RD) to transport the cargo to the designated Discharging Port. Since Freight is determined by the cargo carried rather than the time taken for the Voyage Charter, the Shipowner benefits from completing the Carrying Voyage as quickly as possible, though they are protected by exceptions for delays beyond their control. Typically, the Shipowner will notify the Consignee of the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) at the Discharging Port (DP). However, there is no Cancelling Clause for this Carrying Voyage, as the cargo owner has little incentive to cancel the Voyage Charterparty at this stage.
The Carrying Voyage ends when the ship becomes an Arrived Ship at the Discharging Port and is ready to unload the cargo. These conditions are the same as those for the Preliminary Voyage, and once met, Laytime begins to run, which is the Voyage Charterer’s responsibility.
If the Voyage Charterer has the explicit right to Nominate a Berth, the ship does not become an Arrived Ship until it reaches the specific Berth named in the Voyage Charterparty. When exercising this option, the Voyage Charterer is not obligated to consider the Shipowner’s convenience and may even Nominate a congested Berth, provided the resulting delay is not so extensive as to Frustrate the purpose of the Voyage Charterparty. Without an explicit right to nominate a Berth, the Voyage Charterer appears to still have the option to select the Berth but must assume the risk of any delays from their choice.
English Law does not mandate giving Notice of Readiness (NOR) at the Discharging Port. It is the Consignee’s responsibility to monitor the ship’s arrival. In practice, this poses few issues for the Voyage Charterer since modern Standard Voyage Charterparty Forms typically include a clause requiring the Shipowner to provide Notice of Readiness (NOR). Even at Common Law, Notice of Readiness (NOR) must be given if the Shipowner does not reach the designated port but invokes the “so near thereto as the ship can safely get clause.” Similarly, the Voyage Charterer does not bear the risk of any delay if their failure to learn of the ship’s arrival is due to the Shipowner’s fault.
D- Discharging Port Operation
Cargo Delivery
Cargo Delivery to the Right Person
The Shipowner is also obligated under the Voyage Charterparty to ensure that the Cargo is delivered at the Discharging Port to the rightful recipient. Typically, few issues arise when the Voyage Charterer is also the Consignee since the Voyage Charterer’s identity will be known, and the cargo is usually covered by a Non-negotiable Receipt, which does not require presentation for delivery. However, when a Bill of Lading (B/L) is issued, the situation becomes more complex. The Shipowner’s primary obligation is to deliver the Cargo to the Consignee named in an Un-indorsed Bill of Lading (B/L) or to the individual to whom the Bill of Lading (B/L) has been validly endorsed. If the Shipowner delivers the Cargo upon presentation of the Bill of Lading (B/L) accordingly, the Shipowner is typically protected, provided he is unaware of any other claims or circumstances that should raise suspicion. For instance, in the Glyn, Mills & Co v East and West India Dock Co case, cargo was to be delivered “to Cottam & Co or assigns.” Cottam & Co deposited one Bill of Lading (B/L) from the set with the Claimant Bank as collateral for a loan, then later obtained delivery of the cargo at the Discharging Port using the second Un-indorsed Bill of Lading (B/L). It was ruled that delivery was made in good faith and without knowledge of the bank’s claim, so no liability for wrongful delivery occurred, even though only one Bill of Lading (B/L) from the set was presented.
If the Shipowner is aware of competing claims, he risks liability for conversion of the cargo’s full value if he delivers to anyone other than the rightful recipient. In such situations, the Shipowner should interplead and withhold delivery until the disputing claimants settle the matter in court at their own expense. Finally, a Shipowner who delivers cargo without the presentation of a Bill of Lading (B/L) does so at his own risk, even if delivery is to the person named as Consignee in the Bill of Lading (B/L). Traditionally, such delivery has been considered a Fundamental Breach of the Voyage Charterparty, and if the cargo is delivered to the wrong person, it may prevent the Shipowner from relying on Bill of Lading (B/L) exceptions for protection.
Absence of Consignee
The challenge facing the Shipowner upon arrival at the Discharging Port may be the absence of any Consignee ready to receive the cargo. As the Shipowner has a duty to make personal delivery of the cargo, simply unloading the cargo and leaving it on the dockside does not discharge that obligation under Common Law. In such circumstances, the Shipowner must allow the Consignee a Reasonable Time to collect the cargo. If the Consignee fails to do so, the Shipowner may land and warehouse the cargo at the Consignee’s Expense. However, it is questionable whether the Shipowner can absolve himself of his strict liability as a Carrier merely by warehousing the cargo, although he retains the protection of the carriage exceptions to counterbalance any such potential liability.
Personal delivery might be excused by the Custom of the Port or by an Express Clause in the Voyage Charterparty. For instance, in certain ports, Cargo Delivery to a dock company or to harbor porters may be regarded as equivalent to personal delivery to the Consignee. In the Chartered Bank of India v British India Steam Navigation Co case, such an Express Clause was accompanied by a provision stating that the Shipowners’ liability would cease absolutely as soon as the cargo was free of the ship’s tackle. These Voyage Charterparty Clauses were deemed effective in excluding the Shipowners from liability when a Port Agent employed by the Shipowner Fraudulently delivered the cargo without presentation of the Bill of Lading (B/L).
For additional protection, the Shipowner must rely on the terms of the individual Contract of Carriage. Many Standard Bill of Lading (B/L) Forms include a selection of Remedies available to the Shipowner if a Cargo Owner fails to take delivery at the Discharging Port. These Remedies range from the basic right to discharge and warehouse the cargo to the right, after a specified period, to auction the cargo and recoup any outstanding Freight or other charges from the sale proceeds.
Delivery of Mixed or Unidentifiable Cargo
The Shipowner is responsible for delivering to the Consignee at the Discharging Port the specified quantity of Cargo consigned to them, in the condition in which it was Shipped. Issues arise when such Cargo is shipped along with similar cargo destined for other Consignees and loses its identity during the Carrying Voyage. This loss of cargo identity may occur either because the leading marks are obliterated or the cargoes themselves become irretrievably intermixed with other cargoes on the ship. In the latter scenario, it is generally immaterial whether the cargoes involved are liquid or consist of grain particles or their equivalent, as it would be commercially impractical to separate them in most cases.
The liability of the Shipowner in these circumstances depends on whether the event causing the loss of cargo identity is covered by an Exception Clause. For instance, the mixing of cargo may be due to a Peril of the Sea, or the Voyage Charterparty may have an Exception Clause excluding the Shipowner from liability for obliteration or absence of cargo marks. In such cases, while the Shipowner will avoid liability, the unidentifiable cargo will become the property of the Bill of Lading (B/L) Holders, who will hold as tenants in common of the whole, in the proportions in which they contributed to it. Judge Bovill expressed the principle as: “When goods of different owners become by accident so mixed together as to be undistinguishable, the owners of the goods so mixed become tenants in common of the whole in the proportions which they have severally contributed to it.”
The situation differs when the occurrence is not covered by an Exception Clause. The Shipowner will be in Breach of the obligation to deliver the specified cargo to the consignee and cannot reduce their liability by requiring the Consignee to accept an appropriate proportion of the mixed cargoes. The situation is further complicated if part of the Cargo is lost at sea while a portion of the remainder arrives at the Discharging Port in an unidentifiable state. In these circumstances, it may be impossible to determine what proportion of the claimant’s missing cargo falls into either category. In the Sandeman v Tyzack case, a quantity of bales of jute was shipped to various Consignees under a Bill of Lading (B/L) that recorded the appropriate Cargo Identification Marks. The Bill of Lading (B/L) Expressly Excluded the Shipowner’s liability for obliteration or absence of cargo marks. On discharge, 14 bales were missing, and a further 11 were not labeled as indicated in the Bill of Lading (B/L) and could not be identified as belonging to any particular consignment. In response to the claimant’s claim for Short Delivery of six bales from his consignment, the Shipowner argued that he should be required to accept an appropriate proportion of the 11 unidentifiable bales in mitigation of his loss. The House of Lords rejected this argument, stating that the Shipowner could only succeed if they could prove that the claimant’s missing bales were among the 11 unidentifiable bales. Only in such a case could the Shipowner rely on the Exception Clause covering “obliteration or absence of marks.” As Lord Loreburn stated, “apart from the 11 unidentifiable bales, there were 14 missing bales. It may be that the six which the appellants complain have not been delivered to them were among these 14. So, the Shipowner cannot prove, at least they have not proved, that the failure to deliver these six was due to any absence or obliteration of marking of such bales.”
Reference must be made to the situation where Part of a Cargo shipped in Bulk is Lost or Damaged during the Carrying Voyage as a result of an Excepted Peril. In such a case, the Shipowner is not required to apportion the loss or damage between the various consignees but can deliver the full quantity of sound cargo due to the First Consignee to take delivery.
5- Understanding Bill of Lading (B/L)
History of the Bill of Lading (B/L)
The Bill of Lading (B/L) originated in the 14th century as a Non-negotiable Receipt by a Shipowner for a merchant not accompanying the cargo. The document detailed the cargo’s type, quantity, and condition at the time of shipment. Over time, to mitigate arising disputes between Cargo Owners and the Carrier, terms from the Charterparty were integrated into the Bill of Lading (B/L). By the 18th century, it evolved to include a Negotiable feature through endorsement, catering to merchants desiring to sell their cargo prior to the ship arriving at the Discharging Port.
Historically, the Carrier’s obligation under a Bill of Lading (B/L) to safely deliver cargo was stringent, except for exceptions known as Common Law Exceptions, which included:
- Act of God,
- Public Enemies
- Inherent Vice
Despite these Exceptions, if the Carrier’s Negligence contributed to a loss, liability was maintained. The Carrier’s obligation mirrored the Shipowner’s under a Charterparty. However, with the rise of contract freedom in the 19th century, Bill of Lading (B/L) Carriers began incorporating Clauses limiting their Common Law Liability. The culmination of this trend was the attempt by some Carriers to exempt themselves entirely from liability, even if Negligence was involved. Pushback from Shippers, Bankers, and Underwriters led to model Bill of Lading (B/L) in some regions and protective legislation like the Harter Act 1893 in the United States, which aimed to restrict the exclusion of Carrier Liability.
Over time, it became clear that such fragmented legislation was inadequate, but many shipowning nations were concerned that abandoning contract freedom would lead to higher Freight Rates, disadvantaging their Carriers. An international solution became necessary, leading to discussions among Shipowners, Shippers, Underwriters, and Bankers from leading maritime countries. These discussions, facilitated by the International Law Association’s Maritime Law Committee in 1921 in The Hague, resulted in the Hague Rules after extensive negotiation. These rules, formalized at the Brussels Convention on 25 August 1924, sought to standardize certain aspects of the Bill of Lading (B/L) and ensure minimal protection for the Cargo Owner. While the Hague Rules didn’t cover all aspects of sea carriage, they defined essential Carrier obligations and limited the extent to which Carriers could protect themselves using Exception Clauses and Limitation Clauses. Subsequently, major maritime nations legislated the Hague Rules, including the United Kingdom with the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924.
Over the years, dissatisfaction has increased regarding the limited protection provided to Cargo Owners by the Hague Rules. The criticism focused on the restricted scope of the Hague Rules, as they typically only applied to outward Bill of Lading (B/L) and only during the tackle-to-tackle period. Furthermore, the Hague Rules applied to specific contract aspects rather than offering a comprehensive code, leading Cargo Owners to argue that the underlying philosophy was still tilted in favor of the Carrier.
However, opinions on how to advance were split. On one side, major ship-owning nations resisted substantial changes, preferring minor adjustments to the Hague Rules to rectify the most glaring issues. This stance led to a set of draft amendments known as the Brussels Protocol, finalized at a conference in Brussels in February 1968. The updated Hague Rules, now incorporating these amendments, are called the Hague Visby Rules. On the other side, some leading cargo-providing countries, mostly from Developing Nations, pushed for more extensive reforms. Their efforts through UNCTAD led to a new comprehensive code that covered all aspects of sea carriage contracts, resulting in the Hamburg Rules, which were formalized at a conference in Hamburg in March 1978 and came into effect on November 1, 1992, after receiving the necessary 20 ratifications.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom and several Western European countries chose to adopt the Hague Visby Rules and enacted laws to enforce the Convention. In the United Kingdom, this took the form of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, which became effective on June 23, 1977, after meeting the necessary ratification threshold. Several other states have also integrated the Hague Visby Rules into their maritime codes, applying them in international trade reciprocally.
This situation results in a complex international landscape regarding sea carriage contracts. While many countries still adhere to the original Hague Rules, 30 have adopted the Hague Visby Rules, and another 32 have adopted the Hamburg Rules. Additionally, a fourth group is implementing hybrid systems that combine elements from both the Hague Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules. This legal complexity does not promote the development of international trade, and a greater uniformity would be beneficial.
Main Functions of Bill of Lading (B/L)
When a Shipper wishes to send a cargo shipment overseas, they typically approach a shipping line, often through a Freight Forwarding Agent (FFA), to reserve space on a ship. The Carrier then instructs the Shipper on when and where to deliver the goods. Once delivered, the Carrier’s Agent issues a Receipt detailing the type and quantity of cargo received and its condition upon receipt. From that point, the Carrier generally controls the cargo and oversees its loading onto the ship.
Subsequently, the Shipper usually obtains a copy of the Carrier’s Bill of Lading (B/L) Form, available from the Carrier’s Agent or local stationers. On this form, the Shipper details the cargo’s type, quantity, marks, the Discharging Port, and the Consignee’s name. Upon receiving the completed Bill of Lading (B/L), the Carrier’s Agent verifies the cargo details against loading tallies and acknowledges them if required. After calculating the Freight and recording it on the Bill of Lading (B/L), either the Ship Master or Ship’s Agent signs the document and releases it to the Shipper in exchange for the Mate’s Receipt (MR) or similar document and any advance Freight payment. The Shipper can then either send the Bill of Lading (B/L) directly to the Consignee or use it in an international sales transaction involving a Letter of Credit (LC). In some cases, the Consignee might sell the cargo in transit, endorsing the Bill of Lading (B/L) to a buyer. Ultimately, the final Consignee or Indorsee presents the Bill of Lading (B/L) at the Discharging Port to claim the cargo.
This summary underscores the critical role of the Bill of Lading (B/L) in executing the carriage contract, and it is essential to examine the various functions of the Bill of Lading (B/L) more closely. The Bill of Lading (B/L) serves three primary functions:
A- Bill of Lading (B/L) as a Receipt for Cargo
B- Bill of Lading (B/L) as Evidence of Charterparty
C- Bill of Lading (B/L) as a Document of Title (DOT)
A- Bill of Lading (B/L) as a Receipt for Cargo
Originally, the Bill of Lading (B/L) was established as a basic Bailment Receipt necessary to ensure the delivery of cargo at the Discharging Port. It would typically document the quantity, description, and condition of the shipped cargoes as acknowledged by the Carrier. These recorded facts carried significant commercial implications. First, the Bill of Lading (B/L) acted as the basis for any claims regarding cargo that was either short delivered or damaged upon discharge. Second, in transactions involving cargo sold CIF (Cost Insurance Freight), where payment depended on the receipt of certain documents, the buyer could refuse these documents if the cargo’s description in the Bill of Lading (B/L) differed from that on the sales invoice. Under CIF (Cost Insurance Freight) terms, the buyer or bank could also insist on a Clean Bill of Lading (B/L), which verifies that the cargo was shipped in good order and condition. Third, these declarations could greatly affect the Bill of Lading (B/L)’s negotiability for a Consignee, particularly if the cargo was noted as damaged, making it less likely to be sold during transit.
In such scenarios, it’s vital for the Shipper or Consignee that the Carrier delivers precise and unequivocal statements about the cargo’s quantity and condition in the Bill of Lading (B/L). Without these statements, a Consignee faced with receiving short or damaged cargo would have to prove the cargo’s condition and quantity at the time of shipment. Although these details are usually filled in by the Shipper, the Carrier’s Agent might insert clauses like “weight, quantity, and condition unknown” or “Shipper’s count” to protect the principal before signing the Bill of Lading (B/L). Given the Carrier’s dominant bargaining position, Shippers often cannot prevent these clauses. To counteract this, the Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 3) allow Shippers to demand a Bill of Lading (B/L) with specified details:
Upon accepting the cargo, the Carrier, Carrier’s Agent, or Ship Master is required, at the Shipper’s behest, to issue a Bill of Lading (B/L) that must include:
a) Apparent good order and condition of the cargo
b) Leading Marks necessary for identification of the cargoes as provided by the Shipper before loading, ensuring these marks are visible on the cargo or containers in a manner that remains readable throughout the journey
b) The count of packages or pieces, or the quantity or weight, as specified by the Shipper
In exchange, the Shipper is considered to have vouched for the accuracy of this data entered into the Bill of Lading (B/L) and is responsible for compensating the Carrier for any losses due to inaccuracies. The Carrier is not required to provide a Bill of Lading (B/L) with this information unless explicitly requested by the Shipper and may decline if the data appears incorrect or unverifiable.
The Hague Visby Rules further dictate that such information in the Bill of Lading (B/L) should be regarded as Prima Facie Evidence of the Carrier having received the cargo as described, and becomes conclusive evidence against the Carrier once the Bill of Lading (B/L) is transferred to a Third Party acting in good faith. Although Common Law previously had similar provisions, the Hague Visby Rules remove the necessity for reliance, which was essential for activating the Estoppel mechanism under Common Law. Nonetheless, there remains some ambiguity about the consequences if a Carrier fails to meet a Shipper’s information request as per Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 3). A possible remedy, suggested by Judge Clarke in The Mata K case, is to apply Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 8) to nullify any clauses like “Weight Unknown,” although this approach could potentially contravene the intended purpose of Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 3), warranting further legal examination.
Should the Bill of Lading (B/L) incorporate a clause stating that assertions about the cargo’s quantity and condition “shall be conclusive evidence” against the Carrier, then no contradictory evidence would be admissible, even if the Shipper is the one challenging and the Carrier can demonstrate otherwise.
It is now essential to explore in greater depth each of the three roles of the Bill of Lading (B/L) as a Receipt Function, initially from the perspective of Common Law and subsequently under the Hague Visby Rules. This dual approach remains necessary as some transport contracts are not governed by the Hague Visby Rules.
Bill of Lading (B/L) Cargo Quantity
Bill of Lading (B/L) Cargo Quantity under Common Law
In the possession of the Shipper, the Bill of Lading (B/L) acts as Prima Facie Evidence under Common Law regarding the cargo’s weight or quantity. To evade liability, the Carrier is tasked with proving that the cargo described in the Bill of Lading (B/L) was not actually shipped. This burden is considerable, as the Carrier must conclusively prove that the cargo was indeed not shipped, rather than just likely not shipped. For example, in the case of Smith v Bedouin Steam Navigation Co, where 988 bales of jute were noted under a Bill of Lading (B/L) that 1,000 bales were shipped, Lord Shand asserted that the Carrier needs to provide evidence strong enough not just to suggest possible non-shipment, but to conclusively show non-shipment. This can be challenging to establish after the fact, especially if the Carrier was initially unaware of the non-shipment when the Bill of Lading (B/L) was signed, making it difficult to later ascertain the true status unless evidence like unshipped cargo found at the Loading Port can be presented. Nonetheless, if the Carrier can prove this, the Shipper should not gain financially as they have not truly incurred a loss based on the Bill of Lading (B/L) statement.
Previously under Common Law, a Shipowner could disclaim liability even to a bona fide Bill of Lading (B/L) transferee if it was demonstrated that the cargo was not actually shipped. This scenario was ripe for an Estoppel application as with condition statements, yet it was legally justified because the Ship Master was deemed not to have the Ostensible Authority to commit the Shipowner to such statements. In the Grant v Norway case, where the Ship Master acknowledged shipment of 12 unshipped bales of silk, the court ruled against the Bill of Lading (B/L) indorsees, stating they had no recourse when the absence of cargo was confirmed. Judge Jervis articulated that the Ship Master had no genuine authority to sign a Bill of Lading (B/L) unless the cargo was indeed shipped, and that it was unreasonable for anyone to presume such authority existed irrespective of the cargo’s presence.
Although endorsed in subsequent decisions, this judgment proved problematic as a Consignee’s reliance on a Bill of Lading (B/L) for quantity is as critical as reliance on cargo condition, yet protection through Estoppel was only afforded in the latter case. This also negates the intent behind requiring the Ship Master to verify shipped quantities. However, if the Ship Master possesses financial substance, he might be liable for damages arising from the breach of Warranty of Authority when making the statement.
Thankfully, the adverse impacts of this legal inconsistency have been largely alleviated by the Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 4), which declare that statements of quantity in a Bill of Lading (B/L) are conclusive evidence favoring a Consignee or Indorsee who accepts the Bill of Lading (B/L) in good faith. Yet, where the Hague Visby Rules do not apply, such discrepancies persisted until the enactment of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (Section 2). Effective from 16 September 1992, this act confirms that representations in a Bill of Lading (B/L) regarding the quantity of goods shipped or received for shipment are Conclusive Evidence against the Carrier in favor of a legitimate Bill of Lading (B/L) holder, aligning Common Law more closely with the Hague Visby Rules. However, it is not retroactive, nor does it protect those entitled under a Sea Waybill.
Under Common Law’s contract freedom, a Shipowner can negate the Prima Facie evidentiary effect of a quantity statement in a Bill of Lading (B/L) through endorsements such as “Weight and Quantity Unknown”, “Shipper’s Count”, or “Said to Weigh 100,000 tons”. In cases where a printed clause conflicts with a written quantity statement in the Bill of Lading (B/L), the courts generally interpret that the stated figure is merely the Shipper’s unverified claim.
In the case of New Chinese Antimony Co Ltd v Ocean Steamship Co, the Bill of Lading (B/L) for a cargo of antimony oxide noted 937 tons were shipped, but included a clause stating “weight, measurement, contents and value unknown”. The Court of Appeal determined that this clause meant the written statement did not serve as even Prima Facie Evidence of the shipped quantity. Judge Viscount Reading explained that the clause indicated the Shipowner received a quantity of ore claimed by the Shipper to weigh 937 tons, but the Shipowner neither confirmed nor accepted this weight except for freight calculation purposes.
Bill of Lading (B/L) Cargo Quantity under Hague Visby Rules
Hague Visby Rules (Article III Rule 3) state that the Shipper may request the Carrier to issue a Bill of Lading (B/L) that details the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity or weight of cargo, as declared by the Shipper. The Carrier is not required to issue a Bill of Lading (B/L) or acknowledge the quantity of cargo shipped unless specifically requested by the Shipper. Without such a request, Consignees or Assignees of the Bill of Lading (B/L) cannot demand adherence to this rule. Typically, however, the Carrier will issue a Bill of Lading (B/L) for his own purposes. The Carrier can choose how to quantify the cargo based on the information provided by the Shipper but is not obligated to acknowledge all provided metrics and can disclaim knowledge of others. For example, in the Oricon v Intergraan NV case, the Bill of Lading (B/L) acknowledged the receipt of 2,000 packages of copra cake “said to weigh gross 105,000 kgs for calculating Freight only.” Judge Roskill opined that while the Bill of Lading (B/L), as a Hague Visby Rules Bill of Lading (B/L), acknowledges the number of packages shipped and is Prima Facie Evidence of those numbers, it does not serve as evidence of the cargo’s weight. Under these conditions, the burden of proving the weight of the shipped cargo before succeeding in a short delivery claim rests with the Consignee. As for the evidentiary value of the Bill of Lading (B/L), the Hague Visby Rules align with Common Law by treating the Bill of Lading (B/L) as Prima Facie Evidence of the shipped cargo amount in the Shipper’s hands. The distinction arises in that the Bill of Lading (B/L) is treated as Conclusive Evidence once transferred to a Third Party acting in good faith, without the requirement for the Third Party to have given value, only requiring good faith.
Bill of Lading (B/L) Cargo Condition
Traditionally, the second type of statement in a Bill of Lading (B/L) concerns the Shipowner’s assertion about the cargo’s condition at shipping, referring only to its Apparent Condition as can be reasonably inspected from the outside. In the age of containerization, such statements often have limited value, typically only pertaining to the container’s or packaging’s external appearance, not the actual condition of the cargo within. The Shipowner’s Agent is obligated to record any observed damage during inspection and ensure the cargo is delivered in the same condition as received, barring contractual exceptions. Often, Shippers resist any endorsements on the Bill of Lading (B/L) that could compromise the issuance of a Clean Bill of Lading (B/L), required for shipments financed through a Letter of Credit (LC) from a bank, which necessitates a Bill of Lading (B/L) stating the cargo was shipped “in good order and condition.” However, Shipowners may not be entitled to Clause a Bill of Lading (B/L) even if the inspection reveals damage, provided the cargo’s condition is adequately described in the Bill of Lading (B/L). In the Sea Success Maritime v African Maritime Carriers case, despite a pre-loading survey by the Shipowners’ P&I Club finding rust and superficial damage on hot rolled steel coils, Judge Aikens ruled that Shipowners were not entitled to Clause the Bill of Lading (B/L) if the Charterer intended to include the cargo’s condition from the survey in the Bill of Lading (B/L). Judge Aikens interpreted the term “good” in “apparent good order and condition” to mean “properly” described in the Bill of Lading (B/L). Thus, even if cargo is described as damaged or imperfect, it can still be declared in “apparent good order and condition.” This might seem surprising, but practically, any Transferee of the Bill of Lading (B/L) would be as aware of the cargo’s condition as if the Bill of Lading (B/L) had been Claused (Dirty Bill of Lading B/L). Such a Bill of Lading (B/L) is unlikely to qualify as a Clean Bill of Lading (B/L).
Bill of Lading (B/L) Cargo Condition under Common Law
Similar to quantity representations, statements regarding the condition in which cargo is shipped are Prima Facie Evidence in favor of the Shipper but become conclusive evidence once the Bill of Lading (B/L) is held by a Bona Fide purchaser for value. In the Compania Naviera Vascongada v Churchill case, where timber stained with petroleum was issued a Bill of Lading (B/L) stating it was in “good order and condition,” Judge Channell ruled that the Shipowner was Estopped from denying the statement’s accuracy against an assignee of the Bill of Lading (B/L). The rationale for the Estoppel was the detrimental reliance by the Assignee, who argued that they were prejudiced because they accepted the Bill of Lading (B/L) as a valid tender under a contract for clean timber, based on the assurance of good condition, and paid the full contract price.
Such detrimental reliance is typically evident, whether because the shipment is part of an international sale and the purchaser was induced to pay the contract price by the Clean Bill of Lading (B/L), or because the Consignee of the Bill of Lading (B/L) secured delivery of the goods by presenting the Bill of Lading (B/L) and paying the required Freight. Estoppel has also been effective in favor of a party who advanced money to the Shipper secured by the Bill of Lading (B/L) and subsequently obtained delivery of the goods from the Carrier by presenting the Bill of Lading (B/L) and paying the Freight, even if technically not a party to the carriage contract. However, the Estoppel is only effective concerning defects that would be apparent upon a reasonable inspection by the Carrier or Carrier’s Agent. Thus, in the Silver v Ocean Steamship Co case, while the Shipowners were Estopped from claiming that cargo of Chinese eggs shipped in unclad 42-lb square tins was inadequately packed or that the tins were gashed at shipment, they were not estopped from alleging that pin-hole perforations in the tins existed at shipment, as such defects would not necessarily be evident upon reasonable inspection.
At Common Law, it is possible for the Shipowner to either disclaim responsibility for the accuracy of condition statements or to endorse the Bill of Lading (B/L) with a clause stating “Condition Unknown”. However, representations regarding the condition are typically seen as statements made by the Shipowner following a reasonable inspection of the cargo, distinct from representations about quantity or leading marks, which merely acknowledge the information provided by the Shipper. Thus, courts generally scrutinize any attempt by the Shipowner to negate the efficacy of such representations stringently.
For instance, in The Peter der Grosse case, a marginal endorsement stating ‘weight, contents, and value unknown’ did not negate a positive statement in the Bill of Lading (B/L) that the cargo was shipped in good order and condition. It is generally understood that a clear statement by the Shipowner that the cargo was shipped in “Good Order and Condition” will override any standard printed clause in the Bill of Lading (B/L) that suggests the condition of the cargo upon shipment was unknown.
If the cargo is found to be damaged at shipment, the Shipowner can qualify this by listing the observed damages on the Bill of Lading (B/L) in the form of a marginal endorsement. Such endorsements should specify the exact damage but can be phrased in a way that renders the condition representation too ambiguous to establish an Estoppel. In the Canada & Dominion Sugar Co Ltd v Canadian National Steamships Ltd case involving the shipment of a cargo of sugar, the Shipper was keen to secure a Clean Bill of Lading (B/L) and to facilitate his business arrangements, the Carrier agreed to issue a Bill of Lading (B/L) before completing the loading operation upon receiving assurances that there was nothing wrong with the cargo. Despite this, the Bill of Lading (B/L) stated that the cargo had been “shipped in apparent good order and condition”, but the Shipowner included a marginal endorsement “signed under guarantee to produce ship’s Clean Receipt”. In fact, the sugar had been damaged while on the wharf awaiting shipment, and the Mate’s Receipt (MR) later noted “many bags stained, torn, and resewn”. When the Assignees of the Bill of Lading (B/L) later brought an action, the Privy Council ruled that they could not rely on an Estoppel unless the condition statement in the Bill of Lading (B/L) was unambiguous and unqualified. The court reasoned that the qualifying words “Signed under guarantee to produce ship’s Clean Receipt” clearly indicated on the Bill of Lading (B/L) conveyed to any reasonable businessperson that if the Ship’s Receipt was not clean, then the statement regarding the cargo’s apparent order and condition should not be taken as unqualified. Given this qualification and the availability of the Mate’s Receipt (MR) to potential buyers, the court determined that the Assignee could not rely on the Estoppel.
Bill of Lading (B/L) Cargo Condition under Hague Visby Rules
Under the Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 3), a Shipper has the right to request that a Bill of Lading (B/L) include a declaration about the cargo’s apparent order and condition as assessed by the Carrier. This Bill of Lading (B/L) then acts as Prima Facie Evidence that the Carrier received the cargo as described, and it becomes conclusive evidence once it is transferred to a Third Party acting in good faith. Unlike Common Law, this rule does not require detrimental reliance.
The Ship Master is permitted to make marginal notes on the Bill of Lading (B/L) reflecting the true condition of the cargo but cannot incorporate clauses that exempt him from the mandates of the Hague Visby Rules (Art III). It is unexpectedly common for courts to accept these kinds of liability limitations from Shipowners on technical bases. For instance, in the case of Canada Dominion Sugar Co Ltd v Canadian National Steamships Ltd, it was argued that the Hague Visby Rules nullified the Shipowner’s statement that the Bill of Lading (B/L) was “signed under guarantee to produce ship’s Clean Receipt”. Lord Wright clarified that the Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 3) are applicable only if the Shipper specifically requests a Bill of Lading (B/L) that reflects the cargo’s apparent order and condition, and there was no such request in this situation.
A similar perspective was adopted by the United States Court of Appeals in the Tokio Marine & Fire Ins Co v Retla Steamship Co case, which involved shipping pipes from Yokohama (Japan) to Los Angeles (USA). Even though rust and moisture were noted on the tally-sheets and the Mate’s Receipt (MR), a Clean Bill of Lading (B/L) was issued with a clause stating that “apparent good order and condition” does not imply the cargo was free from visible rust or moisture. The court ruled that, because the Shipper did not ask for a revised Bill of Lading (B/L) that included these notations, the Consignee had to accept the initial qualification as valid under the Hague Visby Rules. This ruling highlights a concern that Consignees or Assignees might lose their rights due to such clauses.
Carriers are often pressured by Shippers to issue a Clean Bill of Lading (B/L) to facilitate sales or fulfill Letters of Credit (LC) requirements. Consequently, Carriers might overlook cargo defects in exchange for a Letter of Indemnity (LOI) from the Shipper, promising to compensate for any resulting losses from subsequent cargo receiver claims. However, such Letters of Indemnity (LOI) provide minimal protection to the Shipowner as they do not defend against third-party claims on a Clean Bill of Lading (B/L) and may be unenforceable if intended to defraud a Consignee or Bank. This was evident in Brown, Jenkinson & Co Ltd v Percy Dalton, where despite the Shipper’s promise to indemnify for issuing a Clean Bill of Lading (B/L) for damaged cargo, the Court of Appeal, led by Judge Evershed, declared the Indemnity (LOI) void due to fraud.
While Letters of Indemnity (LOI) are prevalent in international trade and are enforceable when no fraud is present, they are particularly useful in bona fide disputes about the cargo’s condition to avoid complications with Letters of Credit (LC). According to Hague Visby Rules, a Carrier may also refuse to verify the cargo’s condition if inspection is unfeasible, which could warrant a Letter of Indemnity (LOI) when a Clean Bill of Lading (B/L) is necessary. Nonetheless, such indemnity becomes invalid if the Carrier is aware of the falsity of the declaration.
Furthermore, the Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 5) grant Carriers a statutory Implied Indemnity against losses due to acknowledging the Quantity or Leading Marks based on inaccurate information from the Shipper. However, this rule does not extend to the cargo’s Condition and does not specify the legality of such an Indemnity if the Carrier is aware of the misinformation. In cases of uncertainty, it is advisable for the Carrier not to investigate, provided the Shipper is solvent and likely to fulfill the terms of the Letter of Indemnity (LOI).
Bill of Lading (B/L) Cargo Identification Marks
Quality or Identification Marks present on shipped cargo are typically documented in the Bill of Lading (B/L). Nonetheless, under Common Law, a Shipowner is not estopped from contesting that the cargo was shipped under the Marks described in the Bill of Lading (B/L) unless these Marks are vital to identifying or describing the cargo. This was illustrated in the Parsons v New Zealand Shipping Co case, where a shipment of frozen lamb carcasses was detailed in a Bill of Lading (B/L) that indicated all 608 carcasses bore the Mark 622X. However, only 507 of these bore the Mark 622X, with the remainder marked 522X. When the cargo reached the Discharging Port, the Indorsees for value of the Bill of Lading (B/L) refused to accept the 101 carcasses with the different mark, arguing that the Shipowners were estopped from denying that all carcasses shipped bore the 622X Mark. The trial judge noted that all carcasses were of identical quality and value, and the Seller had used the Marks solely for internal accounting. Consequently, a majority in the Court of Appeal concluded that since the Marks did not affect the goods’ identity, no estoppel was warranted.
Judge Collins emphasized, “The crucial aspect is the identity of the cargo shipped with those purported as shipped; that is the core of the Misrepresentation, and anything irrelevant to that identity should not be involved in the estoppel. Clearly, where Marks carry no market significance and reveal nothing to a Buyer about the nature, quality, or quantity of the cargo he is purchasing, it doesn’t matter whether the cargo bears one Mark or another.” He further elaborated that “an incorrect statement regarding such Marks complicates identification but does not alter the cargo’s existence or identity.”
However, if Cargo Leading Marks relate to the cargo’s identity or description, the Marks listed in the Bill of Lading (B/L) act as Prima Facie Evidence against the Carrier and as conclusive evidence when the Bill of Lading (B/L) is held by a Bona Fide Indorsee for value.
The Hague Visby Rules adopt a similar stance regarding Cargo Leading Marks, with provisions under Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 4) applicable solely to “Cargo Leading Marks necessary for identifying the cargo.” Shippers may insist that the Shipowner acknowledges such Marks, provided the “Cargoes are stamped or clearly displayed on the cargoes in such a manner that they should remain legible until the end of the voyage.”
Under the Hague Visby Rules, the Shipowner is not required to recognize any Quality Marks on the cargo in the Bill of Lading (B/L) unless they are essential to the cargo’s identity. If the Ship Master chooses to note such Marks voluntarily, it is established under Common Law that the Shipowner is not estopped from later proving that cargoes of different quality were shipped. The Ship Master generally lacks the Apparent Authority to include such Cargo Marks, often lacking the necessary commercial expertise to assess their accuracy. In the Cox v Bruce case, the Court of Appeal decided that the Shipowner was not estopped from contesting, against an Indorsee for value, that the quality Marks on a jute shipment had been incorrectly recorded on the Bill of Lading (B/L) by the Ship Master: “It was outside the Ship Master’s responsibilities to include these quality marks, thus the Ship Master did not have the authority to make such a representation, and it should not be assumed by any businessperson that the Ship Master possessed such authority.”
Other Representations in the Bill of Lading (B/L)
Although the Hague Visby Rules do not mandate the inclusion of extra details in the Bill of Lading (B/L), the Shipowner and Shipper may still add factual statements that could potentially establish an Estoppel for future holders of the Bill of Lading (B/L) who acquire it for value. An important example of such a detail is the issuance date of the Bill of Lading (B/L). If the Ship Master or Ship Agent is authorized to sign the Bill of Lading (B/L) on the Shipowner’s behalf, this authority extends to including the Date and Place of issuance in the Bill of Lading (B/L). In certain situations, if the sales contract requires the cargo to be shipped under a Bill of Lading (B/L) with a specific Date and the Loading Operation is delayed, a Bill of Lading (B/L) that is Back Dated may be issued. This backdated document might lead the Buyer to authorize payment based on its date. If the cargo arrives later than expected and the Buyer needs to purchase alternative supplies to fulfill his obligations, the Buyer (Consignee) has the right to seek damages from the Shipowner for Misrepresentation. This stance was solidified in the Grant v Norway case where the court robustly dismissed the claim that the Ship Agent didn’t have the authority to misstate the Date on the Bill of Lading (B/L). It’s unreasonable to presume that the specifics of the Ship Agent’s Authority to include correct dates are common knowledge, particularly since determining the accurate date is generally beyond the usual duties or capabilities of the Ship Agents. Under the right conditions, a similar Estoppel could be applicable to statements in the Bill of Lading (B/L) concerning the shipping date of the cargo.
B- Bill of Lading (B/L) as Evidence of Charterparty
Every Standard Bill of Lading (B/L) Form includes, on its reverse side, a set of Printed Terms or references to the detailed terms in the Long Form Bill of Lading (B/L). It’s widely recognized that these Printed Terms are not themselves the Charterparty (Contract of Carriage) but merely serve as Evidence of such a contract. The Charterparty, whether agreed upon in writing or verbally, is typically established well before the Bill of Lading (B/L) is drafted, based on prior negotiations between the Shipper and the Shipowner regarding the shipment of the cargo. Therefore, if the cargo is lost or damaged before the Bill of Lading (B/L) is finalized, the Shipper retains the right to seek legal remedies for any breach of contract. Furthermore, if the terms in the Printed Bill of Lading (B/L) that is later issued do not match the originally agreed-upon terms of the Contract of Carriage, the Shipper is not restricted from proving the actual terms that were agreed upon. This was underscored by Judge Lush in 1879, who stated: “The Bill of Lading (B/L) is not the Contract, but merely Evidence of the Contract of Carriage. Accepting a Bill of Lading (B/L) does not automatically bind one to all its stipulations without regard to the actual circumstances. If the Shipper was not made aware, or was not informed during the shipment process, that the forthcoming Bill of Lading (B/L) would include specific clauses, he has the right to expect that his cargo is handled according to the standard terms and to demand a Bill of Lading (B/L) that accurately reflects these terms.”
However, the primary legal discussion on this subject was prominently featured in The Ardennes case. In this instance, the claimant needed to ship mandarin oranges from Cartagena to London, hoping they would arrive before December 1 to sidestep an impending hike in import duties. He relayed this urgency to the Ship Agent, who verbally assured him that if the cargo was loaded by November 22, the vessel would head directly to London. Contrary to these assurances, the ship was already scheduled to carry other cargo to Antwerp, and the issued Bill of Lading (B/L) included a Liberty Clause that permitted stops at additional ports en route to London. Due to a stopover in Antwerp, the vessel did not arrive in London until December 4, after the duty increase and a significant drop in the market price of oranges because of other arriving cargoes. When the exporter sought compensation for breach of contract, the shipowner cited the Liberty Clause in the Bill of Lading (B/L) in defense. Lord Goddard supported the admissibility of oral evidence to clarify the original terms of the Contract of Carriage, affirming: “It is well recognized that a Bill of Lading (B/L) is not, in itself, the Contract between the Shipowner and the Shipper of cargo, though it serves as excellent evidence of its terms. The Contract of Carriage is in existence before the Bill of Lading (B/L) is signed, which is typically done by the Shipowner and handed to the Shipper after the cargo is onboard. If the Shipper discovers terms he disagrees with, or notices missing stipulations he had requested, he might, if feasible, demand the return of his goods. Nonetheless, this does not prevent him from demonstrating that a Contract of Carriage was in place prior to the signing of the Bill of Lading (B/L) and that this contract was different from or included additional terms not listed in the document. The Shipper does not participate in creating the Bill of Lading (B/L), nor does he sign it.”
If this assertion holds, two important qualifications must be considered. Firstly, the Bill of Lading (B/L) invariably serves as Prima Facie Evidence of the Charterparty Terms, and it can often be challenging for a party contesting its accuracy to meet the burden of proof. Secondly, it is misleading to broadly claim that the Shipper plays no role in the creation of the Bill of Lading (B/L). In most instances, the Shipper is tasked with inputting the cargo details and thus has a chance to review the other terms specified in the document.
Moreover, once endorsed to a Bona Fide Third Party for value, the Bill of Lading (B/L) becomes definitive Evidence of the Charterparty Terms. In the Leduc v Ward case, the indorsees of a Bill of Lading (B/L) sought damages for a consignment of rapeseed lost near the Clyde. They contended that an unjustifiable deviation to Glasgow by the ship invalidated the Shipowner’s reliance on the ‘Perils of the sea’ exception in the Bill of Lading (B/L). The Shipowner argued that the deviation was justified since the Shipper knew at the time of shipment that the ship would call at Glasgow. The Court of Appeal found that the Bill of Lading (B/L) conclusively evidenced the Charterparty Terms, basing its decision on the Bills of Lading Act 1855, which states that the indorsee of a Bill of Lading (B/L) “shall have transferred to, and vested in, him all rights of suit, and be subject to the same liabilities as if the contract contained in the Bill of Lading (B/L) had been made with himself.” Judge Fry supported his judgment on the premise that “the provision of the statute making the contract contained in the Bill of Lading (B/L) assignable is inconsistent with the idea that any interaction between the Shipper and the Shipowner not included in the Bill of Lading (B/L) could affect the contract.” This case thus represents another instance of the Estoppel Doctrine favoring a Bona Fide Indorsee of the Bill of Lading (B/L) for value, aligning with how courts perceive the Receipt Function of the Bill of Lading (B/L). However, Lord Esher extended this argument by asserting:
“It may be true that the Charterparty (Contract of Carriage) is created before the Bill of Lading (B/L) is issued, typically before the cargo is sent to the ship. But once the cargo is aboard, the Ship Master is authorized to formalize that contract in writing; thereafter, the general legal doctrine that prohibits oral evidence from altering or qualifying the written contract applies, making the document the sole Evidence of the Contract.”
This perspective not only applies to the Bill of Lading (B/L) held by the Shipper but also casts doubt on the authority of the decision in The Ardennes case. This argument is reinforced by the Bills of Lading Act 1855’s explicit reference to “the contract contained in the Bill of Lading (B/L),” a point Judge Fry emphasized, noting: “Here is a clear legislative declaration that there is a contract in the Bill of Lading (B/L), intended to benefit the indorsee under such circumstances. It thus seems impossible now to argue that there is no contract in the Bill of Lading (B/L), regardless of prior interpretations.”
Maintaining the ruling of The Ardennes case as incorrect and seeking to revive the full strength of the Parol Evidence Rule at this juncture would not align with the expectations of the reasonable businessperson. It is essential to remember that the Parol Evidence Rule has been significantly modified since the 1888 decision in the Leduc v Ward case, and rectification can be sought if the written document diverges from the terms of a prior oral agreement.
Moreover, Lord Goddard, before delivering his judgment in The Ardennes case, had thoroughly reviewed the Leduc v Ward case and concluded that it “was a case between the Shipowner and Indorsee of the Bill of Lading (B/L), where the terms are conclusive by virtue of the Bills of Lading Act 1855. In such cases, the statute establishes it as the contract.” Under these circumstances, it might be preferable to consider the principle of The Ardennes case still valid, as it aligns with commercial norms and the judicial approach to the Receipt Function of the Bill of Lading (B/L).
Bill of Lading (B/L) issued to Charterers
C- Bill of Lading (B/L) as Document of Title (DOT)
The Negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L) arose from sea transport due to the typically extended and slow journeys. Consequently, Cargo Owners required a Document of Title (DOT) to either obtain a Letter of Credit (LC) for international trades or exploit opportunities to sell the cargo while it was in transit. A Bill of Lading (B/L) acts as a Document of Title (DOT) solely if it is issued as an Order Bill of Lading (B/L), wherein the Carrier consents to deliver the cargo to a designated “Order” at the destination. If a Bill of Lading (B/L) specifies delivery to a Named Consignee, it is termed a Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) or Sea Waybill, lacking the negotiable feature necessary for it to be considered a Document of Title (DOT). The Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) is not as beneficial as security for a Letter of Credit (LC) and does not allow for the transfer of a legitimate title to the cargo during transit. The Order Bill of Lading (B/L), transferable by endorsement, essentially represents the cargo, and holding the Bill of Lading (B/L) is seen as equivalent to holding the actual cargo.
Judge Bowen eloquently noted in the Sanders v Maclean case:
“When cargo is at sea in the care of the Carrier, it is inherently impossible to deliver physically. During this transport and voyage phase, the Bill of Lading (B/L), as per merchant law, is universally accepted as the symbol of the cargo. The endorsement and delivery of the Bill of Lading (B/L) act as a symbolic delivery of the cargo. The property in the cargo changes hands through such endorsement and delivery of the Bill of Lading (B/L) when it is intended by the parties that ownership should transfer, similarly to how it would through physical delivery of the cargo. It functions as the key that, in the hands of its rightful owner, opens the door to the warehouse, be it stationary or mobile, where the cargo is located.”
The possession of the Bill of Lading (B/L) equates to possession of the covered cargo for three key reasons:
- The Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder is guaranteed delivery of the cargo at the Discharging Port.
- The Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder has the ability to transfer ownership of the cargo during transit by endorsing the Bill of Lading (B/L).
- The Bill of Lading (B/L) can act as collateral for a debt.
The development of the Bill of Lading (B/L) as a Document of Title (DOT) has been so effective that it now serves three distinct functions relating to the Charterparty, the sale of cargo in transit, and the facilitation of a Letter of Credit (LC). Nevertheless, there is a widespread sentiment, particularly among Shipowners, that these varied roles should be distinct to avoid the Carrier being burdened with issues unrelated to their direct responsibilities.
Bill of Lading’s (B/L’s) Function in Contract of Sale
Endorsement and delivery of the Bill of Lading (B/L) typically result in the transfer of ownership of the cargo to the Indorsee, provided four conditions are satisfied:
a- The cargo must be in transit at the time of the Bill of Lading (B/L) Endorsement. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the cargo should be at sea, but it should be under the control of a Carrier or Freight Forwarding Agent (FFA) for transport purposes and not yet delivered to the designated recipient at the Discharging Port. The ability to assign is forfeited once the cargo has been delivered, a delivery warrant has been issued, or a delivery order has been accepted.
b- The Bill of Lading (B/L) must be explicitly transferable. Specifically, the Bill of Lading (B/L) should be an Order Bill of Lading (B/L) that is deliverable to the “Order” of the Shipper or Consignee. This is not applicable when the Bill of Lading (B/L) designates delivery solely to a specific individual or states that it is Non-negotiable. Bills of Lading (B/Ls) are typically issued in sets of three to six Originals (Original Bill of Lading (B/L)), and barring any special agreements to the contrary, endorsing one Bill of Lading (B/L) from a set is enough to transfer ownership of the cargo. Any subsequent endorsements of the remaining Original Bills of Lading (B/Ls) will not affect cargo ownership. This principle was affirmed in the Barber v Meyerstein case, where after the cargo’s initial sale and partial endorsement, attempts to leverage another Bill of Lading (B/L) for an advance from a Third Party were ineffectual. Lord Westbury ruled that the initial transfer secured the cargo, making any later transactions with other Bills of Lading (B/Ls) legally inferior.
c- The Bill of Lading (B/L) must be endorsed by someone with legal cargo title. Possessing the Bill of Lading (B/L) equates to holding the cargo itself, meaning the Indorsee receives no better title than that of the Indorser. The Bill of Lading (B/L) lacks the properties of a Negotiable instrument. Essentially, endorsing a Bill of Lading (B/L) assigns the right to receive the described cargo at its destination and releases the Shipowner from further obligation. It does not confer ownership rights that the Shipper did not have, as possession of the Bill of Lading (B/L) would not outweigh actual possession of the cargo.
d- The endorsement must reflect a clear intent to transfer cargo ownership as stipulated by the Bill of Lading (B/L). Only the ownership level that the parties intended at the time of the Bill of Lading (B/L) Endorsement will be transferred. Possible scenarios include:
- Parties intend a complete transfer of property, such as in a standard sales contract.
- No transfer of property rights to the cargo is intended, often in cases like internal cargo movements between branches of the same company in different countries—a frequent occurrence in multinational companies where no change in ownership is anticipated. Additionally, a Seller might ship cargo under a sales agreement yet retain ownership as security until payment is made. Normally, ownership passes to the buyer when goods are unconditionally allocated to the contract with both parties’ consent, express or implied. This typically occurs in export sales when the seller delivers the cargo to a Carrier for the buyer. To safeguard an unpaid Seller’s interests, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 allows the Seller to reserve disposal rights over the cargo, preventing ownership transfer until payment is received. This right may be exercised explicitly by naming the Seller or the Seller’s Agent as Consignee, or by attaching a Draft Bill of Exchange to the Bill of Lading (B/L) sent to the Buyer.
- The endorsement might be intended merely as a pledge for temporary security against a loan. In such cases, there is no intent for the creditor to become the owner of the cargo, although provisions might allow for later ownership should the loan remain unpaid. Blank endorsements are often made to banks as collateral for loans.
Bill of Lading’s (B/L’s) Function in Financing Contract of Sale
A significant portion of international trade is facilitated by banks using a system of documentary credits (Letter of Credit LC). Within this framework, the prospective Buyer asks his bank to issue a Letter of Credit (LC) in favor of the Seller. To access these funds, the Seller must ship the contracted cargo and then present the required documents in the specified form to the bank. The specific responsibilities of the Seller and Buyer are determined by the terms of the credit, but standard formats for these transactions are recommended by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) under the title Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits. For example, in a typical CIF (Cost Insurance Freight) contract, once the cargo is shipped, the Seller must provide the bank with the Bill of Lading (B/L), the Original Sales Invoice, and an Insurance Policy that covers the cargo during transit. Upon presenting these documents as stipulated by the bank, the Seller is entitled to receive payment of the contract price.
The Bill of Lading (B/L) is crucial to any system of Documentary Credits. Initially, the bank uses the Bill of Lading (B/L) to verify that the Seller has met all the conditions set by the bank for the credit before releasing any funds. This includes checking the cargo’s quantity and description on the Bill of Lading (B/L) against the Sales Invoice to identify any discrepancies. The bank also considers the shipping date, the cargo’s condition upon shipment, and whether the cargo was loaded on deck. The Letter of Credit (LC) typically requires a Shipped Bill of Lading (B/L) rather than a Received Bill of Lading (B/L), which merely acknowledges that the cargo has been handed over to the Carrier. Banks are generally cautious about accepting terms from any Charterparty that might apply to the ship carrying the cargo.
Besides the details listed in the Bill of Lading (B/L), the bank values its role as a Negotiable Document of Title (DOT), offering the necessary security for the credit. Should the Creditor default, the bank can take control of the cargo via the Bill of Lading (B/L) to mitigate its losses. However, a potential security issue arises because the Bill of Lading (B/L) is often issued in several Originals. This poses a risk that another Original Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder might claim the cargo at the Discharging Port before the bank. To prevent this, the Letter of Credit (LC) terms usually require that all Original Bills of Lading (B/L) be submitted to the bank before any funds are disbursed.
Bill of Lading’s (B/L’s) Function in Carriage Contract
The fundamental function of a Bill of Lading (B/L) as a Document of Title (DOT) pertains mainly to its relationship with the Charterparty. In this context, the representation of the cargo by the Bill of Lading (B/L) during transit results in several implications:
- The Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder has control over the cargo throughout the transit.
- A lawful Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder is entitled under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 to pursue legal action under the Charterparty as if they were an initial signatory. Such lawful holders only assume the associated liabilities when they either take or request delivery of the cargo from the Carrier, or start a claim for damage or loss.
- The Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder has the right to claim delivery of the cargo at the Discharging Port upon presenting the Bill of Lading (B/L).
The second point needs additional exploration.
Typically, endorsing and delivering a Bill of Lading (B/L) transfers the ownership of the specified cargo, yet such endorsements have not effectively transferred the Charterparty’s rights and obligations to the Indorsee under Common Law. This issue arises from the traditional Doctrine of Privity of Contract, which limits legal proceedings to the original parties of the Charterparty. English Law has gradually introduced various statutory and judicial remedies to allow cargo receivers, in most disputes, to assert their right to sue the Carrier. Initially, this challenge was addressed by the Bills of Lading Act 1855, which linked the right to sue to cargo ownership. According to this act, a Consignee or Endorsee of a Bill of Lading (B/L) who gains ownership of the cargo through consignment or endorsement automatically obtains the right to sue. To bolster the Bills of Lading Act 1855, Common Law evolved to include two remedial measures: courts began to imply a separate contract between the Consignee or Indorsee and the Carrier, distinct from the Charterparty between the Shipowner and Charterer, effective from the cargo’s delivery at the Discharging Port against the Bill of Lading (B/L). Additionally, a tort remedy became available for cases where damage or loss resulted from the negligence of the Carrier or its servants. Nevertheless, the limited effectiveness of these measures highlighted the need for deeper reform, prompting the Law Commission to propose a thorough solution. This proposal was enacted into law by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, which now regulates the right to sue on a Charterparty. Despite this, the option of an implied contract remains available as an alternate remedy when necessary.
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (COGSA 1992)
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, formulated by the Law Commission, was enacted on 16 September 1992 and applies to all Charterparties initiated from that date onwards. This act broadens the scope beyond its predecessor, the Bills of Lading Act 1855, which was limited to Bill of Lading (B/L). The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 also encompasses Sea Waybills and Ships’ Delivery Orders. For Bill of Lading (B/L), the distinction between a shipped or received for shipment Bill is irrelevant. Additionally, the Secretary of State is authorized to create regulations that extend the act’s provisions to any electronic data interchange that may replace traditional written documents in the future.
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 introduces two notable changes from previous laws:
A- The right to sue is no longer dependent on ownership of the cargo.
B- The assignment of rights under a Charterparty is now independent of the transfer of liabilities.
The specifics of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 are as follows:
- The right to sue is assigned to the Lawful Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder, the Consignee named in a Sea Waybill, or the person entitled to delivery under a Ship’s Delivery Order, regardless of actual cargo ownership.
- A Lawful Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder is defined as a person who:
- Is named as Consignee in the Bill of Lading (B/L),
- Is an Indorsee of the Bill of Lading (B/L),
- Would be considered under the above categories if possession of the Bill of Lading (B/L) was taken before it ceased being a Document of Title (DOT).
This covers situations where the cargo is delivered against a bank guarantee before the Bill of Lading (B/L) reaches a Consignee or Indorsee. By the time the Bill of Lading (B/L) is in their hands, it no longer serves as a transferable Document of Title (DOT), including instances where the cargo is lost in transit. However, the final Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder can sue only if they became a holder under arrangements made before the Bill of Lading (B/L) stopped being transferable.
- Transferring the right to sue from one Lawful Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder to another terminates the contractual rights of the Shipper or any Intermediate Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder, even if the Shipper retains ownership of the cargo. This was evident in the East West Corp v DKBS case where, despite the return of the Bill of Lading (B/L) to the Shipper, no rights to sue were restored without further endorsement.
- Since the right to sue is separate from cargo ownership, a person with the right to sue under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 may not have personally suffered any loss or damage from the Carrier’s breach of the Charterparty. Such a person can sue on behalf of the actual sufferer and hold any recovered damages for them. However, the act does not obligate a Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder to act on behalf of another, making entities like banks prefer to be named as Consignees to secure the right to sue directly.
- Liabilities under the Charterparty are no longer automatically transferred with the right to sue. Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, liabilities attach to those vested with the right to sue only when they take or demand cargo delivery, make a claim under the Charterparty, or had taken or demanded delivery before the rights of suit were vested. This protects entities like banks holding the Bill of Lading (B/L) for security from assuming Charterparty liabilities until they claim the cargo or initiate legal proceedings.
- The rules described also apply, as appropriate, to Consignees identified in a Sea Waybill or persons entitled to delivery under a Ship’s Delivery Order. They can sue based on the contract evidenced by the Sea Waybill or the terms of the Delivery Order but only regarding the specific cargo.
While a Sea Waybill is inherently Non-negotiable, provisions often allow for an Alternative Consignee to be nominated by the Shipper. In such instances, the right to sue transfers once the Shipper directs the Carrier to deliver to someone other than the original Consignee named in the Sea Waybill.
Implied Contract and Bill of Lading (B/L)
While many issues related to the title to sue have been addressed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, the long-established Common Law mechanism of the implied contract remains available if the remedies provided by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 prove inadequate or unsuitable in specific cases. Courts have been willing, in appropriate situations, to imply a contract between a Consignee or Indorsee of a Bill of Lading (B/L) and the Carrier, which is distinct and independent of the original Contract of Carriage (Charterparty) between the Shipper and Carrier. This implied contract arises from the delivery of the cargo against the presentation of the Bill of Lading (B/L), with consideration provided by the payment of any outstanding Freight or other charges due under the original Contract of Carriage (Charterparty) by the cargo receiver. It was then a logical extension for courts to presume that the terms of the implied contract were those of the Bill of Lading (B/L) under which delivery was made.
An example of this principle can be seen in the Cremer v General Carriers case, where a cargo of tapioca chips was shipped in bulk under two Bills of Lading (B/Ls) issued to the Consignee. Despite the fact that the Mate’s Receipts (MR) noted that the tapioca was damp on shipment, both Bills of Lading (B/Ls) were Clean. The Consignee then Indorsed one of the Bills of Lading (B/Ls) to the claimant and handed it over along with a Ship’s Delivery Order for part of the remaining cargo. After the Claimant took delivery of his portion of the cargo using these documents, he later sued the Carrier for cargo damage caused by moisture, relying on the Estoppel created by the Clean Bill of Lading (B/L). Even though the Claimant had no rights under the original Contract of Carriage (Charterparty) since property in the cargo had not been transferred by Indorsement of the Bill of Lading (B/L), the trial judge ruled in favor of the Claimant. He stated that “A contract incorporating the terms of the Bill of Lading (B/L) was to be implied between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants by reason of the payment of the Freight by the Plaintiffs and the delivery of the cargo by the Defendants against the Bill of Lading (B/L).”
Moreover, it was determined that if the Claimant had taken delivery against a Ship’s Delivery Order (rather than a Delivery Order issued by the Seller), he was entitled to the same rights as if he had taken delivery under a Bill of Lading (B/L). However, in both situations, it was crucial that delivery was made against the payment of Freight or other outstanding charges, as this provided the necessary consideration to make the implied contract enforceable. Presumably, in cases where Freight was Prepaid and there were no other outstanding charges, the Indorsee would be unable to invoke this principle. The boundaries of this doctrine are not clearly defined, though it has been established that the decision to imply a contract in any given case is one of fact rather than law. While some judges have advocated for restraint, others have been willing to extend its application as a general remedy. For instance, in The Elli case, the Court of Appeal ruled that where cargo had reached the Discharging Port before the documentation, a guarantee to present the Bill of Lading (B/L) when it arrived was as effective as the actual presentation in inferring a contract. Additionally, where there has been significant mutual cooperation between the Carrier and the cargo Receiver, which can only be explained by the existence of some form of contractual relationship, courts have been inclined to imply a contract to give business reality to the transaction. For example, in The Captain Gregos case, where a consignment of oil, involved in a series of chain sales, was delivered to the ultimate purchaser in Rotterdam without the appropriate documentation, the Shipowner made delivery against a Letter of Indemnity (LOI). The available evidence suggested to the court that the cargo could not have been discharged into the purchaser’s refinery complex in Rotterdam without the active cooperation of both the purchaser and the ship’s crew. In these circumstances, the Court of Appeal found “very powerful grounds for concluding that it is necessary to imply a contract between BP and the Shipowners to give business reality to the transaction between them and create the obligations which both parties believed to exist.” However, the same court was less accommodating in the subsequent case of The Gudermes, where a quantity of oil sold to the claimants was shipped on a ship later found to have no operative heating coils. The oil, having cooled in transit, was refused by the claimant’s sub-purchasers in Ravenna, fearing it might clog their underwater sealine. The claimants then arranged for the oil to be transshipped into another ship off Malta, reheated on board, and subsequently delivered to Ravenna. In an effort to recover the cost of transshipment, the claimants argued that, due to their dealings with the Carrier concerning the transshipment, a Brandt v Liverpool contract should be implied on the terms of the Bill of Lading (B/L), which expressly incorporated the Hague Visby Rules. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and emphasized that before a contract can be implied, the conduct of the parties must be explicable only on the basis of the contract sought to be implied. In its view, the final decision must be one of fact and, in the circumstances of this case, the facts did not support the implication of a new contract between the parties.
There are clear limitations on how far this fiction can be extended. No contract was implied in The Aramis case, where the Carrier failed to deliver any cargo. In this instance, a quantity of cargo covered by several Bills of Lading (B/Ls) had been shipped in bulk, but by the time the Final Bill of Lading (B/L) was presented at the Discharging Port, the cargo supply had been exhausted. The Court of Appeal refused to imply a contract based merely on the presentation of a Bill of Lading (B/L) in the absence of any corresponding response from the Carrier that could be interpreted as an acceptance of the claimant’s offer. This decision effectively denied any remedy for non-delivery.
Similarly, the mere presentation of a Bill of Lading (B/L) followed by partial delivery will not constitute sufficient evidence to establish an implied contract when the parties’ actions could equally be seen as fulfilling obligations and rights under the original contract. The lack of consideration provided by the party presenting the Bill of Lading (B/L) may be a key factor in reaching this conclusion, but it does not appear to be decisive.
Finally, there are two practical issues arising from the implied contract concept. The first raises doubts about whether this approach can provide a remedy for the consignee under a Sea Waybill. Since Sea Waybills were created to avoid problems caused by the late arrival of shipping documents and are not typically presented to obtain delivery of the cargo, the implied contract approach does not offer a practical solution to the issue of the consignee’s title to sue under such a document. The second issue concerns the proper law of the implied contract. In the absence of a choice of law clause in the Bill of Lading (B/L), the proper law of a contract implied from the parties’ conduct at the port of discharge might differ from that governing the original contract of carriage.
Bill of Lading (B/L) and Third Parties
Bailment on Terms
One approach to achieving this objective was presented by the Privy Council in The Pioneer Container case. In this case, various claimants had arranged with a Carrier for the transport of their cargo from Taiwan to Hong Kong, either as a complete voyage or as part of a through transport to other ports. In each instance, the Bill of Lading (B/L) issued to the Shipper included a Clause allowing the Carrier to sub-contract “on any terms the whole, or any part, of the carriage, loading, unloading, storing, warehousing, or handling” of the cargo. The transport was, in fact, sub-contracted to the defendant Shipowners, who issued a Feeder Bill of Lading (B/L) acknowledging Receipt of the cargo and including an exclusive Taiwan Jurisdiction Clause. During the voyage to Hong Kong, the Defendant’s ship was involved in a collision and sank, resulting in the loss of the Claimant’s cargo. The Claimant then sought to recover their loss by issuing a writ in rem in Hong Kong against a sister ship of the Defendant’s ship. In response, the Defendant sought a stay of proceedings based on the exclusive Taiwanese Jurisdiction Clause in the Feeder Bill of Lading (B/L). The weak point in the Defendant’s argument was that the Jurisdiction Clause was part of their sub-contract with the Freight Carrier, while it was acknowledged that no contractual relationship existed between the Defendant and the Claimant. The Privy Council addressed this gap by invoking the Doctrine of Bailment on terms, a concept that had been explored in earlier cases, though mainly in Obiter Dicta. There was no doubt that the original contract of carriage between the Claimants and the Carriers created a Bailor and Bailee relationship, and as noted by Pollock and Wright in the late nineteenth century, if the Bailor had authorized the Bailee to enter into a sub-bailment of the cargo, then while there would be no Privity of Contract between the original Bailor and the Sub-bailee, “it would seem that both the owner and the first bailee have concurrently the rights of a bailor against the sub-bailee according to the nature of the sub-bailment.” The question then was to what extent the head Bailor could be bound by the terms of the sub-bailment. According to the Privy Council, “if the effect of the sub-bailment is that the sub-bailee voluntarily receives into his custody the Cargo Owner’s goods and so assumes towards the owner the responsibility of a Bailee, then to the extent that the terms of the sub-bailment are consented to by the owner, it can properly be said that the owner has authorized the bailee to regulate the duties of the sub-bailee in respect of the goods entrusted to him, not only towards the bailee but also towards the owner.”
In the context of The Pioneer Container case, there was no doubt that the Claimant had consented to the sub-bailment, and by authorizing the Carrier to sub-contract “on any terms,” such consent would encompass all contractual provisions except those that were unreasonable or unexpected in their context. Moreover, the Privy Council found that including a Jurisdiction Clause of this type in the sub-bailment would align with the reasonable commercial expectations of those engaged in this type of trade, and such incorporation would generally lead to a conclusion that is sensible in the context of the carriage of cargo by sea, particularly in a container ship, as it facilitates an orderly and efficient resolution of disputes in a single jurisdiction, avoiding unnecessary legal costs and the risk of inconsistent outcomes in different jurisdictions. Consequently, the Privy Council granted the stay, holding that the Claimant was bound by the Jurisdiction Clause, even though no contractual relationship existed between them and the sub-bailees.
What, then, are the characteristics and effects of such a bailment on terms, and what potential does it have for use in other carriage situations? It is clear that the relationship between the Cargo Owner and Sub-bailee is independent of contract and is created by the voluntary taking of possession of cargo with the knowledge that they are the property of persons other than the immediate Bailor. The result is that such Sub-bailees owe the duty of a Bailee not only towards their Immediate Bailor but also towards the Cargo Owner. In fulfilling such duties, to what extent can the Sub-bailee invoke the Exceptions, Limitation of Liability provisions, and time bars contained in his sub-contract with the Intermediate Bailor, as reinforced by the Hague Visby Rules? The key requirement appears to be the consent of the Cargo Owner to the sub-bailment on the terms in question. As Lord Denning MR stated in the Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd case, “The answer to the problem lies, I think, in this: the owner is bound by the conditions if he has expressly or impliedly consented to the bailee making a sub-bailment containing those conditions, but not otherwise.” Although this opinion was expressed Obiter, it was adopted by the Privy Council as the basis of its judgment in The Pioneer Container case. On the facts of that case, there was little doubt as to the owner’s consent. The Bill of Lading (B/L) provided that the Carrier should be entitled to sub-contract on any terms the whole or any part of the carriage. Where, as here, the consent is very broad in its terms, only terms that are so unusual that they could not reasonably be understood to fall within such consent are likely to be excluded. In the opinion of the Privy Council, there was nothing unusual or unreasonable in an Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause, which would commonly be found in the container trade.
Once one accepts the premise of a sub-bailment on terms, then the facts of The Pioneer Container are reasonably clear-cut. To what extent, however, will this principle apply in other carriage situations? Bills of Lading (B/L) for sea carriage frequently incorporate Clauses entitling the Carrier to sub-contract the carriage of the cargo, while for Bills of Lading (B/Ls) covering Combined Transport, sub-contracting is virtually a necessity. Some Bills of Lading (B/Ls) follow The Pioneer Container pattern and allow sub-contracting “on any terms” or “on any terms whatsoever,” while others allow it “on any terms which are reasonable in the circumstances.” More difficulty may arise from Bills of Lading (B/Ls) that include a general authority to sub-contract, though without reference to the terms. Here again, it could be argued that the Shipper has consented to the Bailment on terms, subject only to the aforementioned test of reasonableness.
However, what is the position when the Bill of Lading (B/L) makes no reference to the possibility of sub-contracting? Lord Denning MR indicated in the Morris v Martin case that implied consent by the Shipper of the cargo to a sub-bailment on terms might be sufficient, and this view was adopted by the Privy Council in The Pioneer Container case: “Such consent may, as Lord Denning MR pointed out, be Express or Implied; and in this context, the sub-bailee may also be able to invoke, where appropriate, the principle of Ostensible Authority.” A typical example of Implied consent might arise when the Cargo Shipper contracts for their carriage with a Freight Forwarder (FF) or another person known to the Cargo Shipper to operate as a Non-ship Owning Carrier (NOC). In such a case, the Shipper must be presumed to be aware that performance of the contract is to be sub-contracted.
Even though consent to a sub-bailment may be Implied, it does not automatically follow that there is consent to all the terms of that sub-bailment. Here again, the test of reasonableness may be an appropriate guide, particularly if the terms involved are standard conditions in the particular trade. Thus, it has been suggested that the terms of a sub-bailment might satisfy the Reasonableness Test where the Exclusions and Limitations of Liability were no wider than their counterparts in the Contract of Carriage concluded between the Cargo Shipper and the contractual Carrier. Certainly, it is arguable that where carriage by sea is anticipated, a sub-bailee should be entitled to rely on the defenses provided by the Hague Visby Rules where such rules were mandatorily incorporated into the contract of sub-bailment. Different conditions might apply where the effect of such rules was dependent on contractual incorporation.
However, what is clear is that the sub-bailee cannot rely on the terms of a sub-bailment to which the Cargo Owner did not consent. Any argument to the contrary was rejected by the Privy Council in The Pioneer Container case as being inconsistent with the reasoning of Lord Denning MR in the Morris v Martin case. “As Lord Denning MR sees it, once it is recognized that the sub-bailee, by voluntarily taking the owner’s cargo into his custody, ipso facto becomes the bailee of those goods vis-à-vis the owner, it must follow that the owner’s rights against the sub-bailee will only be subject to terms of the sub-bailment if he has consented to them, i.e., if he has authorized the bailee to entrust the cargo to the sub-bailee on those terms.”
Vicarious Immunity
Himalaya Clause and Bill of Lading (B/L)
While the House of Lords strictly enforced the Privity Rule in the Scruttons v Midland Silicones case, which prevented Stevedores, engaged as Independent Contractors, from invoking the protection of a Limitation Clause in the contract of carriage, Lord Reid suggested a possible solution. He proposed that an Agency Relationship might address this issue. According to Lord Reid, such a relationship could have been established if four key conditions were met: “Firstly, the Bill of Lading (B/L) must clearly indicate that the Stevedore is intended to be protected by the liability-limiting provisions. Secondly, the Bill of Lading (B/L) must state that the Carrier, in addition to contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, is also acting as Agent for the Stevedore, ensuring that these provisions apply to the Stevedore. Thirdly, the Carrier must have authority from the Stevedore to do this, or perhaps later ratification by the Stevedore would suffice. Fourthly, any issues regarding consideration moving from the Stevedore must be addressed.”
This approach was quickly adopted by the drafters of the Bill of Lading (B/L) considered by the Privy Council in The Eurymedon case. In this case, a drilling machine was shipped from Liverpool to New Zealand under a Bill of Lading (B/L) that incorporated the Hague Visby Rules. The Bill of Lading (B/L) included a specific Clause stating that any Servant, Agent, or Independent Contractor employed by the Carrier would be entitled to the same protection as the Carrier, and that the Carrier was contracting not only on his behalf but also as Agent on behalf of these parties. When a Stevedore was later sued for Negligence for Damage caused to the drilling machine during discharge, he sought to rely on the Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 6), which barred any action brought more than 12 months after the damage occurred. The Privy Council, with two members dissenting, held that the Stevedore was entitled to this protection because the Carrier, in concluding the contract of carriage, had acted as Agent on his behalf. The terms of the Bill of Lading (B/L) were found to meet the four criteria suggested by Lord Reid.
Once the Agency concept was validated, its potential was quickly recognized. It could be used not only to extend the protection of the carriage contract to the employees of a contractual Carrier and Independent Contractors involved in its performance but also to offer similar protection for an actual Carrier when the carriage itself had been delegated to a sub-contractor or was part of a Combined Transport operation. Clauses using this concept soon appeared in many Standard Bill of Lading (B/L) Forms. The effectiveness of this strategy depended on the foresight of the contracting parties and their mutual agreement to include it in their contract.
However, the use of the Himalaya Clause, which relies on this strategy, has its limitations, as shown in The Starsin case. In this case, a Charterer’s Bill of Lading (B/L) was issued that included a Himalaya Clause intended to exempt the Independent Contractor from any liability to the Shipper for, among other things, Negligent damage to the cargo. The majority of the Court of Appeal ruled that, insofar as the Himalaya Clause attempted to extend to the Independent Contractor a broader exemption than that available to the contractual Carrier under the Hague Visby Rules, it was void under the Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 8). Similarly, in The Mahkutai case, a Charterer’s Bill of Lading (B/L) was issued that included both a Himalaya Clause and an Indonesian choice of Jurisdiction Clause. When the Cargo Owner sued for cargo damage, the Shipowner unsuccessfully tried to rely on the Jurisdiction Clause in the Bill of Lading (B/L). The Privy Council stated that the primary purpose of a Himalaya Clause is to prevent the Cargo Owner from bypassing the contractual defenses available to the Carrier by suing the actual Tortfeasor for Negligence. These defenses were meant to benefit only one party, whereas Jurisdiction Clauses were designed to create mutual rights and obligations. Lord Goff expressed regret at this conclusion, noting that “it is inevitable that technical points of contract and Agency Law will continue to be invoked by Cargo Owners seeking to enforce Tortious Remedies against Stevedores and others, without being restricted by the Exceptions and Limitations in the relevant Bill of Lading (B/L) Contract.” To the extent that this decision hinges on the specific wording of the Himalaya Clause, its impact could likely be mitigated by careful drafting.
Direct Approach
The previous examples of judicial creativity have their limitations and none effectively resolves the core issue. Ultimately, the solution must involve directly addressing the problem of privity. This approach was taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1993 in the London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel case. In this case, the Claimant had delivered a transformer to a warehouseman for storage under a contract that limited the warehouseman’s liability to $40 per package unless the Cargo Owner declared the true value of the cargo and paid an additional charge. The Claimant chose not to exercise this option. Later, employees of the warehouseman damaged the transformer while using a forklift, contrary to express instructions. When sued for Damages in Negligence, the employees sought to invoke the Limitation of Liability Clause in the contract between the Claimant and the Claimant’s Employer, despite not being parties to that contract. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court of Canada was willing to create an exception to the privity rule and allow the employees to limit their liability to $40. The majority of the court stressed that they were not abolishing the Privity Rule but were simply creating a new exception, representing only an Incremental Change. Judge Iacobucci, in a judgment concurred by three of his five colleagues, explained the rationale for this new exception: “When an employer and a customer enter into a contract for services and include a Clause Limiting the Liability of the employer for damages arising from conduct that is normally expected to be performed by the employer’s employees, and in fact is performed by them, there is simply no valid reason for denying the benefit of the Clause to employees who carry out the contractual obligations.”
The majority of the court believed it did not make commercial sense to allow a Plaintiff to invoke the Doctrine of Privity in such cases to circumvent a contractual Exclusion or Limitation of Liability Clause to which he had willingly agreed.
Two conditions must be met for such an exception to apply. First, the Limitation of Liability Clause must either Expressly or Impliedly extend its benefit to the employees seeking to rely on it. Secondly, those employees “must have been performing the very services provided for in the contract between their employer and the customer when the loss occurred.”
While this decision focused on an Employer–Employee Relationship, the Canadian Supreme Court clarified in the subsequent Fraser River v Can-Dive Services case that the exception was not intended to be limited to such relationships. In this case, the Charterer of a barge, when sued in Negligence for the loss of the ship, sought to rely on a waiver of subrogation Clause in the hull subscription policy taken out by the Barge Owner. Although he was not a party to the insurance contract, the Supreme Court ruled in his favor, finding that the two basic requirements for the exception had been met. The parties to the insurance policy had clearly intended to extend the benefit of the waiver of subrogation clause to any Charterer of the ship, and the third-party beneficiary in this case was engaged in the very activities anticipated by the Clause on which he sought to rely.
On this occasion, the Supreme Court also addressed whether the original contracting parties could unilaterally revoke the provision in favor of the Third Party beneficiary. The Court held that such a revision of the contract was no longer possible without the Third Party’s consent once the benefit had crystallized by the occurrence of the event envisaged by the contract.
To what extent might English Courts follow a similar path? Lord Goff in The Mahkutai case acknowledged that “the time may well come when, in an appropriate case, it will fall to be considered whether the courts should take what may legitimately be perceived to be the final, and perhaps inevitable, step in this development and recognize in these cases a fully-fledged exception to the Doctrine of Privity of Contract, thus escaping from all the technicalities with which courts are now faced in English Law.” However, for various reasons, he did not believe that the appeal in The Mahkutai case was the right occasion to follow the example set by the Canadian Court.
Contracts Act 1999 (Rights of Third Parties)
The legislature addressed the challenge by enacting the Contracts Act 1999 (Rights of Third Parties), which came into effect on 11 May 2000. This statute allows a Third Party (such as a Shipbroker) to enforce a contractual provision in their own name if either the contract includes an Express Term granting this right, or if the contract appears to confer a benefit on the Third Party, unless it is clear from the contract’s interpretation that the parties did not intend for the Third Party to have a personal right to enforce the benefit. In both cases, the right of enforcement depends on the Third Party being explicitly identified in the contract by name, class, or description (the Shipbroker’s name must be expressly stated in the Charterparty). However, there is a specific exception concerning contracts for the Carriage of Goods by Sea. In such cases, the statutory right to enforce a contractual provision does not grant positive rights to a Third Party but is expressly limited to allowing a Third Party to benefit from an Exclusion or Limitation of Liability provision in such a contract.
The first part of the new statutory enforceability test seems to offer an alternative to using a Himalaya Clause. In typical scenarios covered by such a clause, the agency mechanism is specifically designed to extend the protection provided by the carriage contract’s provisions to a Third Party performing the obligations outlined in the contract. These Third Parties are usually identified by description. The direct relief offered by the new statutory remedy may eventually replace the more cumbersome agency mechanism in the Himalaya Clause, although the Contracts Act 1999 (Rights of Third Parties) explicitly preserves existing Common Law Remedies. The practical effectiveness of the new statutory provisions will be crucial in determining their use.
One potential drawback of the new legislation is that it retains the right of the original contracting parties to modify or cancel the contract without the consent of the Third Party beneficiary. Exercising this right, which could remove the protection otherwise granted to the Third Party, is subject to certain conditions. The original parties cannot modify or cancel the contract without the Third Party’s consent once the Third Party has communicated their acceptance of the contractual provisions to the Promisor, or if the Third Party has relied on these provisions and the Promisor is aware of this reliance or could reasonably have anticipated it.
All three potential restrictions assume that the Third Party is aware of the contractual provision in their favor when they either accept it or act in reliance on it. The Law Commission, in its report supporting the legislation, explicitly states that “Reliance on a promise, in our view, means conduct induced by the belief (or expectation) that the promise will be performed or at least, that one is legally entitled to performance of the promise.” The issue arises in cases where the Stevedore or Sub-contractor may be unaware of the Himalaya Clause in the Bill of Lading (B/L) at the time they perform what would otherwise be considered an act of reliance. Would the lack of intentional reliance in this context undermine the legislation’s purpose? In practice, this may have little impact, as any changes to the contract terms require the agreement of both original contracting parties, and a carrier is unlikely to agree to a change that would expose them to an Indemnity Claim by the Third Party. For example, in Scruttons v Midland Silicones case, the Carrier, in hiring Stevedores to unload the cargo, had contracted to provide them with the same protection as the Carrier in the Bill of Lading (B/L). When the Stevedores were held liable for the full value of the damaged cargo due to the Privity Rule, they were later able to recover their loss from the Carrier as damages for Breach of Contract.
Presentation of Bill of Lading (B/L)
The distinctive feature of the Bill of Lading (B/L) is that delivery of the Cargo must be made against the surrender of this document. This rule serves a dual purpose: it protects the Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder by ensuring that the Carrier only delivers the Cargo against presentation of the Bill of Lading (B/L), and it also fulfills the Carrier’s duty to deliver under the contract of carriage. The primary challenge for the Carrier arises from not knowing the identity of the party entitled to delivery at the Discharging Port, especially when the Cargo has been sold and resold to Third Parties during transit. Given the risk of substantial damages for misdelivery, the Carrier naturally prefers using a Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) or Non-negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L) which obligates delivery only to the Named Consignee. However, using such Non-negotiable Bills of Lading (B/L) often isn’t viable in export sales.
Further complicating the Carrier’s situation is the traditional issuance of the Bill of Lading (B/L) in sets of three Original Bills of Lading (B/L). This practice allows for the delivery of the Cargo against the presentation of any single Original Bill of Lading (B/L). Originating from the 16th century, this method ensures one Original Bill of Lading (B/L) is retained by the Shipper, another by the Carrier as part of the Ship’s Bag, and the third dispatched to the Consignee, potentially via different methods like sea-mail or airmail. Despite its historical roots, the utility of this practice was questioned as early as 1882 by Lord Blackburn, who argued that a single Original Bill of Lading (B/L), serving as the sole Document of Title (DOT), with certified copies as needed, would suffice. Yet, if the aim is to safeguard the interests of various parties against lost Bills of Lading (B/L) or defaulting Shippers, then retaining an Original Bill of Lading (B/L) remains essential for securing delivery from the Carrier.
To protect the Carrier, Bills of Lading (B/L) often include a clause stating that “one Original Bill of Lading (B/L) being accomplished, the other Bills of Ladings (B/Ls) to stand void.” Thus, the Carrier is shielded if delivery is made against a single Unendorsed Original Bill of Lading (B/L) or a validly Endorsed Bill of Lading (B/L). However, the Carrier faces strict liability for delivering against a forged endorsement, presenting a clear opportunity for fraud—yet, surprisingly, there are few recorded cases of such misuse. One notable exception was the Glyn Mills v East & West India Dock Co case, where a cargo of sugar was shipped to Cottam and Co in London, and despite being endorsed to Glyn Mills as security for a loan, Cottam and Co obtained the Cargo by presenting an Unendorsed Original Bill of Lading (B/L). The House of Lords ruled the warehouseman not liable for misdelivery since he acted in good faith, unaware of the bank’s claim.
If the Carrier or the Carrier’s Agent blatantly disregards the obligation to deliver the Cargo only against the presentation of the Original Bill of Lading (B/L), they commit a fundamental Breach of the Contract of Carriage, losing protection from all Exceptions and Limitation of Liability Clauses. For example, in the Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd v Rambler Cycle Co Ltd case, the Carrier’s Agent released the cargo without requiring the Original Bill of Lading (B/L), relying on a form of indemnity from the appellant bank. Despite claims that such practices were common in Singapore, the Privy Council affirmed that knowingly delivering Cargo without requiring the Original Bill of Lading (B/L) constituted a breach of fundamental contract obligations, thereby voiding the Cesser Clause protection.
The principle of Fundamental Breach has evolved following the decision in Photo Production v Securicor, shifting from a rule of law to a question of contract interpretation. Recent judicial opinions suggest that courts are inclined to interpret exception clauses narrowly, especially when they could excuse breaches of fundamental contractual obligations. However, it is now feasible to draft clauses that completely exclude liability for disregarding the presentation rule, as seen in The Antwerpen case, where a carrier was fully protected by a clause in the Bill of Lading (B/L) that covered actions constituting a fundamental breach of contract. Ironically, such a well-crafted clause could undermine the entire purpose of the rule.
Problems in Presentation of Bill of Lading (B/L)
The unique characteristic of the Bill of Lading (B/L), which mandates the delivery of Cargo only upon the presentation of the Original Bill of Lading (B/L), presents significant practical challenges. Advances in transport technology, such as containerization, have expedited shipments, yet this speed is often outpaced by banking delays and slower postal services, causing the Cargo to arrive at its destination before the Original Bill of Lading (B/L). This scenario is especially common in the shipment of bulk cargoes over short sea routes and places the Carrier in a dilemma.
If the Carrier insists on the presentation of the Original Bill of Lading (B/L), several issues may arise. Without knowing the identity of the current Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder or the reasons for the delay in the arrival of the Original Bill of Lading (B/L), the Carrier cannot predict when it will be available. Often, there may be no storage options for the Cargo, other than on board the ship. In such cases, the Charterer could face liabilities for Demurrage (D) or Damages for Detention (DFD), and the Shipowner risks losing subsequent charters that might contain a Cancelling Clause. For liner trades, the Carrier faces scheduling concerns. Additionally, there are risks for the Cargo Owner, especially if the Cargo is perishable or subject to fluctuating market prices.
Alternatively, if the Carrier is reasonably certain of the identity of the Cargo Receiver, they might risk delivering the Cargo without the presentation of the Original Bill of Lading (B/L). However, this action is perilous as it constitutes wilful misconduct and a deliberate breach of the Carrier’s contractual obligations. If the Carrier delivers to the incorrect party, even in good faith, they could lose all protections afforded by the contract of carriage, including those under the Hague Visby Rules Exceptions and Limitations of Liability, as well as the protection of liability insurance provided by the Protection and Indemnity Club (P&I Club).
A third option involves the Carrier requiring a Letter of Indemnity (LOI) before agreeing to deliver without the Original Bill of Lading (B/L). Typically, a bank indemnity is demanded, though sometimes a Charterparty may only require personal guarantees. However, a Letter of Indemnity (LOI) is only as reliable as the financial standing of the guarantor, and bank indemnities can be costly as they often require ample coverage in terms of both time and amount.
None of these three methods offers an ideal solution to the issue posed by the absence of the Original Bill of Lading (B/L) when needed. Over the years, various proposals have been suggested to address this issue with varying success. One clear solution is for the sales contract or Bill of Lading (B/L) to explicitly accommodate such situations, as seen in the standard GAFTA 100 Form used in the grain trade, which allows Sellers to provide alternative documents or an indemnity that permits Buyers to obtain delivery of the Cargo and make payment in exchange for the same. Additionally, measures can be taken to expedite the transmission of current forms of documentation, such as producing documents at the Cargo’s destination or near the Consignee, where details can be quickly provided via modern communication systems. Arrangements for the presentation of the Original Bill of Lading (B/L) to a bank or the Carrier’s Agent at a convenient location other than the Discharging Port can also be made. Efforts have also been made to speed up document production through the adoption of uniform layouts by organizations like the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), allowing all necessary documentation to be produced efficiently, accurately, and swiftly. These uniform formats ensure the master document contains all relevant information while the various copies display only the necessary details, reducing transcription errors significantly.
Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L)
One of the first data aligned documents introduced was the Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L). The goal with the Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L) was to streamline documentation and enhance production speed by minimizing the information displayed on the Bill of Lading (B/L). This was accomplished by removing the Printed Clauses of the contract of carriage from the reverse of the Bill of Lading (B/L) and replacing them with a straightforward Clause that incorporates the Carrier’s standard terms and conditions. The Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L) can be produced in a proprietary format with the Carrier’s name printed at the top, or in a generic format where the name of the chosen Carrier is added by the Shipper. The latter format offers significant advantages as it is universally applicable and eliminates the need for the Shipper to maintain separate stocks of Bill of Lading (B/L) for each Carrier.
The key feature of the Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L) is that it retains all the functions of the Standard Long Form Bill of Lading (B/L): it serves as a Receipt, provides Evidence of a Charterparty, and acts as a Transferable Document of Title (DOT), allowing the Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder to sell the Cargo in transit or pledge it to a bank. Consequently, it serves as a direct replacement for the Long Form Bill of Lading (B/L) in all contexts and has been endorsed by the banking sector as suitable security for Letter of Credit (LC). Like the Long Form Bill of Lading (B/L), it is subject to the Hague Visby Rules.
The primary challenge with the Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L) concerns the effectiveness of the incorporation Clause across different Jurisdictions. In the Common Law world, its validity is generally undisputed as it meets all the criteria set by the Doctrine of Notice established in a series of ticket cases. However, the response of courts in Civil Law Jurisdictions might be less predictable, especially if a copy of the Carrier’s Standard Terms is not easily accessible. Courts might also show more sympathy towards the assignee of a Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L) who might be disadvantaged by not having access to the Standard Terms, unlike the Shipper who likely has a copy in their office. For this reason, some Shippers opt to print key provisions of the contract on the Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L) itself, somewhat counteracting the original purpose of the format. Such terms typically include Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Clauses which are crucial for the Consignee, Arbitration Clauses, and Clauses Expressly incorporating the Hague Visby Rules. It is also important to note that the Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L) is essentially a Received for Carriage Document, whereas banks issuing a Letter of Credit usually require a Shipped Bill of Lading (B/L). Although there are options to add a Shipped notation, any delay in doing so can undermine the goal of saving time.
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Sea Waybill
In scenarios where a Negotiable Document of Title (DOT) is not necessary, the presentation challenge can be addressed by replacing the Traditional Bill of Lading (B/L) with a Sea Waybill. Originally developed for land and air transport where Negotiable Documents of Title (DOT) were not needed due to the brief nature of the journeys, the Sea Waybill simplifies the delivery process. Since a Sea Waybill does not permit negotiation, the Carrier’s duty is to deliver the Cargo directly to the Named Consignee, provided the Named Consignee can verify their identity, eliminating the need for presenting the Sea Waybill before receiving the Cargo.
Unlike the Bill of Lading (B/L), the Sea Waybill serves as a Receipt and provides Evidence of the contract of carriage, but it does not function as a Negotiable Document of Title (DOT). This limitation makes it less suitable for transactions involving Letters of Credit (LC) or scenarios where the Consignee might need to sell the Cargo in transit. Despite these limitations, the Sea Waybill is increasingly used, particularly in trans-Atlantic trade of containerized Cargo, where reports suggest up to 85 percent of such trade could be conducted using Sea Waybills. It is particularly advantageous for in-house cargo movements within multinational firms, shipments of personal effects, and open account trading with established and trusted overseas Buyers where security is not a concern. General cargo, which is rarely sold in transit, and mixed ownership cargo in containers arranged by Freight Forwarders (FF), are also suitable for Sea Waybill use because they are specifically intended for delivery to the Named Consignee.
The modern Sea Waybill mirrors the Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L) as a concise document with a blank reverse side but includes a Specific Clause incorporating the Carrier’s Standard Terms and Conditions. Like the Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L), it is primarily a Received for Carriage Document, though Shipped Notations can be added. However, unlike the Short Form Bill of Lading (B/L), the Sea Waybill is not governed by the Hague Visby Rules, though many standard forms include a clause expressly incorporating these rules except for Deck Cargo and live animals.
The primary advantage of using a Sea Waybill is that it circumvents the delays associated with the arrival of the Bill of Lading (B/L). The Consignee only needs to prove their identity at the Discharging Port to receive the Cargo, as the Sea Waybill does not adhere to the Presentation Rule. Since no negotiation of the document is required, the details of the Sea Waybill can be swiftly transmitted via fax or email, speeding up the transfer of necessary information. However, its major drawback is its non-negotiable nature and lack of status as a Document of Title (DOT), which makes it unsuitable for Letter of Credit (LC) transactions that prioritize security.
To address these anomalies, the Comite Maritime International (CMI) recently developed a set of rules for voluntary incorporation into any contract of carriage governed by a Sea Waybill. These rules acknowledge that contracts covered by Sea Waybills are subject to the same international conventions or national laws as would apply if the contract had been covered by a Bill of Lading (B/L) or similar Document of Title (DOT). They also include provisions similar to Hague Visby Rules Articles III Rules 3 and 4, making representations about the quantity or condition of the Cargo Received for Shipment (RFS) Prima Facie Evidence in favor of the Shipper and conclusive for a Consignee acting in good faith.
Additionally, these rules confirm the Shipper’s right to change the Consignee’s name anytime before the Consignee takes delivery of the Cargo, provided the Shipper notifies the Carrier and covers any resulting costs. This control can be transferred to the Consignee not later than when the Cargo is received by the Carrier, and this transfer must be noted on the Sea Waybill. Banks willing to accept a Sea Waybill as security for a Letter of Credit (LC) will likely require such a transfer of control. The rules also stipulate that while the Carrier must deliver the Cargo to the Consignee upon proper identification, the Carrier is not liable for incorrect delivery if they have taken reasonable care to verify the Consignee’s identity.
Straight Bill of Lading (B/L)
The Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) is a document less commonly used than the Sea Waybill but serves a similar function due to its non-negotiable nature. Unlike the Sea Waybill, the Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) uses the Standard Bill of Lading (B/L) Form, which can be drafted either as a negotiable or non-negotiable document. When issued as a Straight Bill of Lading (B/L), the Cargo is consigned directly to a specified person without reference to Order. As a shipping document, the Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) maintains all the attributes of the Standard Bill of Lading (B/L) except that it is non-negotiable, sharing similar limitations as the Sea Waybill when used as security for Letters of Credit (LC) or other financial arrangements.
The non-negotiability of the Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) raises similar concerns to those associated with Sea Waybills, particularly regarding the applicability of the Hague Visby Rules to the carriage contract it covers. Without definitive case law, academic consensus initially suggested that such regulatory frameworks did not apply because the Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) was not considered a Document of Title (DOT). However, this view was overturned by the House of Lords in The Rafaela S case, which involved a Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) for shipping printing machinery with an ultimate destination of Boston. The cargo was discharged and reshipped on a different vessel owned by the same Carrier without a new Bill of Lading (B/L). The House of Lords decided that two separate contracts were involved, with the on-carriage forming a new contract that would have been governed by the Hague Visby Rules if a Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) had been issued for it, emphasizing that such a document should be treated expansively under the Hague Visby Rules.
The Lords approached the matter from a policy perspective, asserting that the Hague Visby Rules aimed to protect Third Parties like Consignees from onerous terms in contracts they had not negotiated. They argued that a Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) should be included under these protections because it was known at the time the Hague Rules were drafted, and there was no intention to exclude them. The Lords ultimately held that the Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) qualifies as a similar Document of Title (DOT) under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, applicable to the contract of carriage and thus subject to the Hague Visby Rules.
This decision clarifies the applicability of the Hague Visby Rules to the Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) but leaves several questions unresolved. For instance, while a Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) may be a Document of Title (DOT) under the Hague Visby Rules, it remains unclear whether it serves as such for other legal purposes, such as Letters of Credit or under the Sale of Goods Act 1979. It is also uncertain whether presentation of the Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) is always a precondition for Cargo delivery under a carriage contract. This decision could also impact international standards, potentially conflicting with the US Pomerene Act, which allows Cargo delivery under a Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) based on proof of identity alone, without requiring document surrender. This issue may have broader implications if the Act’s scope is extended to include incoming shipments to the United States.
Furthermore, in terms of legal standing to sue for loss or damage to Cargo, the Straight Bill of Lading (B/L) is treated similarly to a Sea Waybill under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, assigning the right to sue to the consignee named in the Bill of Lading (B/L).
Bill of Lading (B/L) and Central Registry System
Carriers are increasingly pressured to release cargo without a Bill of Lading (B/L) presentation. Although Carriers could potentially insure against the risks involved, Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs) currently do not cover such risks. Relying on Letters of Indemnity (LOI) is costly, and banks are more hesitant to extend credit in these circumstances. Carriers often view the requirement for a Bill of Lading (B/L) presentation as a problem stemming from the Cargo Owner’s business practices, which they believe should be the Cargo Owner’s responsibility to solve financially, including any changes in protection and indemnity.
One proposed solution is the development of an electronic central registry system, though this has not progressed beyond experimental stages. This system would involve creating a central electronic registry where the Bill of Lading (B/L) is deposited immediately after issuance by the Carrier. The Bill of Lading (B/L) would still be issued in its traditional negotiable form at the loading port, but no physical transfer of the document would occur after deposit. Instead, all subsequent transactions involving the Bill of Lading (B/L) would be recorded at this registry, based on notifications by the current Consignee of record.
Under this system, the Carrier would notify the electronic central registry of the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) when less than 48 hours from the discharge port. The registry would then request the current Consignee to confirm the identity of the person authorized to receive the cargo, at least 24 hours before the ship’s arrival. Once this information is received, no further transactions involving the Bill of Lading (B/L) could be registered, and the Carrier would be instructed to deliver the cargo to the identified Consignee. Instructions from the registry would act as the equivalent of presenting the Bill of Lading (B/L) to the Carrier, fulfilling the Carrier’s delivery obligations under the contract of carriage.
This electronic central registry system would maintain the use of existing Bill of Lading (B/L) forms and would not necessitate changes in the current body of case law. Notifications of transactions to the registry would have the same legal effect as a physical transfer of the Bill of Lading (B/L), transferring property in the cargo and allowing reliance on its stated conditions. This system addresses the issue of Bill of Lading (B/L) delays by ensuring the Carrier can discharge duties by delivering to the party specified by the registry, without the risk of conflicting claims from holders of different Original Bill of Ladings (B/L), as the Bill of Lading (B/L) would no longer circulate physically.
However, implementing such a system successfully faces several significant challenges. Banks and Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs) must be assured of the system’s security to protect their interests. The initial setup of the electronic central registry system would be costly, with ongoing costs potentially covered by user fees, though the substantial initial investment remains a concern. Additionally, the system would need to be universally accepted and possibly located at strategic global locations. The legal framework, especially regarding the application of the Hague Visby Rules to Bills of Lading (B/L) within this system, would need clear definition. Lastly, the risk of errors or negligence by the registry staff and the associated liability would need careful consideration, potentially increasing insurance costs and user fees.
An alternative practical solution recently developed, particularly in the oil trade, involves the Shipper giving an Original Bill of Lading (B/L) to the Ship Master with instructions to deliver it to a specified person at the Discharging Port. This method bypasses delays but raises concerns about legal validity and the risks of Wrongful Delivery, especially if other Original Bill of Ladings (B/L) are fraudulently endorsed by the Shipper. While this practice resolves the timing issue, it introduces legal and operational risks that might not adequately protect the Carrier against claims from bona fide third-party Indorsees.
Electronic Bill of Lading (B/L)
In recent times, there has been a push for a more innovative approach that fully utilizes modern technology. Electronic communication methods are already prevalent in the shipping industry for sending various types of data, including ship manifests and Bill of Lading (B/L) information. The challenge is whether these technologies can be harnessed to create electronic alternatives to the traditional paper Bill of Lading (B/L). For any new Bill of Lading (B/L) system to be successful, it must gain acceptance from a broad spectrum of stakeholders such as Shippers, Carriers, Consignees, Banks, Underwriters, and Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs), many of whom are traditionally resistant to change and have conflicting interests.
A comprehensive market survey by UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) revealed that electronic alternatives to the traditional Bill of Lading (B/L) are not as prevalent in commercial practices as one might expect. The survey highlighted that for an electronic Bill of Lading (B/L) to be viable in the shipping market, it must perform all the functions of the traditional paper version while also being legally recognized. It is generally agreed that an electronic Bill of Lading (B/L) can serve as a Receipt and provide Evidence of a Charterparty.
Transitioning to an electronic record for a paper Sea Waybill should be relatively straightforward. However, replicating the traditional Bill of Lading (B/L)’s unique role as a Document of Title (DOT) presents a significant challenge. Legally, the status of an Electronic Bill of Lading (B/L) remains uncertain, especially concerning whether it qualifies as a document under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992. These acts explicitly apply to Bill of Lading (B/L) or other documents and presume the use of paper. Although the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 allows for regulations to adapt its provisions to technological advancements, such regulations have not yet been implemented.
However, a potential resolution is offered by the proposed Rotterdam Rules, which aim to replace the Hague Visby Rules and introduce a legal framework that treats electronic and paper communications equivalently, provided there is express or implied consent from both the Carrier and Shipper. The Rotterdam Rules outline specific procedures for using electronic records, and such procedures must be explicitly referenced in the contract particulars for any relevant transaction.
Bill of Lading (B/L) and Atlantic Container Line Datafreight System
The initial foray into electronic systems was marked by the introduction of the Atlantic Container Line Datafreight System, which underwent experimental testing in Sweden. This system leverages electronic data processing to eliminate traditional documentation. At the point of cargo receipt, the Shipper provides the essential shipment details, which are entered into the Carrier’s computer at the Loading Port. The Carrier adds necessary information, including the Freight amount and any relevant Clean Bill of Lading (B/L) notations. Subsequently, the system generates a Datafreight Receipt with all entered data, certifies it as the initial printout, and hands it to the Shipper. This information is then transferred to a secondary computer at the Discharging Port, which sends an advance notice of the cargo’s arrival to the Consignee, along with a copy of the Datafreight Receipt. Modeled after the Sea Waybill, this procedure avoids issues related to cargo disposition during transit, requiring the Consignee only to provide identification to receive the cargo.
The Atlantic Container Line Datafreight System introduces several benefits. It addresses delays related to the Bill of Lading (B/L) by eliminating the need for document presentation and aligns well with established business practices without necessitating legal changes. The system essentially fulfills the legal roles of a Bill of Lading (B/L), such as acting as a Receipt and evidencing the carriage contract. However, its major limitation is that it does not serve as a Document of Title (DOT), making it unsuitable for transactions where the Consignee may want to sell the cargo en route. Yet, it can secure a Letter of Credit (LC) if the financing bank is named as the Consignee. Under this arrangement, the cargo seller would secure payment upon shipment and by presenting the certified Datafreight Receipt, provided it meets the bank’s requirements, including naming the buyer’s bank as the Consignee and including a Clean Bill of Lading (B/L) notation with a declaration transferring disposal rights of the cargo to the Consignee during transit.
Following this process, an advance Notice of Arrival (NOA) and a second copy of the Datafreight Receipt are sent to the buyer’s bank, along with a similar notice to the buyer to facilitate loan repayment before cargo arrival. Once payment is received, the bank releases the Cargo Receipt, enabling the buyer to take delivery.
However, there remains uncertainty regarding the security effectiveness in a Letter of Credit (LC) scenario, especially if the buyer becomes insolvent during transit. Traditionally, banks are hesitant about being named as Consignee due to the obligations under the contract of carriage. If the buyer fails to repay the loan, banks face the challenge of disposing of the cargo while possibly delaying delivery instructions to the Carrier, replicating the issues initially caused by the late arrival of the Bill of Lading (B/L).
Bill of Lading (B/L) and Electronic Data Exchange Systems
The fundamental advantage of Electronic Data Exchange Systems is found in the rapid and efficient exchange of an electronic Bill of Lading (B/L). Yet, for such systems to be commercially viable, they must replicate the functions of a Negotiable Paper Bill of Lading (B/L), allowing cargo to be sold while in transit. To achieve this, an Electronic Bill of Lading (B/L) must meet two criteria: it must feature a form of electronic signature for authentication, and it must maintain the unique security properties of the paper Bill of Lading (B/L).
The first criterion is addressed by implementing an Electronic Signature, a broad term for any electronic numbers or letters used to authenticate a message. This can range from simple PIN numbers to sophisticated public key cryptography systems that generate a Digital Signature. To meet the security requirements akin to those of a paper Bill of Lading (B/L), various encryption methods are employed. Encryption involves complex mathematical formulas that convert electronic text into a format unreadable to anyone without the decryption key. Despite rapid technological advancements in code-breaking, the security of the text depends on the complexity of the encryption code used. Two types of encryption are commonly used: the Private Key system and Public Key cryptography.
In the Private Key system, a single key is used for both encrypting and decrypting the data. This system mirrors the functions of a Negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L), allowing for successive sales of cargo in transit. Under this system, cargo details are entered into the Carrier’s computer by the Shipper at the Loading Port, and the Shipper is given a Private Key to control the cargo during transit. The Shipper can transfer control by instructing the Carrier to hold the cargo for a Named Consignee, who can then direct the Carrier to deliver to an Alternative Consignee if desired. Each transfer involves the cancellation of the existing Private Key and the issuance of a new one to the Transferee, ensuring that the Carrier takes instructions only from the current Key Holder. This system’s implementation follows the CMI (Comité Maritime International) Rules for Electronic Bills of Lading (B/L), which allow for opting out under certain conditions, such as the need for a physical Bill of Lading (B/L) for customs or Letter of Credit (LC) purposes.
The Public Key system, in contrast, uses two mathematically related keys where the Public Key is widely available and the Private Key remains confidential to the owner. This system can secure the confidentiality of messages and authenticate the sender’s identity through digital signatures, unique to both the message and the Private Key used to create it. Recipients can verify the sender’s identity and the integrity of the message using the sender’s Public Key.
However, despite these technological advances, there remains a global hesitancy to fully embrace Electronic Bills of Lading (B/L) due to the traditional security offered by tangible Bills of Lading (B/L). A critical aspect of a paper Bill of Lading (B/L) is its uniqueness to one holder at a time, a feature that must be convincingly replicated in an electronic format to gain broader acceptance. If a system can restrict rights to a single owner at any time, effectively mimicking the physical possession of a Bill of Lading (B/L), it could replace the need for a physical document. The challenge lies in ensuring that electronic systems can reliably distinguish the Original Bill of Lading (B/L) from copies, maintaining the integrity and ownership rights associated with traditional negotiable documents.
Bill of Lading (B/L) and Bolero
Bolero represents the latest innovation in the realm of Electronic Bill of Lading (B/L), aiming to harness electronic data interchange to replicate the three fundamental functions of a traditional Bill of Lading (B/L). However, the adoption of Bolero faces two significant legal hurdles. Firstly, there is uncertainty about whether an Electronic Bill of Lading (B/L) qualifies under the legal definition required to activate relevant maritime legislation and conventions. To address this, a contractual approach has been devised, mandating all Bolero users to enter a multilateral agreement that contractually replicates the roles of a paper Bill of Lading (B/L). This foundational contract would explicitly incorporate the Hague Visby Rules or other pertinent maritime conventions, while also ensuring compliance with the CMI (Comité Maritime International) Rules for Electronic Bill of Lading (B/L).
The second challenge arises from the non-negotiable nature of an Electronic Bill of Lading (B/L), potentially complicating the privity of contract. Bolero’s solution is to utilize novation to update the contract of carriage upon the endorsement of the Electronic Bill of Lading (B/L). This process extinguishes the existing contract between the Carrier and Shipper, establishing a new contract with the same terms between the Carrier and the Named Consignee. This procedure repeats with each subsequent endorsement, transferring control of the cargo and legal standing to sue the Carrier to each new Indorsee.
Operational specifics of Bolero involve all transactions, like endorsements, being relayed through Bolero to the recipient rather than directly between parties. Bolero authenticates these transactions using the unique Private Key assigned to the sender, further securing the process with its digital signature. Despite its sophisticated framework, Bolero remains a subscription-based system reliant on widespread market participation. Without significant adoption, frequent switches to traditional paper Bill of Lading (B/L) may be necessary. Additionally, its reliance on advanced technology may limit its applicability in less developed regions or in jurisdictions requiring paper documentation for customs or other legal processes. Bolero’s future as a definitive solution for Electronic Bill of Lading (B/L) challenges remains to be seen, dependent on its ability to inspire confidence and meet the rigorous security and legal standards of the maritime and financial industries.
Switch Bill of Lading (B/L)
Under the Switch Bill of Lading (B/L) process, the Original Bill of Lading (B/L) issued for the shipped cargo is surrendered to the Carrier or the Carrier’s Agent in return for a new set of Bill of Lading (B/L) with altered details such as the Shipper’s name and address, the issuance date of the Bill of Lading (B/L), or the Loading Port. This practice can be used for various commercial reasons, including hiding the origin of politically sensitive cargo or for fraudulent activities like evading customs duties at the Loading or Discharging Port or misrepresenting the shipment date that affects the cargo’s purchase price. The practice is fraught with risks, not only providing opportunities for fraud but also necessitating explicit authorization by the Actual Shipowner, not merely any Disponent Shipowner. Provisions in an Employment Clause and Agency Clause in a Time Charter that permit the Charterer to issue Bill of Lading (B/L) do not inherently grant permission to issue a Switch Bill of Lading (B/L). Likewise, even if a Sub-Charterparty explicitly allows a Sub-Charterer to issue a Switch Bill of Lading (B/L), it won’t bind the Shipowner without a similar clause in the Head Charter.
A major risk of this procedure is the Carrier issuing the new set of Bill of Lading (B/L) without securing the surrender of the Original Bill of Lading (B/L) first. This scenario leads to the existence of two competing sets of Bill of Lading (B/L), increasing fraud potential and complicating the Carrier’s duty to deliver the cargo to the rightful owner. Normally, the Shipowner or the Shipowner’s Agent who issues the Bill of Lading (B/L) should absorb the cost of any resulting losses.
Challenges also emerge if the terms of the two sets of Bill of Lading (B/L) are not identical. A subsequent Indorsee of a Switch Bill of Lading (B/L) may have no issues upon discovering that the terms of the Original Bill of Lading (B/L) were more beneficial. From a contractual perspective, the exchange of the set of Original Bill of Lading (B/L) for the Switch Bill of Lading (B/L) could be viewed as a mutual amendment of the contract of carriage terms by the parties currently involved. Problems might arise, however, where the two sets of Bill of Lading (B/L) were issued in different jurisdictions and the Hague Visby Rules were applicable in one but not the other. Would the Hague Visby Rules apply throughout the carriage or be nullified by the issuance of the Switch Bill of Lading (B/L) if they applied to the Original Bill of Lading (B/L)? Furthermore, numerous issues remain unresolved when the carriage is part of an international sales contract, particularly when financed by a Letter of Credit (LC). It is uncertain whether the terms and conditions of the Switch Bill of Lading (B/L) would meet the documentary requirements of the Letter of Credit (LC) or provide the buyer with continuous documentary coverage from the Loading Port to the Discharging Port. Despite the frequent use of Switch Bill of Lading (B/L), these questions have yet to be thoroughly litigated and answered.
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6- Understanding Hague Visby Rules
Under Common Law, parties to a Contract of Affreightment (COA) covered by a Bill of Lading (B/L) or a similar document, as well as those to a Charterparty, had complete autonomy to negotiate their own terms. However, the 19th-century exploitation of the Shipowner’s and the Carrier’s dominant bargaining position led to the restriction of this freedom with the introduction of the Hague Rules in 1924. The aim of the Hague Rules, and subsequently the Hague Visby Rules, was to shield Cargo Owners from the Carriers’ widespread liability exclusions. This protection was established by mandating that Standard Clauses be embedded in the Bill of Lading (B/L), outlining the risks that the Carrier must accept and defining the maximum coverage the Carrier could seek from Exclusion and Limitation of Liability Clauses. Any further attempts to diminish or negate such fundamental liability were deemed null and void. Nonetheless, the Carrier is not prohibited from accepting greater liability than what the Hague Visby Rules minimally prescribe.
The Hague Visby Rules provide a fundamental, compulsory set of contractual clauses to be included in a contract of carriage, while allowing parties the freedom to negotiate additional terms. These rules are incorporated as a schedule in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971.
Application of the Hague Visby Rules
Types of Carriage Covered by the Hague Visby Rules
The primary criteria for applying the Hague Visby Rules focus on the document that governs the contract of carriage rather than the contract itself. The Hague Visby Rules (Art I(b)) specify that they apply “only to contracts of carriage covered by a Bill of Lading (B/L) or any similar Document of Title (DOT) as far as such document pertains to the carriage of goods by sea.” This principle is further supported by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, which legislatively enacts the Hague Visby Rules and states in subsection (4) that ‘Subject to subsection (6), nothing in this section shall be construed as applying the Hague Visby Rules to any sea carriage contract unless the contract explicitly or implicitly includes the provision for the issue of a Bill of Lading (B/L) or any similar Document of Title (DOT).”
It appears that the Hague Visby Rules do not intend to cover carriage contracts that contemplate issuing a Sea Waybill or other non-negotiable documents, as these are not Documents of Title (DOT).
Moreover, the Hague Visby Rules would not apply to a Charterparty or even a Bill of Lading (B/L) issued under a Charterparty, as long as the Bill of Lading (B/L) remains with the Charterer. In these cases, the Bill of Lading (B/L) functions merely as a Receipt and does not govern the Contract of Carriage, which is exclusively outlined in the Charterparty. However, once a Bill of Lading (B/L) is transferred to a Third Party, the situation shifts, and the Hague Visby Rules become effective the moment such a Bill of Lading (B/L) or similar Document of Title (DOT) starts to regulate the relationship between a Carrier and a Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder.
Conversely, if the parties anticipate that the contract of carriage will be covered by a Bill of Lading (B/L), the Hague Visby Rules are triggered even if such a document is ultimately not issued. This was affirmed in the Pyrene Co Ltd v Scindia Navigation Co case, where a consignment of fire tenders was delivered next to the ship for shipment. As one of the tenders was being hoisted aboard by the ship’s tackle, it fell back onto the dockside, causing severe damage. Although the remaining tenders were safely loaded, and the Bill of Lading (B/L) eventually issued did not mention the damaged tender, when the Carrier attempted to limit his liability under the Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 5), the Shipper contended that this was not permissible as the carriage of the damaged tender was not covered by a Bill of Lading (B/L). The trial judge decided that the crucial aspect was the parties’ expectation of issuing a Bill of Lading (B/L) at the time of contracting, not whether one was actually issued. Since contracts of carriage are typically finalized well before any Bill of Lading (B/L) is issued, he concluded, “whenever a contract of carriage is concluded with the anticipation that a Bill of Lading (B/L) will eventually be issued, that contract is, from the outset, governed by a Bill of Lading (B/L) and thus, inherently a contract of carriage subject to the Hague Visby Rules.”
While the operation of the Hague Rules was limited by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924 to Bill of Lading (B/L) issued for outward voyages from the United Kingdom, Hague Visby Rules (Art X) significantly broaden their scope to include:
every Bill of Lading (B/L) related to the carriage of cargo between ports in two different states if: a) Bill of Lading (B/L) is issued in a contracting State, or b) carriage is from a port in a contracting State, or c) the contract contained in or Evidenced by the Bill of Lading (B/L) stipulates that these Hague Visby Rules, or legislation of any State giving effect to them, shall govern the contract, regardless of the nationality of the ship, the Carrier, the Shipper, the Consignee, or any other interested party.
Hague Visby Rules (Art X) explicitly envision an international contract of carriage between ports in different states, although the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (s 1(3)) extends the application of the Hague Visby Rules, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, to also encompass coastal trade.
Two conditions specified in Hague Visby Rules (Art X) meet the fundamental requirement that a Bill of Lading (B/L) be issued: where the Bill of Lading (B/L) is issued in a contracting state and where the Bill of Lading (B/L) explicitly incorporates the Hague Visby Rules, regardless of the geographical location of the Loading Port in either scenario. The third alternative pertains merely to carriage from a port in a contracting state. This introduces a potential ambiguity because unless the outward shipment itself automatically activates the Hague Visby Rules, their application could be circumvented by the Carrier issuing a Non-negotiable document instead of the required Bill of Lading (B/L). Although Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 3) certainly grants the Shipper the right to demand the issue of a Bill of Lading (B/L) upon the Carrier or the Carrier’s Agent receiving the cargo, this right is only effective if the Hague Visby Rules are already operational. As the principal aim of the drafters of both the Hague Visby Rules was to make their application compulsory for outward cargo shipments from contracting states, it is crucial to resolve this ambiguity. Perhaps the most sensible approach would be to apply the Hague Visby Rules to all cases of outward shipments from the United Kingdom unless the shipper was not entitled to demand the issue of a Bill of Lading (B/L) or other Document of Title (DOT), as issuing such documents was not customary in a specific trade or intended by the parties. This interpretation would accommodate the common use of Sea Waybills in container trade and for roll-on/roll-off traffic and aligns with the spirit of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (s 1(4)) which asserts that nothing in this section shall apply the Hague Visby Rules to any contract for the carriage of cargo by sea unless the contract explicitly or implicitly mandates the issue of a Bill of Lading (B/L) or any similar Document of Title (DOT).
Several lawyers believe that the parties cannot exclude the application of the Hague Visby Rules, where otherwise applicable, either by mutual agreement or by the Shipper accepting a Sea Waybill and not exercising the Shipper’s right under Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 3) to demand a Bill of Lading (B/L). Such a power to exclude by agreement would be crucial for adopting new documentary procedures.
This interpretational challenge is compounded by the language of Hague Visby Rules (Art VI), which essentially allows the Carrier and Shipper to bypass the provisions of the Hague Visby Rules and negotiate their terms for the carriage of specific cargoes. These cargoes, considered unique and not typically part of regular trade, may justify a special contract due to their particular characteristics or the circumstances under which they are transported. Examples include experimental cargoes or contracts for the transport of nuclear waste. Hague Visby Rules (Art VI) also stipulates that such cargoes should be accompanied by a Non-negotiable Receipt, ensuring that the unique terms of such contracts are not transferred to anyone other than the original Shipper. A final provision clarifies that the special provisions of Hague Visby Rules (Art VI) do not apply to ordinary commercial shipments conducted in the regular course of trade. This clause is often seen merely as emphasizing that the special provisions apply solely to the carriage of specific cargoes, although some commentators view it as excluding the possibility of circumventing the application of the Hague Visby Rules for normal commercial cargoes by using Sea Waybills or other Non-negotiable Receipts.
Lastly, it’s important to note that the scope of the Hague Visby Rules has been further broadened by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (s 1). Not only does this act extend coverage to the coastal trade within the United Kingdom, but under Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (s 1(6)(b)), the Hague Visby Rules are also legally binding in relation to ‘any receipt, which is a non-negotiable document marked as such if the contract contained in or Evidenced by it expressly stipulates that the Hague Visby Rules govern the contract as if the Receipt were a Bill of Lading (B/L)’. This subsection aims to clarify the legal implications of a clause in a Non-negotiable Receipt that explicitly incorporates the Hague Visby Rules, rather than defining the conditions under which the Hague Visby Rules would apply to such a document.
Cargoes Excluded by Hague Visby Rules
Two types of cargo are Expressly Excluded from the application of the Hague Visby Rules (Art I(c)). These are Live Animals and “cargo which by the contract of carriage is stated as being carried on Deck and is so carried”. In both scenarios, the parties are at liberty to negotiate their own terms of carriage for such cargoes. The exclusion arises due to the unique risks associated with each category of cargo; the first due to the nature and inherent characteristics of the animals, and the second due to the exposed positioning of the cargo.
Deck Cargo
Two conditions must be met to circumvent the operation of the Hague Visby Rules for Deck cargo. First, the cargo must indeed be Stowed on Deck, and secondly, this fact must be Explicitly Stated on the Bill of Lading (B/L). If either condition is unmet, the contract of carriage remains governed by the Hague Visby Rules. Thus, the Rules will still apply if the Bill of Lading (B/L) omits any mention of Deck stowage even though the cargo is Stowed on Deck, or if the Bill of Lading (B/L) claims the cargo is to be carried on Deck but it is actually Stowed in the Ship Hold.
Determining whether cargo is Stowed on Deck is straightforward; however, proving that such a statement is included on the Bill of Lading (B/L) can be challenging. The decisive factor is whether an innocent Transferee can verify, just by examining the Bill of Lading (B/L), whether the cargo was Stowed on Deck. Consequently, a clause in the Bill of Lading (B/L) granting the Carrier discretionary power to stow cargo on Deck would be inadequate, as the Transferee would be unable to ascertain if this discretion was exercised. In the case of Svenska Traktor v Maritime Agencies, where a consignment of tractors was shipped under a Bill of Lading (B/L) providing the Carrier liberty to Stow the cargo on Deck, and one tractor was lost overboard, the court ruled against the Shipowner. The judge argued that “a general liberty to carry goods on deck does not constitute a definitive statement that the goods are being carried on deck,” emphasizing the need for such a statement to act as a clear notification to Consignees and Indorsees under the Bills of Lading Act 1855 (s 1) that they are receiving Deck Cargo.
Furthermore, a Bill of Lading (B/L) clause stating the Carrier is permitted to carry the cargo on Deck unless the Shipper objects also fails to satisfy the requirement, as the Transferee would have no means of knowing whether an objection was made. This was highlighted in the Encyclopaedia Britannica v Hong Kong Producer case, where encyclopaedias shipped in containers were damaged by seawater. The Carrier’s attempt to invoke an Exclusion Clause was unsuccessful because the court determined the Hague Visby Rules (Art I(c)) did not apply; the clause merely suggested potential Deck stowage but did not confirm it.
Lastly, it is crucial to note that customary practices in the trade, such as the Deck carriage of timber or inflammable materials, do not influence the applicability of the Hague Visby Rules. If the Carrier wishes to benefit from the exclusion provided by Hague Visby Rules (Art I(c)) and avoid their operation, the Bill of Lading (B/L) must contain an Express Clause stating that the cargo has been shipped on Deck.
Consent to Deck Carriage
At this juncture, it is pertinent to address a related issue that is often conflated with the circumstances under which Deck Cargo is not subject to the provisions of the Hague Visby Rules. This concerns the implications for the contract of carriage when the Carrier opts to stow the cargo On Deck without prior consent from the Shipper. Traditionally, such actions were deemed a Fundamental Breach of the contract of carriage, preventing the Carrier from invoking any contractual terms and exceptions for protection in cases of loss or damage to the cargo. Notably, the US Court of Appeals in the Encyclopaedia Britannica v Hong Kong Producer case held that following such a Breach, the Carrier was barred from utilizing the protection offered by the Hague Visby Rules, particularly the Limitation of Liability Clause. However, these assumptions no longer seem valid under English Law. The Doctrine of Fundamental Breach has likely been rendered obsolete following the House of Lords’ decision in the Photo Production v Securicor Transport case. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in The Kapitan Petko Voivoda case ruled that even if cargo is carried On Deck in breach of an express underdeck carriage agreement, it does not prevent the Carrier from using the Limitation of Liability provisions in the Hague Visby Rules for defense against cargo claims. Judge Longmore argued that ‘the seriousness of the breach is no longer an adequate measure for deciding the applicability of exemption or limitation clauses to specific breaches.’
When considering this purely as a matter of interpretation, the phrase “in any event” is crucial. It most naturally means “in every case”, regardless of how serious the contract breach is; whether or not the cargo was stowed under deck. Consequently, the Carrier was able to limit his liability despite what was previously considered a Fundamental Breach of the contract of carriage.
To prevent such breaches of the contract of carriage, the Shipper must have consented, either Expressly or Impliedly, to the Stowage of the cargo On Deck. It appears that a general Liberty Clause in the Bill of Lading (B/L) or even a Clause stating “the carrier is permitted to stow on Deck unless Shipper objects” might suffice, provided the Shipper was adequately notified of the Clause at the time of shipment. For instance, in the Svenska Traktor case, the Court of Appeal, while denying the Carrier’s right to exclude the provisions of the Hague Visby Rules due to the absence of a Deck shipment statement in the Bill of Lading (B/L), still acknowledged that the inclusion of a Liberty Clause in the Bill of Lading (B/L) meant that Deck Stowage did not constitute a breach of the contract of carriage. Thus, the court allowed the Carrier the defenses provided by the Hague Visby Rules. Similarly, consent is typically implied when it is customary in the trade to ship certain types of cargoes On Deck, such as timber, certain dangerous cargoes, and notably, containers on a specially designed container ship. This interpretation, however, is disputed by Judge Tetley, who contends that a printed Liberty Clause in a Bill of Lading (B/L) does not imply consent unless it is accompanied by a clear statement that the cargo has indeed been shipped On Deck. In his view, a Liberty Clause is merely an option, and the absence of a definitive statement in the Bill of Lading (B/L) serves as an assurance that the option has not been exercised. He argues that any resulting ambiguity is problematic, as the Carrier could easily clarify the situation with a clear On Deck statement in the Bill of Lading (B/L). Judge Tetley believes that Carrier hesitation likely stems from concerns that a bank or a Consignee might refuse a Bill of Lading (B/L) indicating Deck Carriage. Thus, he views shipment On Deck without explicit documentation as a Fundamental Breach of Contract.
This perspective, however, finds little support in UK cases, as evidenced by the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Svenska Traktor case. Moreover, there are valid commercial reasons for omitting clear statements about Deck Carriage in the Bill of Lading (B/L). In the container trade, for example, approximately 30 percent of containers are typically carried On Deck in an efficient operation. The final placement of each container depends on multiple factors, including the potential hazardous nature of its contents, the ship’s trim, or simply the timing of its arrival at the dockside. In such scenarios, the Carrier seldom has the opportunity to annotate each Bill of Lading (B/L) and typically relies on the inclusion of a Liberty Clause.
Period of Coverage of the Hague Visby Rules
While the Hague Visby Rules apply to a specific contract of carriage covered by a Bill of Lading (B/L), they do not govern the entire performance of the contract of carriage but are relevant only to the sea transport portion. According to the Hague Visby Rules, the Contract of Carriage encompasses the period from when the cargo is loaded onto the ship to when it is discharged from the ship.
This period is typically interpreted as covering the Tackle-to-Tackle Period where the Carrier is responsible for both loading and discharge, starting when the Ship’s Tackle hooks onto the cargo at the Loading Port and ending when the tackle is released at the Discharging Port. Thus, Carrier liability under the Hague Visby Rules extends not only during the voyage but also during loading and discharging operations, such as instances where the cargo falls back onto the dockside while being lifted aboard with the Ship’s Tackle, or into the sea during discharge into lighters. However, the Hague Visby Rules do not extend to any additional time the cargo is under the Carrier’s control outside the Tackle-to-Tackle period. Under modern trading conditions, this period can be significant, especially since cargo for shipment, delivered to a Ship Agent nominated by the Carrier, is often discharged into a designated warehouse at its destination. Since Hague Visby Rules (Art VII) allow parties to negotiate their own terms regarding the care of cargo before loading and after discharge, Carriers often attempt to exclude responsibility during this period. This is known as the before and after problem and is a recognized weakness in the Hague Visby Rules, which cargo interests are now seeking to rectify.
Complexities with Through Bill of Lading (B/L) or Combined Transport Bill of Lading (B/L)
Another issue arises when cargo is shipped under a Through Bill of Lading (B/L) or Combined Transport Bill of Lading (B/L) that involves transshipment at an intermediate port. The question is whether the Hague Visby Rules govern the entire operation or only up to the port of transshipment. A key factor in this determination is the wording of Hague Visby Rules (Art I(c)), which specifies that the Contract of Carriage for the purposes of the Hague Visby Rules is covered by a Bill of Lading (B/L) “insofar as such document relates to the carriage of goods by sea.” It is clear then that the Hague Visby Rules are inapplicable to any segment of through transport involving land or air carriage. However, a Canadian court expanded on this by ruling that even when sea carriage is anticipated throughout transit, the Hague Visby Rules do not cover periods when the cargo is on the dockside awaiting transshipment. In the Captain v Far Eastern Steamship Co case, cargo shipped from Madras to Vancouver under a contract expected to involve transshipment was stored on the dock in Singapore for three weeks, during which it sustained rainwater damage. The court allowed the Carrier to rely on a contractual clause excluding liability for this period, asserting that the Hague Visby Rules did not apply while the cargo was dockside, as it does not relate to the carriage of cargo by water.
This decision, however, was distinguished by Judge Bingham in the Mayhew Foods v OCL case involving the carriage of frozen poultry from Sussex to Jeddah. The Bill of Lading (B/L) covered the entire journey, and the Shipper was unaware of the Carrier’s intention to transship the cargo in Le Havre. Judge Bingham noted that it would be unexpected for the Carrier to discharge, store, and tranship the cargo, thus avoiding liabilities they would have faced if they had shipped directly from Southampton to Jeddah. He concluded that such actions still related to and connected with the sea carriage, thereby falling under the Hague Visby Rules. The decision implies that when cargo is shipped from a contracting state under a Bill of Lading (B/L) that covers the entire sea journey to the final destination, despite any intermediate transshipment, the Hague Visby Rules apply throughout the operation, governed by the requirements of Hague Visby Rules (Art X).
The decision in The Morviken case is pertinent primarily in scenarios where the Hague Visby Rules are obligatory. If the Hague Visby Rules are not directly applicable, courts are reluctant to assume that selecting English Law implies an intent to integrate the Hague Visby Rules into the contract of carriage as defined by Hague Visby Rules (Art X). For example, in The Komninos S case, a cargo of steel coils shipped from Thessaloniki (GR) to Ravenna (IT) under a Bill of Lading (B/L) stipulating UK courts for dispute resolution implied an associated Choice of Law. When a cargo damage claim arose, the Shipowner sought to utilize Exclusion Clauses, which would be invalid under the Hague Visby Rules if applicable. However, as Greece was not a contracting state at that time and the shipment did not originate from a contracting state, the Hague Visby Rules were not mandatorily applicable. The Court of Appeal declined to deduce an intent to incorporate the Hague Visby Rules merely from the inclusion of a forum selection clause, allowing the Shipowner to apply the contractual exceptions.
Furthermore, it is essential to recognize that parties can explicitly include the Hague Visby Rules in a Bill of Lading (B/L) or Non-negotiable Receipt when these rules would not typically apply. Previously, such actions were regarded purely as contractual agreements, and courts would resolve any disputes between the Hague Visby Rules and other contract terms through standard interpretation. However, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (s 1(6)) now specifies that in any conflict, the provisions of the Hague Visby Rules will supersede any Express Terms of the contract that are inconsistent with them, aiming to give statutory binding effect to voluntary contractual agreements. This outcome is contingent on the Non-negotiable Receipt fully adopting the Hague Visby Rules. In The European Enterprise case, a shipment of meat packed in a refrigerated tractor trailer from Dover (UK) to Calais (FR) under a Non-negotiable Consignment Note included the Hague Visby Rules with certain limitations, including a less generous Limitation of Liability than those stipulated in Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 5). When the cargo suffered damage in transit, the Cargo Owner contended that the lower contractual limit was voided by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (s 1(6)(b)), which endowed the Hague Visby Rules with legal force. The trial judge dismissed this argument, noting that the Hague Visby Rules were not inherently applicable to Non-negotiable Receipts, allowing parties to negotiate their terms and decide on the extent of incorporation into their Contract of Carriage. The judge remarked it would be odd if a voluntary Paramount Clause, reflecting only a partial adoption of the Hague Visby Rules, resulted in statutory binding character for all the Hague Visby Rules where there was no foundational contractual bond. Judge Steyn further noted that before the Hague Visby Rules could achieve legal force upon incorporation into a Non-negotiable Receipt, strict adherence to two formal requirements outlined by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (s 1(6)(b)) was necessary: the receipt must explicitly state its Non-negotiable nature and must explicitly dictate that the Hague Visby Rules govern the contract of carriage as if the Receipt were a Bill of Lading (B/L). Failure to include this specific phrasing would prevent the Hague Visby Rules from obtaining statutory force.
Basic Provisions of the Hague Visby Rules
The Hague Visby Rules were crafted not as a comprehensive, all-encompassing code governing the carriage of cargo by sea but were designed to establish a basic yet mandatory framework for the contract of carriage. Parties are free to negotiate additional terms outside of this framework. As suggested by the title of the Hague Visby Rules Convention, the primary goal was to standardize certain regulations related to Bill of Lading (B/L) to achieve significant uniformity in safeguarding the interests of both Carriers and Cargo owners. The provisions of the Hague Visby Rules are broadly categorized into two groups: first, those that set the minimum obligations of the Carrier, and second, those that outline the maximum protections available to the Carrier, including the extent to which liability can be limited.
Duties of the Carrier under the Hague Visby Rules
1- Obligation to Provide a Seaworthy Ship – Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 1)
Traditionally, the Carrier was absolutely obligated under Common Law to provide a Seaworthy Ship, subject only to the Common Law exceptions of Act of God, Queen’s Enemies, or Inherent Vice. This liability is now replaced by an obligation to exercise Due Diligence under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (s 3). The Hague Visby Rules (Article III Rule 1) stipulate that:
The Carrier must, before and at the beginning of the voyage, exercise Due Diligence to:
- Make the ship Seaworthy.
- Properly man, equip, and supply the ship.
- Ensure that the ship holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship where cargo is carried, are fit and safe for their reception, carriage, and preservation.
In Hague Visby Rules (Article III), the obligation encompasses the three recognized aspects of Seaworthiness under Common Law: the physical condition of the ship, the efficiency of the crew and equipment, and the Ship’s Cargoworthiness.
1(a)- Duration of the Obligation to Provide a Seaworthy Ship
Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 1) mandates that the Carrier exercise Due Diligence to ensure the ship is Seaworthy “before and at the beginning of the voyage.” This phrase has been interpreted to cover the period starting from at least the beginning of the loading operation until the ship departs on its voyage. An illustrative case saw the claimant’s cargo lost when the defendant’s ship had to be scuttled before it could depart on the contractual voyage. During the loading, an attempt to thaw ice in the scupper holes with an oxyacetylene lamp led to a fire, necessitating the scuttling of the ship. Although the Shipowner attempted to invoke the fire exception under Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 2(b)), the Privy Council ruled that the loss resulted from a breach of the Seaworthiness obligation since the Carrier’s duty to exercise Due Diligence persisted throughout the loading and until the ship’s departure. The Carrier’s failure to prevent the fire, caused by the negligence of its servants, breached this obligation, rendering the Carrier liable. The Privy Council noted that the implicit guarantee of Seaworthiness in Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 1) is an overarching obligation, any violation of which negates the Carrier’s right to claim the protections under Hague Visby Rules (Art IV) for any resultant damage. If the Shipowner ensures the ship is Seaworthy before it sets sail, they are not liable under the Hague Visby Rules for defects that arise during the voyage or at an intermediate port. The definition of “voyage” under Hague Visby Rules (Art III) spans the entire journey indicated on the Bill of Lading (B/L), regardless of intermediate stops. The Charterparty doctrine of stages, which requires the ship to be Seaworthy at the start of each stage, does not apply under these rules. Thus, in the case of Leesh River Tea Co v British India Steam Nav Co, a ship was not deemed Unseaworthy under Hague Visby Rules (Art III) when cargo was damaged due to the secretive removal of a storm valve cover plate by an unknown person while the ship was docked at an intermediate port.
2- Care of Cargo by the Carrier under the Hague Visby Rules
The Hague Visby Rules impose a second duty on the Carrier concerning the care of cargo. Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 2) state that “subject to the provisions of Hague Visby Rules (Art IV), the Carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods delivered.”
This rule has been interpreted to mean the Carrier must exercise a level of care akin to Reasonable Care. This interpretation is evident from the use of the word “carefully” in the rule, but the addition of “properly” suggests the drafters of the Hague Visby Rules may have intended a higher standard of care. This was examined by the House of Lords in the Albacora v Westcott and Laurance Line case, where wet salted fish shipped from Glasgow to Genoa deteriorated due to bacterial action. Although the Carrier was unaware that this type of fish needed refrigeration for such a voyage, the House of Lords found that the Carrier had adopted a “sound system” of carriage, as Lord Reid put it, based on all the knowledge the Carrier had or should have had about the cargo. Lord Pearce supported this, noting that a “sound system” doesn’t need to cater to every specific requirement of a particular cargo but should be efficient under the general practice of sea carriage.
Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 2) suggests a continuous Carrier obligation from Tackle-to-Tackle (TTT), meaning from the start of loading to the end of discharging. This assumes the Carrier is responsible for these tasks unless the contract specifies otherwise, such as when loading and discharging are to be handled by shore-based equipment at the Shipper or Consignee’s expense. The House of Lords in the Jindal Iron & Steel Co v Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co case clarified that Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 2) does not compel the Carrier to perform these tasks but merely states that if they undertake to do so, it must be done “properly” and “carefully.” Such a transfer of responsibility does not violate the Hague Visby Rules, as it merely delineates the scope of the carriage contract.
However, clear wording is required to effect such a transfer, and the assumption that the Shipper handling loading and discharging operations (Free In Out Stowed Trimmed – FIOST) relieves the Carrier of liability is incorrect. Yet, a recent case has found that a clause transferring responsibility for loading and stowing cargo to Charterers “at their expense under the supervision of the Ship Master” effectively exempts the operation of Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 2). Judge Morison distinguished between the right to supervise, which does not confer ultimate responsibility, and the duty to supervise, which does.
It is also important to note that the duty of care required by the Carrier is expressly subject to Hague Visby Rules (Art IV). This brings up questions about the burden of proof: when cargo is damaged in transit, is it up to the Carrier to prove the cargo was carried “properly” and “carefully,” or does the burden to prove negligence rest with the Cargo Owner? The prevailing opinion suggests that once the Cargo Owner demonstrates that the cargo was damaged or lost during transit, the onus shifts to the Carrier to show that the cause of damage falls under one of the exceptions listed in Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 2a and 2p). If unable to do so, the Carrier is held strictly liable unless they can demonstrate that the damage or loss occurred without their actual fault or that of their agents or servants. If the Carrier can attribute the loss to an exception, they are relieved of liability unless the Cargo Owner can then prove a breach of the Carrier’s duty of care as specified in Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 2).
3- Obligation to Issue a Bill of Lading (B/L) Under the Hague Visby Rules
Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 3) stipulate that after taking charge of the cargo, the Carrier, the Ship Master, or the Ship Agent of the Carrier must, upon the Shipper’s request, issue a Bill of Lading (B/L) that details: a- the apparent order and condition of the cargo, b- Leading Marks necessary for identifying the cargo as provided in writing by the Shipper before loading begins, ensuring such marks are clearly visible on the cargo or its coverings in a way that they should remain legible through the voyage, c- the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity or weight of the cargo, as provided in writing by the Shipper.
This obligation, however, is subject to certain conditions. Firstly, the Carrier is not required to verify the above details if there are reasonable grounds to doubt their accuracy, or if verifying them is impractical, such as when the cargo is sealed within a container. Secondly, the Shipper is considered to have guaranteed the accuracy of the information provided and must indemnify the Carrier against any losses resulting from inaccuracies.
It is important to note that only the Shipper has the right to demand the issuance of a Bill of Lading (B/L) with the specified information. No similar right is extended to the Consignee or any subsequent Endorsee. Thus, without a request from the Shipper, the Carrier is not obligated to issue a Bill of Lading (B/L) or provide the required information, and it is not uncommon for Bills of Lading (B/L) to include the disclaimer “Weight and Condition Unknown.” This practice can undermine the purpose of Hague Visby Rules (Art III) to provide the Consignee with a Bill of Lading (B/L) that serves as an effective Receipt for the cargo.
Additionally, Hague Visby Rules (Art III) establish that the Bill of Lading (B/L) shall serve as Prima Facie Evidence of the Carrier’s receipt of the cargo as described, becoming conclusive when transferred to a Third Party acting in good faith. Unlike previous Common Law Estoppel rules, there is no requirement for the transfer to be for value. A Received for Shipment Bill of Lading (B/L) issued under these provisions will typically confirm only the quantity and condition of the cargo at the time of receipt by the Carrier and will not provide even Prima Facie Evidence of the cargo’s quality or condition at the time of shipment, which is crucial when a Letter of Credit (LC) is involved. To address this, Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 7) grants the Shipper the right to request a Shipped Bill of Lading (B/L) post-loading, which includes all pertinent information.
Rights and Immunities of the Carrier Under the Hague Visby Rules
A- Exceptions for the Carrier under the Hague Visby Rules
Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 2) outlines the exceptions available to the Carrier. The Carrier may voluntarily waive these protections, either entirely or partially, but cannot expand the list of exceptions. The Carrier and the ship are not liable for loss or damage arising from:
a) Acts, neglect, or defaults by the Ship Master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the Carrier in the navigation or management of the ship. b) Fire, unless it results from the actual fault or privity of the Carrier. c) Perils, dangers, and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters. d) Act of God. e) Act of war. f) Act of public enemies. g) Arrest or restraint by princes, rulers, or people, or seizure under legal process. h) Quarantine restrictions. i) Acts or omissions of the Shipper or Cargo Owner, or their agents or representatives. j) Strikes, lockouts, or stoppages or restraints of labor from any cause, whether partial or general. k) Riots and civil commotions. l) Efforts to save life or property at sea. m) Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage due to inherent defect, quality, or vice of the goods. n) Insufficiency of packing. o) Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks. p) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence. q) Any other cause not due to the actual fault or privity of the Carrier, or the fault or neglect of the Carrier’s agents or servants. The burden of proof is on the party claiming the benefit of this exception to prove that the loss or damage did not result from the Carrier’s fault or that of their agents or servants.
Most of these exceptions imply no fault by the Carrier or the Carrier’s Agents and Servants. The presence of fault typically prevents the Carrier from claiming these exceptions. However, exceptions related to navigational or managerial errors, and those covering damage caused by fire, have faced criticism from cargo interests. The navigational error exception is particularly controversial as it has no counterpart in any other transport convention. The final exception on the list provides a fallback for the Carrier: if unable to show that the loss falls under a specific exception, they may still avoid liability by proving the cause involved no fault on their part or that of their agents or servants. This is a challenging but achievable burden of proof, and it is not uncommon for Carriers to prefer relying on other listed exceptions wherever possible.
B- Limitation of Liability under the Hague Visby Rules
The concept of Limitation of Liability has evolved since the 16th century, originally to boost shipping investment. Its modern utility is twofold: it shields the Carrier from the risks linked to high-value cargoes whose worth is undisclosed, and it facilitates the provision of uniform and cost-effective Freight Rates by standardizing liability levels. To prevent Carriers from setting excessively low liability caps, the drafters of the Hague Visby Rules, along with subsequent conventions, set a minimum standard of liability. Shippers retain the option to declare the full cargo value before shipping and note this on the Bill of Lading (B/L) to secure full coverage, though this is infrequently exercised due to higher Freight Rates associated with declared value, which often surpass the costs of direct insurance by the Cargo Owner.
The drafters of the Hague Visby Rules faced two challenges in defining a limitation of liability: choosing a suitable unit of cargo to base the Carrier’s liability calculation, and settling on a monetary unit to define the minimum liability.
Limitation of Liability under the Hague Rules
Hague Rules (Art IV Rule 5) initially capped Carrier liability at £100 gold value per package or unit. Upon adopting the Hague Rules in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924, the UK used a literal £100 valuation, while other nations adjusted this figure to their currencies. Over time, inflation has diminished the relevance of these limits to actual damages incurred by Cargo Owners, yet few countries have adjusted their figures accordingly. The UK addressed this through Gold Clause Agreements by the British Maritime Law Association in 1950 and 1977, which abandoned the gold value criterion for flat sums of £200 and £400, respectively.
Confusion has also emerged internationally concerning the definition of ‘package’ and ‘unit.’ What defines a ‘package’? Does size matter, and must it be wrapped? Is ‘unit’ referring to a shipping unit like a crate, package, or container, or does it extend to a freight unit used in calculating freight for bulk cargoes like grain or oil? In English Law, there is scant litigation on this, with ‘package’ and ‘unit’ often used interchangeably, and ‘unit’ typically interpreted as ‘shipping unit.’ This has avoided the need for a precise definition of ‘package,’ although the lack of guidelines for bulk cargo is notable.
In the United States, the interpretation of these terms has been complex, fueled by prolific case law, especially since US legislation allows for the term ‘package’ or ‘customary freight unit’ to be used. US courts typically do not require that ‘packages’ be fully wrapped, but they are reluctant to classify unboxed vehicles or machinery as ‘packages.’ Often, Cargo Owners may find it beneficial to use the ‘freight unit’ option, particularly when freight units outnumber shipping units, though this is not always advantageous.
Until recently, English courts hadn’t addressed this particular matter until The River Gurara case in 1998. A ship journeying from West Africa ran aground off Portugal’s coast, resulting in a total loss of its cargo, much of which was containerized and listed under a Bill of Lading (B/L) that adhered to the Hague Rules. Many containers were filled privately by Shippers and noted on the Bill of Lading (B/L) as containing specific quantities of items like pallets, crates, cartons, or bags. The key issue was whether the Cargo Owner’s compensation would be confined to £100 per container or £100 per listed item.
The Court of Appeal leaned on the United States’ method, decreeing that each item listed separately in the Bill of Lading (B/L) should be regarded as an individual ‘package’ for limitation reasons. The court further assessed how the Carrier’s non-verification of the items listed by the Shipper influenced the case. There were two possible reservations: the Carrier might claim ignorance of the container’s contents using terms like ‘weight, number and contents unknown,’ which the majority of the Court of Appeal believed would nullify any claims made in the Bill of Lading (B/L) about the container’s contents. In such instances, the Cargo Owner would need to present external proof to establish the count of items for limitation purposes. Alternatively, the Carrier might indicate that any declarations in the Bill of Lading (B/L) regarding the container’s contents were solely the Shipper’s responsibility by using terms like ‘Shipper’s Count’ or ‘Said to Contain’. Although this scenario wasn’t directly resolved in The River Gurara case, Judge Phillips suggested that such terms do not automatically undermine the Bill of Lading’s (B/L) reliability. He articulated, “It seems at least arguable that the words ‘said to contain’ merely clarify that the Carrier, as mandated by Hague Rules (Art III Rule 3), is recording the ‘number of packages as furnished in writing by the Shipper’ without disputing the description, thereby allowing the description to serve as Prima Facie Evidence of the contents within the containers.”
Problems of Limitation under the Hague Visby Rules
Two additional issues related to the operation of the Hague Visby Rules’ limitation provisions need to be addressed. The first concerns the scope of these rules: Which types of claims are they meant to cover, and are their provisions intended to protect not only the Carrier but also other parties involved in executing the contract of carriage? Secondly, under what conditions, if any, will the Carrier’s actions prevent him from invoking the protection of the limitation provisions?
Scope of Application under the Hague Visby Rules
The Common Law principle of privity of contract prohibits a person who is not a party to a contract from relying on its provisions for protection against any claims brought against them. As a result, in the Adler v Dickson (The Himalaya) case, it was ruled that a member of a ship’s crew, sued for negligence that caused injury to a passenger, could not rely on an Exception Clause in the contract of carriage between the passenger and the Shipowners. Similarly, in the Scruttons v Midland Silicones case, the House of Lords refused to allow a firm of stevedores hired by the Carrier to invoke the protection of the Hague Visby Rules’ Limitation of Liability provisions when sued for negligently damaging the cargo during unloading operations. In both instances, the party being sued was not considered a party to the contract of carriage.
A partial solution to this problem is provided by Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 2), which states that “the Carrier’s Agent and the Carrier’s Servant (such servant or agent not being an independent contractor)” may, if an action is brought against the Carrier, avail themselves of the same defenses and limits of liability under the Hague Visby Rules as the Carrier himself. This provision effectively overturns the decision in Adler v Dickson, enabling an employee of the Carrier to rely on the protection of the Hague Visby Rules to the same extent as their employer. However, it does not extend this protection to independent contractors hired by the Carrier, such as the stevedores in Scruttons v Midland Silicones, who must seek protection through other means. Although there seems to be no logical commercial basis for this distinction, it is important to note that the issues of privity of contract and the concept of an independent contractor appear to be almost exclusively confined to the Common Law system.
However, independent contractors have two potential options for protection. First, they can insist on obtaining an indemnity from the Carrier to cover this extended liability before starting the work. Secondly, they can require the Carrier to ensure that they are explicitly included as a party to the contract of carriage, at least concerning the Hague Visby Rules provisions related to excepted perils and limitation of liability. This can be accomplished by incorporating the so-called Himalaya Clause into the contract of carriage, the effectiveness of which was established by the Privy Council in the New Zealand Shipping Line v Satterthwaite case. Additionally, they may be able to invoke the protection of the Limitation of Liability provisions in the contract of carriage if they meet the criteria of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
In conclusion, it is important to note that Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 1) specify that the overall defenses and limits of liability provided by the Hague Visby Rules apply whether the action brought against the Carrier is based on contract or tort. Additionally, Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 3) stipulate that if the Cargo Owner initiates separate proceedings against the Carrier and the Carrier’s Agent or the Carrier’s Servant for the same damage, the total amount recoverable shall not exceed the limit provided by the Rules.
Challenging the Limitation of Liability under the Hague Visby Rules
Under the Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 5), the liability limits specified are meant to apply “in any event.” Despite this clear language, there was a prevailing belief that Carriers could not rely on these limitation provisions if they committed a Fundamental Breach of the Contract of Carriage, such as deviating from the agreed route or stowing cargo on deck without the Shipper’s consent. However, this approach was questioned by the Court of Appeal in The Kapitan Petko Voivoda case, where several excavators were stowed on deck contrary to an explicit agreement in the contract of carriage for Underdeck Stowage. During the voyage, some of the excavators were washed overboard in heavy weather, while others were damaged by saltwater. When the Carrier attempted to limit his liability under Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 5), the Cargo Owner argued that this constituted a fundamental breach. The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, stating that “the seriousness of the breach is no longer a sufficient criterion for determining whether Exception or Limitation Clauses apply to particular breaches.” Judge Longmore noted that a breach of the Seaworthiness obligation might, in some cases, result in more severe losses than unauthorized deck carriage, yet the Hague Visby Rules limitation would still apply in such situations.
Following the construction approach suggested in the Photo Production v Securicor Transport case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the phrase “in any event” should be interpreted as it is written and should apply to any breach, regardless of its seriousness.
This decision leaves two unresolved issues. First, in deciding that the Carrier was entitled to limit his liability, the court appeared to give no special significance to the express agreement in the contract of carriage to stow the cargo underdeck. Since the same decision would likely have been reached without such an express agreement, it is unclear what benefit the Cargo Owner gains from including this term in the contract. Secondly, in reaching their decision, the Court of Appeal members resisted the argument that applying the limitation provision in this case would virtually exclude carrier liability.
In justification, the court members highlighted that several practical measures could prevent this outcome. First, the Cargo Owner could declare the true value of the cargo and include this information in the Bill of Lading (B/L), making the full loss recoverable. Secondly, the parties could agree on a higher limitation figure than the amount specified in Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 5). Finally, the parties could explicitly incorporate the Hague Visby Rules into the contract of carriage, as these rules provide higher limitation amounts than those in the original Hague Visby Rules. These suggestions, however, raise questions about the relative bargaining power of the parties involved. The phrase “in any event” remains in the corresponding Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 5a) and is likely to be interpreted similarly to its predecessor. However, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 must also be considered, as it provides that the Hague Visby Rules “shall have the force of law.” This provision suggests that the Hague Visby Rules would apply even in cases of Fundamental Breach of the Contract of Carriage. The situation may be clarified by the fact that the Hague Visby Rules now specify certain types of misconduct that will deprive the Carrier of the protection of the limitation provisions. Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 5e) states:
“Neither the Carrier nor the ship shall be entitled to the benefit of the Limitation of Liability provided for in this paragraph if it is proven that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the Carrier done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result.”
Similar conduct by a servant or agent of the Carrier will also deprive them personally of the benefit, not only of the limitation provisions but also of any other defenses provided in the Hague Visby Rules. However, it is not intended that misconduct by the servant or agent will affect the Carrier’s personal liability limit. It remains to be seen how courts will interpret the phrase “recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result” in this context. For instance, will unauthorized deck stowage or intentional deviation be considered “reckless” conduct if there is a strong likelihood of damage to the cargo?
A potential indicator can be found in the approach taken by the Court of Appeal when interpreting an identical phrase in the Warsaw Convention (Art 25). According to Judge Dyson, “It is sufficient for recklessness that a person acts without regard for the possible consequences of their actions. What Warsaw Convention (Art 25) requires is knowledge of the probable consequences.” Moreover, “it is well-established that knowledge in Warsaw Convention (Art 25) is not imputed knowledge. It is not enough to show that, due to their training and experience, the pilot ought to have known that damage would probably result from their act or omission. The test is subjective; actual knowledge is required.” If a similar test is applied in the context of Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 5e), the burden of proof on the claimant will be a challenging one.
Limitation of Actions under the Hague Visby Rules
Municipal law typically sets a general time limit within which actions must be initiated to recover compensation for lost or damaged goods. Under the Limitation Act 1980, a contractual claim must be initiated within six (6) years from the date when the cargo in question was delivered or should have been delivered. To expedite the resolution of cargo claims, the Hague Visby Rules impose a one-year (1) time limit, which can be extended by mutual agreement of the parties after the cause of action has arisen. Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 6) states:
“Subject to paragraph 6 bis, the Carrier and the ship shall in any event be discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods, unless suit is brought within one year of their delivery or of the date when they should have been delivered. This period may, however, be extended if the parties so agree after the cause of action has arisen.”
Several aspects of this provision merit attention. First, the limitation period begins from the time the cargo was delivered or should have been delivered. The use of the term ‘delivery’ instead of ‘discharge’ appears intentional by the draftsmen of the Hague Visby Rules, and it is presumed that at least some form of constructive delivery to the consignee or their authorized agent will be required before the time starts to run. In this context, paragraph 6 further provides that “In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage the carrier and the receiver shall give all reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying the goods.”
Secondly, Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 6) stipulates that time runs either from the date of delivery or from the date when the goods should have been delivered, without any reference to the respective timing of these events. Consequently, if it can reasonably be concluded that delivery was made under the original contract, even though the terms of that contract may have been modified to accommodate issues encountered during a particular voyage, the timing of the delivery relative to the expected delivery date is irrelevant for the purposes of the time bar. Time will run from the date of actual delivery. Only in the event of a failure to deliver the cargo, or where delivery is made under what is considered a separate and distinct contract, will the date on which the goods should have been delivered become relevant for the time bar. For example, in The Sonia case, a cargo of jet oil was shipped from a Saudi Arabian port for delivery in Lagos under a Voyage Charterparty that incorporated specified provisions of the Hague Visby Rules. Upon arrival in Lagos, the cargo was rejected by the receivers as off-specification due to contamination. After extended negotiations between Shipowners and Charterers, the ship was eventually rerouted to a Greek port, where delivery of the cargo was made some eight weeks later to a receiver nominated by the Charterer. In response to a claim against the Shipowners for failing to take proper care of the cargo, resulting in its rejection in Lagos, the Court of Appeal held that time began to run under Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 6) from the date of delivery in Greece, rather than from the date when the cargo should have been delivered in Lagos. The court reasoned that since the cargo had remained on the same ship throughout and had been delivered by the same Shipowner to the order of the same Charterer, delivery had been made under the original contract of carriage, and no separate and distinct contract was involved.
Thirdly, the Carrier is “discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the cargo.” This provision has been interpreted as covering not only the typical claim for cargo damage or loss but also extending to claims arising from a fundamental breach of contract by the Carrier or from the type of misconduct listed in Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 5e). This interpretation is justified by the fact that the provision is expressly given “the force of law.”
Fourthly, the paragraph requires that “suit” be brought within a period of 12 months. A narrow interpretation was applied to this requirement in Compañia Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Nav Co, where it was held that the suit must be brought within the relevant jurisdiction during this period. The Bill of Lading (B/L) in question provided for exclusive English jurisdiction, but the claimant initially brought their action in New York. By the time the error was discovered, the 12-month period had elapsed, and the trial judge ruled that any action in an English court was then barred. This seems an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation if the purpose of the time limit is to encourage cargo owners to promptly notify their claims to carriers since an action brought in any jurisdiction should suffice for this purpose. The term “suit” has also been construed as including both litigation and arbitration proceedings. In The Merak case, the Bill of Lading (B/L) incorporated the terms of a Charterparty, which included an Arbitration Clause. Unaware of this, the claimant brought a court action for cargo damage, and by the time this action was stayed, the 12-month period had expired. It was held that the word “suit” included arbitration proceedings, and consequently, the arbitration avenue was now time-barred. Given the prevalence of Bills of Lading (B/L) incorporating Charterparty Terms, the issues raised by The Merak case are likely to recur, potentially causing hardship to the unsuspecting Consignee. On the other hand, if suit is brought within the required 12 months, Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 6) does not prevent the amendment of such a claim outside that period, provided the amendment does not substantially alter the nature of the original claim.
Fifthly, the case of The Clifford Maersk has determined that if the last day of the limitation period falls on a Sunday or another day when the Supreme Court’s office is closed, the suit will be considered timely if the claim form is issued on the next available business day.
Finally, it’s important to consider the impact of the time bar on the substantive claim involved. Generally, the Limitation Act 1980 bars the relevant claim but does not extinguish it. Therefore, while the party entitled to a statute-barred debt cannot pursue it through legal action, they may still recover it if other methods are available. However, under Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 6), the situation is different, as the Carrier is “discharged from all liability whatsoever” once the time limit expires. In the Aries case, the House of Lords concluded that this provision not only bars the remedy but also extinguishes the right. In this case, the defendants, having paid the freight upon receiving the cargo, made a deduction for short delivery. Two years later, they were sued by the Carrier for the remaining freight balance and tried to use a right of set-off as a defense. The court ruled that such a defense was inadmissible since any right on which it could have been based had been extinguished by the passage of time.
Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 6) also provides for the extension of the 12-month period “if the parties so agree after the cause of action has arisen.” It is presumed that an earlier agreement between the parties would also be valid since Hague Visby Rules (Art V) allows a Carrier to increase his obligations by waiving a right or immunity he would otherwise have. However, such a provision must be “embodied in the Bill of Lading (B/L) issued to the Shipper.”
This discussion primarily pertains to the initial claim against the Carrier. Hague Visby Rules often include provisions for the Carrier to be indemnified by a third party if a successful claim is made against the Carrier, and similar provisions may have been specifically included in the contract of carriage. An indemnity action cannot be initiated until the initial claim against the Carrier has been resolved by judgment or settlement, which is unlikely to happen within the limitation period. Therefore, Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 6) allow an indemnity action to be brought outside the 12-month period if it is initiated within the normal limitation period of the court seised of the case. In the United Kingdom, the relevant period is six (6) years for a standard claim based on contract or Tort. The paragraph also stipulates that, in any event, a minimum period of three months must be allowed from the time the party seeking indemnity has settled the claim or has been served with process in the action against them.
Dangerous Cargo under the Hague Visby Rules
Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 6) stipulates the conditions for handling dangerous cargo, detailing:
“Should cargo of a flammable, explosive, or inherently dangerous nature be shipped without the Carrier’s, Master’s, or Carrier’s Agent’s prior knowledge and consent concerning its nature and characteristics, the Carrier has the right to unload, destroy, or neutralize such cargo at any location without compensating the Shipper. Furthermore, the Shipper is liable for all damage and expenses arising directly or indirectly from transporting such goods. Conversely, if dangerous goods are shipped with appropriate knowledge and consent and later pose a risk to the ship or other cargo, the Carrier may similarly remove or neutralize these goods without incurring liability, except for general average costs.”
This clause underlines an implied condition at Common Law that a Shipper must not load dangerous goods without the Carrier’s consent. If shipped without consent, the Carrier can handle such goods as needed without owing compensation, while the Shipper remains liable for resultant damages. Even with consent, if the cargo endangers the ship or other cargo, the Carrier can take necessary actions without facing liability, barring general average contributions.
Incorporation of the Hague Visby Rules in Charterparties
While Hague Visby Rules (Art V) clarifies that these rules are not compulsory for Charterparties, they are often incorporated voluntarily through various methods. This can be done by directly referencing the legislation that enacts these rules, by mentioning the rules themselves, or through a clause embodying Hague Visby Rules (Art III and Art IV). Commonly, this is achieved by including a Clause Paramount in the Charterparty, such as in the New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) 1946 (Clause 24) Form, which explicitly embraces the provisions of the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936. Sometimes, the Charterparty merely mentions a Paramount Clause without specifics, which courts are urged to interpret effectively rather than disregard as ambiguous.
This incorporation can lead to conflicts between the terms of the Charterparty and the Hague Visby Rules. Often, if there’s a conflict, the Charterparty will specify that the Hague Visby Rules prevail. Absent this, courts view it as a contractual matter requiring interpretation. Since the rules are not mandatory here, courts aim to respect the parties’ intentions rather than get entangled in technicalities. For instance, in Adamastos Shipping Co v Anglo-Saxon Petroleum, despite the unintentional inclusion of the US Paramount Clause in a charter, the Lords interpreted it as intending to apply the Hague Visby Rules to the Charterparty. Even when these rules state they don’t apply to Charterparties once incorporated, courts have found ways to enforce them, underscoring the intention to align the obligations, liabilities, rights, and immunities with those established between Carriers and Shippers under the rules.
Furthermore, in The Satya Kailash case, where a ship was chartered to lighten another ship that could not enter port due to excessive load, an incident occurred. During the operation, both ships collided due to negligent navigation by the chartered ship. The court found that the Paramount Clause within the charter, which incorporated the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936, allowed the Shipowner to utilize the Hague Visby Rules’ exceptions covering negligent navigation. This decision highlights that the Act’s provisions were deemed applicable even though the charter involved no cargo-carrying voyage and was not connected to any voyage to or from a US port. This interpretation suggests that courts are likely to uphold clauses that incorporate the Hague Visby Rules into charterparties, emphasizing that the requirement for these rules to have the force of law mainly applies when explicitly included in a Bill of Lading (B/L) or Non-negotiable Receipt.
Incorporating the Hague Visby Rules into a Charterparty significantly alters the foundational obligations that arise under such agreements.
Ship Seaworthiness Obligation
Traditionally, Common Law mandates a strict obligation to provide a Seaworthy Ship. This is modified by the Hague Visby Rules to a requirement of exercising due diligence to ensure the Ship is Seaworthy “before and at the beginning of the voyage.” Interpreting this phrase within a Charterparty context poses challenges. Specifically, it is uncertain whether this duty arises only at the start of the initial voyage or extends to the commencement of each voyage within the Charterparty. While straightforward for Voyage or Trip Charters, which typically involve a single voyage, the scenario becomes complex with multiple voyage charters. The House of Lords, in the case of Adamastos Shipping Co v Anglo-Saxon Petroleum, ruled that the duty covers all voyages under a Charterparty, whether the ship is loaded or in ballast. This ruling was specific to a Consecutive Voyage Charter, but it is suggested that the obligation similarly applies to each voyage under a Time Charter when each voyage requires new Bill of Lading (B/L) that incorporates the Hague Visby Rules, depending on the overall interpretation of the Charterparty.
Additionally, the Lords in the Adamastos case recognized that the Hague Visby Rules’ provisions for compensation due to breaches of the Seaworthiness Obligation (Hague Visby Rules Art IV Rule 1 and Rule 2) are not confined to physical cargo damage or loss. They extend to compensatory damages for freight losses incurred due to an Unseaworthy Ship completing fewer voyages than planned during the charter term, as long as the loss fits within the scope of activities outlined in Hague Visby Rules (Art II).
Exceptions
In Charterparties, Shipowners typically undertake a broader array of activities than those covered under standard Bill of Lading (B/L) contracts or those envisaged by the exceptions listed in Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 2). A pertinent question is whether a Shipowner can claim the immunities provided in the Hague Visby Rules for these extensive activities if the Charterparty incorporates these rules. This was affirmatively answered in The Satya Kailash case by the Court of Appeal. Despite the unusual nature of the operation (lightening another overloaded ship), the Shipowner successfully invoked the Navigation Exception from the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936, incorporated into the Charterparty. This decision underscores that broad incorporation clauses can extend statutory immunities to cover additional contractual duties under the Charterparty, as highlighted by Judge Goff’s assertion that general incorporation terms effectively shield the owner regarding statutory duties and other contractual activities stipulated by the Charterparty.
7- Understanding Rotterdam Rules
To mitigate further fragmentation, a new global initiative was launched. At the invitation of UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law), the CMI (Comité Maritime International) developed a ‘Draft Instrument on Transport Law’ which was presented to the UNCITRAL Secretariat in 2001. This draft underwent a thorough evaluation by a dedicated UNCITRAL Working Group, which, after comprehensive review and discussions, completed its third and final assessment in January 2008. The finalized draft was subsequently distributed to all UN (United Nations) members for feedback before it was finalized and unanimously adopted by the UNCITRAL Commission in New York in July 2008. The text of the Convention was later ratified by a resolution of the UN General Assembly in the fall of that year. This time, there was no diplomatic conference; instead, the Convention, known as ‘The Rotterdam Rules,’ was made available for signature in Rotterdam on September 23, 2009. Implementation requires twenty ratifications or equivalent actions, and the Convention will become effective one year after the 20th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession is deposited. The principal policy trends of the new Convention are in line with developments seen in countries like Australia and the USA. The Convention is modeled after the Hamburg Rules, yet it offers an expanded overview of the various facets of the contract of carriage, consisting of 96 articles.
Due to the comprehensive and intricate nature of the Rotterdam Rules, this commentary is intended to summarize the key features of the Rotterdam Rules in comparison with previous carriage conventions.
Scope of Application of the Rotterdam Rules
The Rotterdam Rules adopt a Door-to-Door (DD) approach, moving away from the traditional Port-to-Port (PP) coverage, requiring only that the transport involves a sea leg and that this leg includes cross-border transport. The Carrier’s responsibility extends from the Receipt of the cargo to its delivery to the Consignee, covering liabilities for loss, damage, or delay during any inland transport that occurs before or after the sea leg. However, with a formal agreement between the Shipper and Carrier noted in the contract specifics, certain aspects of the transport, such as loading, handling, stowing, or unloading of the cargo, can be outsourced to parties other than the Carrier. In these situations, the Carrier can be exonerated from liability if it can show that such loss, damage, or delay was due to these outsourced activities. It’s also noteworthy to mention the volume contract, which allows parties, under specific safeguards, to opt out of many of the Rotterdam Rules’ otherwise compulsory conditions.
Expanding the coverage from Door-to-Door (DD) introduces potential conflicts with other existing carriage conventions. To address these conflicts, the Rotterdam Rules incorporate a limited network liability mechanism, allowing the rules to be superseded in situations where, at the time of the loss, damage, or delay, another international convention is mandatorily applicable to a non-sea leg, and it can be demonstrated that the issue occurred solely during that leg. This network approach is narrowly tailored, only extending to aspects of other carriage conventions specifically concerning a Carrier’s liability, limitations on liability, or timing of lawsuits.
The Rotterdam Rules apply to all sea carriage contracts regardless of the type of documentation used. They also cover situations where electronic documents have replaced traditional paper ones, as long as the Shipper and Carrier agree to their use. Charterparties and Contracts for the use of a ship or any space on it are excluded from the Rotterdam Rules, except for Bill of Lading (B/L) or their electronic counterparts issued under such agreements, except as between the original parties to those contracts. The new Rotterdam Rules apply to both inward and outward voyages from a contracting state, significantly broadening their applicability. However, coverage will not extend to cases where the parties specifically incorporate the Rotterdam Rules into their contract of carriage where it would not otherwise apply, although they are still free to voluntarily include its provisions on a contractual basis. In such instances, these provisions would not be obligatory should the Rotterdam Rules later be enacted into law.
Basic Carrier Liability under the Rotterdam Rules
One of the most significant and debated aspects of the Rotterdam Rules is the approach to defining Carrier Liability. This approach integrates elements from both the Hague Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules. Carrier Liability is outlined in a revised version of the Hamburg Rules (Art 5.1), predicated on fault with a shifted burden of proof. Thus, if the claimant demonstrates that loss, damage, or delay occurred during the carrier’s responsibility period, the carrier is liable unless it can establish that neither its fault nor that of any performing party contributed to the incident. In attempting to meet this burden, the Carrier may show that the loss, damage, or delay was due to events that suggest no fault on its part. This list of events aligns with the exceptions in the Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 2), excluding the controversial nautical fault exception. In this instance, these are intended as rebuttable presumptions of no fault, rather than absolving liability as before.
It could be argued that these provisions sufficiently define Carrier Liability, but the prevailing opinion supported adding an Additional Clause that specifies the Carrier’s duties explicitly. Consequently, the Rotterdam Rules reaffirm the obligations from the Hague Visby Rules to maintain Due Diligence in providing a Seaworthy Ship and to handle the cargo carefully during the Carrier’s responsibility period. Uniquely, Seaworthiness is now a continuous obligation throughout the voyage. Claimants may counter the presumption of no fault, resulting from the Carrier’s invocation of an exception, by proving that the primary cause of the loss was either the Unseaworthy condition of the ship or the Carrier’s negligence.
Specific Provisions for Particular Cases under the Rotterdam Rules
The appropriateness of a convention’s application to all goods types or the exclusion of problematic cases has been contentious. The Hague Visby Rules regime chose an exclusive approach for such cases, whereas the Hamburg Rules adopted an inclusive strategy, albeit with special provisions for specific goods types. The Rotterdam Rules adopt the inclusive approach of the Hamburg Rules for the carriage of deck cargo, while following the Hague Visby Rules for other special cases.
Deck Cargo under the Rotterdam Rules
The Rotterdam Rules allow for deck shipment when it aligns with the carriage contract, the customs, practices, or laws of a specific trade. Under these conditions, the standard Rotterdam Rules provisions apply, except the Carrier is not liable for loss, damage, or delay arising from inherent risks of deck carriage. If cargo is shipped on deck without such consent or legal basis, no Fundamental Breach occurs, but the Carrier remains liable for any loss, damage, or delay solely caused by its deck carriage, losing the defenses under Rotterdam Rules (Art 17). Liability for cargo in containers or on vehicles is treated the same as standard cargo under the Rotterdam Rules, whether carried below or above deck, as long as the latter is on decks designed for that purpose.
If deck cargo consent hinges on mutual agreement or trade customs, the Carrier cannot use such consent against a Third Party holding a Negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L) in good faith unless the contract specifies possible deck carriage. However, the Carrier will forfeit its right to liability limitation if it breaches an explicit agreement with the Shipper for under-deck carriage.
Live Animals under the Rotterdam Rules
Contrasting with Deck Cargo, the Rotterdam Rules adopt the Hague Visby Rules’ exclusionary stance on the carriage of Live Animals and specific cargo types as outlined in the Hague Visby Rules (Art VI). In cases involving Live Animals, the Carrier can limit or exclude liability unless proven that the loss, damage, or delay was caused intentionally or recklessly by the Carrier, knowing that such outcomes were likely. While the new Rotterdam Rules don’t specifically mention particular cargo, the provisions for certain other cargo types aim to achieve similar objectives as those in the Hague Visby Rules regime. The Carrier can limit liability where the nature or condition of the cargo or the terms and circumstances of their carriage justify a special agreement, provided it does not involve standard commercial shipments or issue negotiable transport documents for the cargo’s carriage.
Handling of Dangerous Cargo Under the Rotterdam Rules
For the first time within a maritime convention, a clear definition has been established for Dangerous Cargo. This term refers to items that inherently or potentially pose risks to people, property, or the environment. The guidelines for managing Dangerous Cargo align closely with those in the Hamburg Rules. Shippers must appropriately mark or label these items following relevant laws and regulations and must notify the Carrier of the cargo’s hazardous properties well before it is handed over to the Carrier. Should the Shipper neglect to do this and the Carrier remains unaware of the hazardous nature, the Shipper will be held accountable for any resultant loss or damage. If the Carrier deems the cargo too risky upon discovery, it may refuse to load it or may opt to unload, neutralize, or destroy it to mitigate the threat to people, property, or the environment.
Carrier Definition Under the Rotterdam Rules
Under the Rotterdam Rules, a Carrier is defined broadly as any person who enters into a carriage contract with a Shipper. This expansive definition is similar to that found in the Hamburg Rules and suggests inclusion of entities beyond traditional Shipowners or Charterers, such as any principal party entering a carriage contract with a Shipper, irrespective of their direct involvement in transporting the cargo. The earlier distinction between Carrier and Actual Carrier seen in the Hamburg Rules has evolved into the concept of the Performing Party. This term refers to any entity, aside from the Carrier, engaged directly or indirectly in fulfilling the Carrier’s contractual duties regarding the physical movement of cargo (e.g., loading, stowage) at the behest or under the oversight of the Carrier. Performing Parties are categorized as either Maritime or Non-maritime, with Maritime Parties specifically involved from when the cargo reaches the Loading Port until it leaves the Discharging Port.
Under the Rotterdam Rules, Carriers delegating their contractual duties remain legally responsible for both the actions and oversights of the Performing Party and its employees. A Maritime Performing Party faces similar obligations and liabilities to those of the Carrier if loss, damage, or delay happens under its watch or during its involvement in the contractual duties within a Contracting State. Such a Party can also invoke the Carrier’s defenses and limitations of liability under the Rotterdam Rules. Agreements that increase the Carrier’s obligations or liabilities beyond the standard set by the Rotterdam Rules do not bind Performing Parties unless they explicitly agree to them. If responsibilities of the Carrier and Performing Party overlap, their liability is joint and several, though the combined liability cannot surpass the limits outlined in the Rotterdam Rules.
Documentation Provisions Under the Rotterdam Rules
Parties involved can opt to forgo traditional transport documents or electronic transport records, or decide to use only their non-negotiable forms, depending on the prevailing customs, usage, or practices of the trade involved. In the absence of such agreements or customs, upon delivering the cargo for transport, the Shipper can request the issuance of either a Negotiable or Non-negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L), or their electronic equivalents if previously agreed upon. The Rotterdam Rules specify a detailed list of information that must be included in these documents or records, a list more comprehensive than that of the Hague Visby Rules. Essential details include the cargo’s description, identifying marks, quantity, and weight, all provided by the Shipper. There is also a requirement to declare the cargo’s apparent condition when it is handed over for transport. The Shipper must compensate the Carrier for any losses or damages arising from inaccuracies in the provided details. The Carrier has the right to amend the transport document or electronic record if it knows or suspects that the Shipper’s information is incorrect, noting what it believes to be the accurate details.
Moreover, the Carrier may qualify the information when it lacks reasonable means to verify the details provided by the Shipper, specifying which parts of the information are affected. The Rotterdam Rules expand on what constitutes ‘reasonable means of checking’, encompassing situations where verification is not physically or commercially feasible. These rules also introduce major changes in how these details affect the evidentiary value of the transport documents or electronic records. As with past conventions, these details serve as prima facie evidence of the cargo’s condition as described by the Carrier, but they become conclusive evidence when a Negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L) or a negotiable electronic record is transferred to a Third Party acting in good faith. The Rules further describe instances where such details, once transferred to a Consignee acting in good faith, are regarded as conclusive evidence, particularly when a Non-negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L) must be surrendered to receive the cargo, or when details furnished by the Carrier are relied upon in good faith by the Consignee.
Deviation under the Rotterdam Rules
The Rotterdam Rules take a stringent stance on deviation, stipulating that even if a deviation is considered a breach of the Carrier’s obligations under applicable law, the Carrier will still retain access to any defenses or limitations provided by the Rotterdam Rules. Essentially, the principle of fundamental breach will not affect the contracts of carriage governed by the Rotterdam Rules.
Delay in Cargo Delivery under the Rotterdam Rules
The Rotterdam Rules follow the Hamburg Rules’ perspective on delivery delays, holding a Carrier liable for any loss or damage due to delays occurring within its period of responsibility, unless the Carrier can demonstrate that the delay was not due to its fault or that of any responsible party. Delay is specifically defined as the failure to deliver cargo at the designated destination within the agreed timeframe. This definition deviates from the Hamburg Rules by excluding the standard of what would be reasonable for a diligent Carrier. Given that sea carriage contracts rarely specify delivery times, this omission might leave a significant legal gap. It is unlikely that a court would deny compensation for losses caused by the Carrier’s negligent or deliberate failure to expedite the voyage, even if no delivery time was agreed upon. Under the Rotterdam Rules, entitlement to compensation for delay-related losses expires unless the loss is reported to the Carrier within 21 consecutive days following the cargo’s delivery.
Limitation of Liability under the Rotterdam Rules
The limitations on liability in the Rotterdam Rules are largely in line with the modified framework of the Hague Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules. Liability limits are set at 875 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) per package or other shipping unit, or 3 SDRs per kilogram of the cargo’s gross weight, whichever amount is greater. There are provisions for higher compensation if the nature and value of the cargo are declared by the Shipper prior to shipment and recorded in the contract, or if the Carrier and Shipper explicitly agree on a higher value. The container clause remains but is expanded to include cargo transported on a vehicle. The limit for economic losses due to delay is set at two and a half times the Freight Payable on the delayed cargo, provided that this amount does not surpass the total loss limit of the cargo. As in previous conventions, the Carrier’s right to limit liability is forfeited if it is proven that the loss, damage, or delay resulted from an intentional act or omission by the person claiming the right to limit, done recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would likely occur.
Network Liability under the Rotterdam Rules
The Rotterdam Rules introduce a form of network liability applicable in situations where an international convention is mandatorily applicable to a segment of the journey other than the sea leg. This is particularly relevant to liability limitations, where there may be significant discrepancies between different conventions. This issue becomes complex when a Shipper cannot determine on which leg of the journey the loss, damage, or delay occurred. Many Bill of Lading (B/L) documents presume such incidents happen on the sea leg, where the lowest limitation amounts are typical. It seems that the Rotterdam Rules would likely yield a similar outcome, being mandatorily applicable from Door-to-Door (DD) and only deferring to an alternate convention if the loss, damage, or delay occurred exclusively on a non-sea leg. The burden of proving such a circumstance would presumably rest with the claimant.
Limitation of Action under the Rotterdam Rules
Under the Rotterdam Rules, the timeframe for initiating judicial or arbitral proceedings is limited to two (2) years from when the cargo was delivered or should have been delivered. This Time Bar applies to both claims made by or against the Carrier and is procedural in nature.
The rules explicitly allow a party to utilize a Time-Barred claim as a defense or as a set-off against a claim made by the other party. Additionally, the Rotterdam Rules provide for the extension of this time limit through a declaration or declarations by the party against whom the claim is made. Similar to earlier conventions, a claim for indemnity by a person found liable under the Rotterdam Rules may be filed outside the limitation period if it is initiated within the legal timeframe of the concerned jurisdiction, or within ninety (90) days from when the party seeking indemnity has settled the claim or been served with process in the action against it, whichever comes first.
Contracting Out under the Rotterdam Rules
Following previous conventions, the Rotterdam Rules explicitly void any attempts to exclude or limit the obligations or liabilities defined by the rules. Rotterdam Rules (Art 79) prohibits any contract terms that directly or indirectly attempt to exclude or limit the obligations of the Carrier, Shipper, Consignee, or controlling party. Any methods aiming to circumvent this prohibition are also explicitly void, including terms that increase the Shipper’s liabilities or assign the benefits of cargo insurance in favor of the seller.
Volume Contracts (Contracts of Affreightment) under the Rotterdam Rules
An exception to the general prohibition against derogations from the Rotterdam Rules is found in the provisions concerning Volume Contracts (Contracts of Affreightment). These contracts are defined as agreements to transport a specified quantity of cargo over a series of shipments during a set period. The quantity specified may be a minimum, maximum, or a specified range. Under such contracts, the Carrier and Shipper may modify the obligations or liabilities imposed by the Rotterdam Rules, provided the contract prominently states that it deviates from these rules and is either “individually negotiated” or explicitly specifies the sections of the contract to which the derogations apply. The Shipper must also be given the option to enter into an alternative contract that complies with the Rotterdam Rules. Such derogations must be clearly stated within the Volume Contract itself and cannot be implied through other documents or standard form contracts. Moreover, these derogations are not enforceable based on the Carrier’s public price schedules or transport documents unless they are expressly agreed to by Third Parties, who must be clearly informed of the contract’s deviations from the Rotterdam Rules and must explicitly consent to them.
The enforceability of such derogations against Third Parties depends on compliance with these conditions. The party claiming the benefit of the derogations bears the burden of proof that all conditions have been met. These provisions faced significant opposition during their development, as they potentially allow for broad exemptions from the mandatory framework of the Rotterdam Rules, possibly undermining their goal of harmonizing international cargo carriage laws. Concerns were also raised about the potential negative impact on small Shippers or Carriers with limited bargaining power, especially given the broad definition of Volume Contracts and the absence of a minimum cargo quantity requirement, which might lead some states to have reservations about implementing these provisions.
Transfer of Rights Under the Rotterdam Rules
The Rotterdam Rules specify that the transfer of rights under a contract of carriage is applicable only to Negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L) or negotiable electronic transport records, excluding Non-negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L), which are governed by national laws. According to the Rules, rights under a Negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L) can be transferred by endorsement to another person or by endorsement in blank if the document is issued to order. No endorsement is necessary for bearer documents or documents endorsed in blank, or when the transfer occurs directly between the original Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder and the person named in the order, such as between Shipper and Consignee.
The Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder is defined as the individual in possession of a negotiable transfer document who, in the case of an order document, is either the Shipper or Consignee, or the individual to whom the document is endorsed. For bearer documents or documents endorsed in blank, the holder is the bearer. The extent of liability for a Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder under the contract of carriage is limited; a Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder other than a Shipper does not incur liability merely by holding the document but only when exercising rights under the contract of carriage. Such liabilities are restricted to those defined in or ascertainable from the Negotiable Bill of Lading (B/L). However, merely negotiating a transport document by endorsement or agreeing to exchange a negotiable document for an electronic record with the Carrier does not constitute exercising rights under a contract of carriage.
Jurisdiction and Arbitration Under the Rotterdam Rules
The provisions of the Rotterdam Rules concerning jurisdiction and arbitration are optional and only binding on Contracting States that choose to adopt them. The aim is to provide claimants with a choice of jurisdiction or arbitration forums, rather than being restricted by exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses or Arbitration Clauses. Such clauses are enforceable only within volume contracts under strict conditions that limit their effectiveness for both the original parties and Third Parties.
Jurisdiction Under the Rotterdam Rules
Claimants can initiate proceedings against a Carrier in several possible venues under the Rotterdam Rules:
- The domicile of the Carrier.
- The contractual place of Receipt or delivery of the cargo.
- The port where the cargo is initially loaded on a ship or where it is finally discharged.
- Any other place agreed upon by the Shipper and Carrier.
A Carrier attempting to preempt a claimant’s choice of jurisdiction by seeking a declaration of non-liability must withdraw the action at the defendant’s request once the defendant selects a forum, unless the defendant appears in the alternative court without contesting its jurisdiction. While the provisions do not affect jurisdiction over arrest or other protective measures, such actions do not confer jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the dispute. The Rules also provide for the recognition and enforcement of decisions made by competent courts in other Contracting States.
Arbitration Under the Rotterdam Rules
The Rotterdam Rules permit parties to opt for arbitration instead of court proceedings to resolve disputes arising from a contract of carriage. Claimants are not allowed to initiate court proceedings preemptively against agreed arbitration, though they are not bound to arbitrate in the specified forum. Claimants can choose an arbitration venue from a list identical to that for jurisdiction, with the addition of the forum specified in the arbitration agreement. The Rotterdam Rules include special provisions on the enforceability of exclusive Arbitration Clauses in non-liner transportation agreements. After a dispute arises, the disputing parties may agree on any forum for arbitration.
8- Understanding Hamburg Rules
The 1968 Brussels Protocol’s amendments to the Hague Rules did not achieve widespread acceptance. Many nations with significant cargo interests viewed these as merely a stopgap measure, and there was a burgeoning call for a thorough overhaul of carrier liability to formulate a comprehensive code addressing all aspects of the carriage contract. This initiative led to the drafting of a new convention, ratified at a United Nations-sponsored international conference in Hamburg in March 1978. Known as the “Hamburg Rules,” this convention came into effect on 1 November 1992, a year after the deposit of the twentieth ratification instrument. To date, 34 states have adopted the convention, though no major maritime nations have ratified it yet.
The Hamburg Rules govern sea carriage contracts, defined as any contract where the carrier, in exchange for freight payment, agrees to transport goods by sea from one port to another. If the contract includes multimodal transport, the Hamburg Rules apply only to the maritime segment. This differs from the Hague Visby Rules, which focus on contracts evidenced by a Bill of Lading (Bill of Lading) or a similar Document of Title (DOT). Under the Hamburg Rules, it does not matter whether a Bill of Lading or a Non-negotiable Receipt is issued, and the definition of a Bill of Lading in Art 1.7 is crafted accordingly. However, like its predecessors, the new convention does not apply to charterparties or to Bill of Lading (B/L) issued under them unless the Bill of Lading regulates the relationship between the carrier and the Bill of Lading (B/L) Holder, that is, it is issued or negotiated to someone other than the charterer.
The Hamburg Rules apply to contracts of sea carriage between ports in different states (excluding coastal trade), and the scope of covered voyages is similar to those listed in the Hague Visby Rules (Art X), with a notable exception. The Hamburg Rules regulate both inward and outward Bill of Lading (B/L), a crucial consideration for shipowners trading with countries where the Hamburg Rules are effective. There is also a provision for parties to explicitly incorporate the Hamburg Rules into the Bill of Lading (B/L) or other contract evidence.
Unlike the Hague Visby Rules, which apply only from Tackle-to-Tackle, the Hamburg Rules operate for the Entire Duration the Carrier is responsible for the cargo, from loading at the departure port to unloading at the destination port. This extended period is clearly defined, addressing the existing ‘before and after’ issue seen in the Hague Visby Rules, where the carrier can disclaim liability for cargo not physically on board his ship.
Carrier Liability under the Hamburg Rules
In establishing a uniform and comprehensive standard for Carrier Liability, the creators of the Hamburg Rules have embraced the long-standing argument by cargo interests that Carrier Liability should exclusively rely on fault. They assert that a Carrier must be accountable for all loss of, or damage to, cargo resulting from his own fault or that of the Carrier’s Agents and Servants, without any exceptions. Consequently, they have decided to articulate an affirmative rule of responsibility based on assumed fault and to eliminate the list of exceptions found in the Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 2). This foundational liability is articulated as follows:
“Carrier is liable for losses stemming from damage to or loss of the goods, as well as from delivery delays if the event causing the loss, damage, or delay occurred while the goods were under his care as outlined in Article 4, unless the Carrier demonstrates that he, his servants or agents, took all reasonable measures to prevent the event and its repercussions.”
Regarding the majority of exceptions in the Hague Visby Rules that typically do not involve the Carrier’s fault, the removal of these exceptions should minimally impact Carrier Liability. This elimination might even be advantageous legally, as it reduces the uncertainty surrounding the scope and definition of such exceptions, which are merely instances where fault cannot be ascribed to the Carrier. Nonetheless, a significant shift in responsibility is anticipated by removing the exception for negligence in the navigation or management of the ship. Cargo interests have consistently argued that it is unfair for a Carrier, who has complete control over the ship and cargo, to exclude such liability fundamental to the carriage contract. This form of protection is not afforded to carriers in any other transport mode. Carrier interests are understandably hesitant to relinquish such conventional protection and argue, among other points, that such a change would lead to a significant rise in Freight Rates. Resistance to discarding the exception for faults in ship management is less pronounced since it is widely acknowledged that this conflict with the Carrier’s Duty of Care towards the cargo has led to considerable legal uncertainty and litigation.
Nature of Carrier Liability under the Hamburg Rules
By implementing a uniform liability test, the Hamburg Rules draftsmen aimed to rectify some of the discrepancies and ambiguities stemming from the vague language in the Hague/Visby Rules. Under these earlier rules, the carrier’s obligation to ensure a seaworthy ship was confined to exercising ‘due diligence’, while he was mandated to care for the cargo ‘properly and carefully’ throughout the journey. The adoption of a uniform fault-based liability test is intended to address these issues. Under the Hamburg Rules, the carrier’s obligation to maintain a seaworthy ship is evaluated on the same grounds as his duty towards the cargo, with both responsibilities extending over the entire carriage duration. The remaining question is how national courts will interpret the carrier’s duty to take ‘all necessary measures to prevent the occurrence and its consequences’. Will British courts view this as indicative of negligence liability, or will they continue to hold the carrier responsible for the negligence of independent contractors, as in The Muncaster Castle case? If the latter interpretation prevails, will a similar duty of care extend to the cargo? Regrettably, the quest for uniformity in interpretation is not helped by the introduction of varied terminology, such as the use later in the Hamburg Rules (Art 5) of ‘fault or neglect’ by the Carrier rather than ‘all necessary measures’. Does the same duty of care apply in both instances? Further complexity arises from attaching to the Hamburg Rules a Common Understanding that the Carrier’s Liability under the Hamburg Rules rests on the principle of presumed fault or neglect.
Burden of Proof under the Hamburg Rules
To enhance uniformity and simplicity, the Hamburg Rules introduce a consistent Burden of Proof Rule. Under the Hague Visby Rules, Burden of Proof was addressed explicitly only in specific situations, leading to divergent interpretations by courts. Particularly challenging has been determining the respective Burden of Proof between the Carrier’s Duty of Care towards cargo in Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 2) and reliance on exceptions listed in the Hamburg Rules (Art IV Rule 2.13). The Hamburg Rules aim to clarify this by presuming fault in all instances of loss or damage to cargo, thereby standardizing the Burden of Proof on the Carrier. This approach is rationalized by the advantage of placing the burden on the party most familiar with the facts. The exception is fire-related damage; here, the burden shifts away from the Carrier due to the complexity of pinpointing a fire’s origin at sea, where most fires tend to originate with the cargo. Hamburg Rules (Art 5.4) specify that the Carrier is liable for fire-related losses only if the Cargo Owner demonstrates fault or neglect by the Carrier, the Carrier’s Servant, or the Carrier’s Agents, or their failure to take all reasonable measures to extinguish the fire and mitigate its effects.
Specific Provision for Particular Cases under the Hamburg Rules
Hamburg Rules (Art 5) make distinct provisions for certain scenarios. It’s acknowledged that some cargo types, like animals or deck cargo, pose assimilation challenges to any standard Carrier Liability formula. The drafters of the Hague Visby Rules chose to exempt such problematic cases, permitting contracting under specific terms for such transports. Recognizing the difficulties but objecting to entirely exempting such cargo from the code, Cargo Owners favored a more inclusive approach. The Hamburg Rules drafters concurred, opting to initially include these cases in the general formula, then address their unique aspects separately.
Live Animals under the Hamburg Rules
Under Hamburg Rules (Art 5.1), the carriage of live animals adheres to the general care obligation, but the Carrier won’t be liable for losses stemming from inherent risks of this transport type. Furthermore, if the Carrier proves adherence to the Shipper’s instructions regarding animal transport and links the specific loss to these risks, it will be presumed the loss occurred due to these risks unless evidence shows part or all of the loss was due to negligence or fault by the Carrier, the Carrier’s Servants, or the Carrier’s Agents.
Deck Cargo under the Hamburg Rules
Under Hamburg Rules (Art 9), Deck Cargo is treated as standard cargo and governed by the Rules if shipped according to an agreement with the Shipper, trade usage, or legal requirements. If the cargo is on deck per agreement, this must be noted on the Bill of Lading (B/L). Absent such notation, the Carrier must prove the agreement’s existence but cannot use it against a Third Party who acquires the B/L in good faith. If cargo is on deck without consent or authority, it doesn’t constitute a Fundamental Breach of contract, but liability for losses during deck transport is limited to those “resulting solely from the carriage on deck”. Nonetheless, the Carrier retains the right to invoke liability limitations under Hamburg Rules (Art 6) unless violating an explicit commitment to stow the goods below deck.
Deviation under the Hamburg Rules
Under the Hague Visby Rules (Art IV Rule 4), a Carrier is exempt from liability for losses due to ‘any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at sea or any reasonable deviation.’ During the formulation of the Hamburg Rules, there was consensus on maintaining the Carrier’s exemption from liability when deviating to save lives at sea. However, extending this exemption to include property-saving deviations, especially when not linked to saving lives, garnered less support. Critics argued that this allowed Carriers to benefit significantly from salvage operations, often at the expense of the cargo on their own ship. The clause regarding Reasonable Deviation in the Hague Rules often led to interpretative challenges but was seldom successfully invoked in courts. The Hamburg Rules drafters decided against a specific provision for deviation. Instead, they integrated liability for losses resulting from Deviation under the general Carrier Liability umbrella, holding the Carrier accountable unless it can be shown that ‘all measures that could reasonably be required to prevent the occurrence and its consequences’ were taken. However, it was deemed necessary to specifically address losses from life-saving attempts, but providing blanket immunity for property-saving attempts was seen as potentially problematic. The final wording in Hamburg Rules (Art 5.6) states: “Carrier is not liable, except in general average, where loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from measures to save life or from reasonable measures to save property at sea.”
Partial Liability of Carrier under the Hamburg Rules
Under the Hague Visby Rules, complications arise when the Carrier’s fault merges with an exception under Hague Visby Rules (Art IV), contributing to cargo damage. Sometimes, Carrier negligence is the primary cause of loss; other times, it may exacerbate an existing problem. If the Carrier’s fault leads to an excepted peril, such as storm damage to cargo due to Carrier’s Negligence, courts typically rule that the exception does not absolve the Carrier. Conversely, if the Carrier’s Negligence coincides with another factor causing damage, like cargo spoilage from combined strike-related delays and poor ventilation, the Carrier might only be liable for the portion of loss directly attributable to their fault, if this portion can be distinctly determined. The Hamburg Rules attempt to clarify this by stating the Carrier is liable ‘only to the extent that the loss, damage or delay in delivery is attributable to his fault,’ provided the Carrier can determine the loss percentage attributable to other factors. Generally, if the Carrier cannot prove this, they are liable for the full loss, a challenging burden to meet.
Loss Caused by Delay in Delivery under the Hamburg Rules
The Hague Visby Rules lack a specific clause for losses due to delivery delays. When such delays result in physical damage to the cargo, like quality deterioration, recovery is likely under Hague Visby Rules (Art III Rule 2), which mandates general cargo care. However, the position is less clear concerning Purely Economic Loss, such as market loss due to delays. Some countries explicitly allow for such loss recovery in their maritime laws, while Common Law often considers it within the ‘reasonable contemplation of the parties’ as per the Hadley v Baxendale case. Ambiguities often lead to clauses in Liner Bill of Lading (B/L) that limit or exclude liability for delays. To eliminate these uncertainties and align sea transport with other international modes, the Hamburg Rules explicitly state the Carrier is liable for losses from delivery delays unless they can prove no fault on the part of the Carrier or the Carrier’s Servants or Agents. In English law, this liability is expected to remain limited to losses foreseeable by both parties, aligning with the Hadley v Baxendale standard.
Limitation of Liability under the Hamburg Rules
Despite compelling arguments that maintaining the principle of Limitation of Liability is outdated, the authors of the Hamburg Rules decided to keep it, arguing it benefits both the Shipper and the Carrier. This is because it allows the Carrier to predict risks beforehand, enabling the establishment of stable and lower Freight Rates. Nonetheless, any newly agreed limits should be set high enough to motivate the Carrier to adequately care for the cargo and should be adjusted for inflation over time. Like in the Hague Rules, special attention was needed for defining the correct unit of cargo and choosing an appropriate monetary unit for accounts. During the development of the Hamburg Rules, there was a strong push for a weight-based liability formula, similar to other transport conventions. Ultimately, a dual system was maintained to benefit owners of high-value, lightweight cargo. An improvement in the Hamburg Rules was to clarify the conflict between ‘Shipping’ and ‘Freight’ units by distinctly stating that the unit in question is a ‘package or other shipping unit.’
This dual system is strictly for addressing liability for cargo loss or damage. As for delays in delivery, this system was not deemed fit. Instead, the preferred method was to limit liability to an amount up to two and a half times the Freight Payable for the delayed cargo, ensuring it does not surpass the total Freight Payable under the carriage contract. The maximum recoverable amount for any combination of loss, damage, or delay cannot exceed what would be compensated in a total loss scenario. Questionably, the cap on maximum compensation for delays is limited to the amount stated in the Bill of Lading (B/L) Freight. For container limitation, the Hamburg Rules adopt the solution from the Hague Visby Rules, where the shipping units are considered as the individual items specified in the Bill of Lading (B/L) or a similar document. If a container or pallet’s contents are not itemized separately, then the container or pallet, along with its contents, is treated as a single shipping unit. Should there be loss or damage to the container or pallet itself, it is considered a separate unit for limitation purposes, unless provided by the Carrier. When there are disputes over the Shipper’s load and count as noted on the Bill of Lading (B/L) due to doubt or lack of verification opportunity, the Carrier is required to note a reservation in the Bill of Lading (B/L) and state the reasons for it.
Unit of Account under the Hamburg Rules
Rejecting the Poincaré Franc, the drafters of the Hamburg Rules chose the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the preferred unit of account. According to Hamburg Rules (Art 26), ‘the relevant units of account should be converted into the national currency of a State based on the currency’s value on the date of judgment or on a date agreed by the parties’. For states in the IMF, this conversion follows IMF regulations. For non-members, the state itself decides the conversion approach. Some countries may not allow calculations based on this method, in which case they may revert to using the Poincaré Franc. In terms of liability limits, under the SDR system, the Carrier’s Liability is restricted to ‘equivalent to 835 units of account per package or other shipping unit, or 2.5 units of account per kilogram of gross cargo weight lost or damaged, whichever is higher’. For states allowed to use the Poincaré Franc, the limits are set at 12,500 and 37.5 monetary units, respectively, a 25 percent increase over the current limits in the Hague Visby Rules.
Limitation of Action under the Hamburg Rules
Under the Hamburg Rules, actions are time-barred if judicial or arbitral proceedings are not initiated within two (2) years from the delivery of the cargo or from when it should have been delivered. This timeframe applies whether the proceedings are initiated by the Cargo Owner or the Carrier, contrasting with the twelve (12) month period specified under the Hague Visby Rules, which only applies to actions against the Carrier or the Ship. During the limitation period, the party against whom a claim is made can extend this period by a written declaration to the claimant. Actions for indemnity can be initiated after the basic limitation period, with a minimum extension of ninety (90) days from the date the party seeking indemnity has settled the claim or has been served with process in the action against themselves.
Dangerous Cargo under the Hamburg Rules
The Hamburg Rules establish three new protocols for handling dangerous cargo. Firstly, the Shipper must clearly mark or label the cargo as dangerous. Secondly, the Shipper must inform the Carrier about the cargo’s dangerous nature and any necessary safety measures. Lastly, the Bill of Lading (B/L) must explicitly state that the cargo is dangerous. The consequences for non-compliance are similar to those under the Hague Visby Rules. If the Shipper fails to disclose the dangerous nature of the cargo and the Carrier is unaware, the Shipper is liable for any resulting loss. Moreover, the Carrier has the authority to unload, destroy, or neutralize the dangerous cargo without compensation whenever necessary. Even with prior consent to transport, the Carrier may take such actions if the cargo poses a real threat to life or property during the voyage.
Jurisdiction under the Hamburg Rules
When a claim related to a contract for the carriage of cargo under the Hamburg Rules is brought, the claimant has a broad choice of jurisdictions for initiating judicial or arbitral proceedings. As long as the chosen court is competent under its domestic laws, proceedings can be started in any court located in: a) the principal place of business of the defendant, or, if not available, the habitual residence of the defendant; b) the place where the contract was made, provided the defendant has a business, branch, or agency there through which the contract was made; c) the port of loading or the port of discharge; d) any additional location specified for this purpose in the sea carriage contract.
Additionally, an action can be initiated in the courts of any contracting state where the carrying ship or a sister ship has been arrested according to standard legal procedures. In such cases, the defendant has the right to request that the hearing be moved to one of the jurisdictions mentioned above in the Hamburg Rules (Art 21.1), provided they can furnish adequate security to cover any potential judgment. No proceedings related to the convention can be initiated in any other court.
Definition of the Carrier under the Hamburg Rules
The primary objective of the Hamburg Rules, much like their predecessors the Hague Visby Rules, is to ensure that the Shipper has fundamental and non-waivable rights against the Carrier. As such, any attempt to deviate from the stipulations of the Hamburg Rules is deemed null and void. However, the Carrier is permitted to assume greater responsibilities than those outlined in the contract of carriage or to relinquish rights provided under the Hamburg Rules. So, who exactly qualifies as the Carrier under the Hamburg Rules? The term Carrier is broadly defined in Hamburg Rules (Art 1) as ‘any person by whom or in whose name a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a Shipper.’ This definition is broader than that of the Hague Visby Rules, encompassing not only the Shipowner or Charterer but also any individual who has negotiated a sea carriage contract as principal, regardless of whether they intend to physically transport the cargo themselves. This could include a Freight Forwarder (FF), a combined transport operator, or any non-ship owning Carrier.
Furthermore, the Hamburg Rules differentiate between the Carrier, as previously described, and the Actual Carrier—the party actually tasked with performing the carriage. Often, the Carrier and Actual Carrier are the same entity. The Hamburg Rules clarify that even if the contracting Carrier delegates the carriage, they remain responsible for any actions or omissions by the Actual Carrier and their Servants and Agents acting within their employment scope. Additionally, the Hamburg Rules apply to the Actual Carrier’s responsibilities for their portion of the carriage, with overlapping obligations resulting in joint and several liabilities.
These provisions significantly aid the Cargo Owner claimant who currently faces the challenging task of deciphering the complex relationships among Shipowners, Charterers, and Demise Charterers to pinpoint the Carrier. Under the Hague Visby Rules, only the Contractual Carrier is recognized. In contrast, the Hamburg Rules simplify this by imposing the same obligations on both Contractual and Actual Carriers, allowing a claimant to confidently sue an Actual Carrier liable for any loss, damage, or delay during the portion of the carriage they perform, regardless of their status as the Contractual Carrier. This practical approach often favors suing the Shipowner directly.
Only in specific circumstances are contracting Carriers allowed to disclaim liability. This exception occurs when the contract of carriage explicitly states that a particular segment of the carriage is to be performed by a named individual other than the Contractual Carrier. In such cases, the Contractual Carrier may explicitly exclude liability for that segment. This is particularly relevant in scenarios involving Combined Bill of Lading (B/L) or Through Bill of Lading (B/L), where a segment of the carriage is assigned to an Actual Carrier, though the particular on-carrier’s name might not be known at the time of shipment. Conversely, there is no apparent reason why the term ‘specified part of the carriage’ cannot extend to cover the entire carriage period when a non-ship owning contractual carrier negotiates the contract. Thus, a Voyage Charterer or Time Charterer could specify the Actual Carrier in the carriage contract and transfer all liability to the Shipowner.
Prospects for Adoption of the Hamburg Rules
The resistance to adopting the Hamburg Rules from shipowning groups stems from several concerns. Firstly, there is a significant opposition to eliminating the catalogue of exceptions, particularly the exclusion of liability for Negligent Navigation. Secondly, there are reservations about the revised formulation of the fire exception, and the extension of the time limit for initiating legal proceedings to two (2) years is also widely unpopular. A broader worry relates to the language and terminology used in the Hamburg Rules. Unlike the well-litigated and understood provisions of the Hague Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules introduce new concepts in language that often result from diplomatic compromises, potentially leading to extensive and costly litigation. With the burden of proof now squarely on the Carrier, there is concern that litigation might become more frequent to test the strength of the Carrier’s defenses. All these issues, combined with significantly higher liability limits, have led opponents to argue that implementing the Hamburg Rules would inevitably raise Freight Rates.
Proponents of the Hamburg Rules counter these objections by pointing out that similar predictions of dramatic increases in Freight Rates were made before the implementation of the Hague Visby Rules and were proven incorrect. They argue that it is time for a more equitable redistribution of risk between the Cargo Owner and Carrier, and it is reasonable for the burden of proving the cause of loss to lie with the party that has access to the relevant facts. They also contend that there is no rationale for granting the sea Carrier immunity from consequences of their own Negligent Navigation when such protection is not offered to Carriers by other modes of transport. Advocates also emphasize the need for a uniform global regime of Carrier Liability. Despite the unpopularity of proposed amendments in the Brussels Protocol, they believe that adopting the Hamburg Rules, which have considerable support in some developing countries, represents the best chance for establishing a uniform regime in the near future.
Critics argue that the main flaw of the Hamburg Rules is the drafters’ failure to adopt strict liability for the Carrier, thereby centralizing all risk on them. Retaining the principle of package limitation of liability means that both cargo and Carrier’s Liability insurance remain necessary, perpetuating the complications and costs associated with risk allocation. A more radical solution would not be favorable for cargo underwriters or maritime lawyers.
Looking ahead, what are the prospects for widespread adoption of the Hamburg Rules? Currently, no major maritime nation has ratified the Rules, though they have been implemented in 34 states, representing about 5% of global trade. Despite this modest start, several factors suggest that their influence might grow. In jurisdictions where they are implemented, the Hamburg Rules mandatorily apply to both inbound and outbound cargoes, regardless of origin. They mandate that the Bill of Lading (B/L) include a Paramount Clause that integrates the Rules and nullifies any contract terms that detract from them to the Cargo Owner’s disadvantage. Failure to include this clause results in the Carrier being liable for any loss due to its absence. Additionally, claimants have a broad choice of forums for litigation or arbitration, unrestricted by any contractual forum choice clauses.
In practice, this could lead to conflicting conventions applying to a single voyage. For instance, a voyage from a United Kingdom port to a Hamburg state would be governed by the Hague Visby Rules at the shipping port and by the Hamburg Rules at the discharge port. The applicable Rules would depend on where the dispute is litigated. Assuming the Bill of Lading (B/L) includes the relevant Paramount Clause, the Cargo Owner could choose to litigate in the Hamburg state regardless of any contractual forum choice. Even if a lawsuit is initiated in an English court, the Paramount Clause would still be effective under the Hague Visby Rules (Art V), which allows enforcement of terms more favorable to cargo interests. If the English court applies the Hague Visby Rules because the carriage contract failed to incorporate a Hamburg Rules Paramount Clause, the Cargo Owner could subsequently claim indemnity from the Carrier for any resulting loss.
9- Bill of Lading (B/L) issued under Charterparty
10- Challenges in Combined Transportation
11- Exceptions included in the Contract of Carriage
12- Shipowner’s ability to Limit their Liability
13- Freight
14- Shipowner’s authority to enforce a Lien
15- Resolving Disputes in Ship Chartering
16- Breach of Charterparty
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17- What is Ship Chartering?
Ship Chartering refers to the practice of renting or leasing a ship for the purpose of transporting goods or passengers between different locations. This practice is essential to the global shipping industry and international trade, as it enables companies to efficiently and cost-effectively move large volumes of cargo worldwide. In this arrangement, a shipowner leases their ship to a charterer, who then operates the ship according to the stipulations laid out in a charter party agreement. Ship Chartering comes in various forms, including Bareboat, Time, and Voyage Charters, each defining distinct terms and obligations for the Shipowner and Charterer.
The process of Ship Chartering involves the leasing of a ship to move cargo or passengers, similar to renting a truck for land transportation. The charterer and shipowner enter into a charter party agreement that outlines specific terms such as freight rates, loading and unloading speeds, and laytime.
Shipbrokers are integral to the Ship Chartering process. They serve as the link between those looking to charter a ship and shipowners, helping to find a ship that matches the charterer’s requirements. Moreover, they assist shipowners in identifying appropriate charterers. While Ship Chartering primarily focuses on cargo transport, it is also utilized for passenger movements. For instance, cruise companies often lease ships for lengthy durations. Furthermore, charterers may also rent additional vessels like tugs and workboats to support cargo operations.
Parties involved in Ship Chartering
1- Charterer
A Ship Charterer’s responsibilities and roles vary based on the type of charter agreement:
Voyage Charter: Here, the Ship Charterer contracts the ship for a specific journey or series of voyages. The Shipowner supplies the ship, crew, and handles operational expenses, while the Voyage Charterer pays a freight rate based on the cargo’s volume or weight. Voyage Charters are the most prevalent type of chartering arrangement in the shipping industry.
Time Charter: In a Time Charter, the Time Charterer leases the ship for a determined period. The Shipowner provides the ship and crew, and Time Charterer covers operational costs such as bunker (fuel) and port fees. Time Charterer is in charge of directing the ship’s course and managing the expenses related to cargo loading and unloading. Time Charters typically last from short to medium terms.
Bareboat Charter: Ship Charterer taking complete control over the ship’s operations, which includes hiring the crew, securing insurance, and procuring necessary supplies. Bareboat Charterer also shoulders the costs for bunker (fuel), port fees, and other operational expenses. Bareboat Charters are generally utilized for long-term agreements.
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2- Ship Owner
A Shipowner is either an individual or a company that possesses one or more ships, utilized for transporting goods or passengers along various maritime routes. Shipowners may operate independently, managing their own vessels, or be part of larger shipping companies that have a fleet catering to diverse markets and cargo types.
The primary duty of a Shipowner is to offer shipping services to Charterers needing transportation for goods or passengers. Shipowners are tasked with maintaining and operating their ships according to international regulations, safety standards, and environmental guidelines. They are responsible for employing and overseeing the crew, keeping the ship seaworthy, and ensuring compliance with all legal and technical standards.
A Ship Owner is the entity that owns the ship and generates income by leasing it to Charterers. This owner could possess a single vessel or a fleet of various ships in different types and sizes. The Ship Owner manages the day-to-day maintenance of the ship, ensuring adherence to safety and seaworthiness standards among other regulations. Furthermore, the Ship Owner coordinates and finances inspections and ship registration fees.
The initial expense of acquiring or building the ship, often substantial, falls on the Ship Owner. Consequently, consistently securing Charterers is vital. They are also accountable for paying the crew and, in the case of Voyage Charters, covering all other voyage expenses.
Shipowners are integral to international trade and the global shipping industry, providing the necessary ships and services for the global transport of goods and passengers. Success for Shipowners requires a deep understanding of the shipping market, ship types, maintenance and operational costs, regulations, and safety standards.
What are the responsibilities of a Ship Owner?
The involvement and responsibilities of Shipowners vary depending on the type of charter agreement:
Voyage Charter: In a Voyage Charter, the Shipowner supplies the ship, crew, and covers operational expenses for a designated voyage or series of voyages. Voyage Charterer pays a freight rate determined by the cargo’s volume or weight. Here, the Shipowner is in charge of the overall operation and performance of the ship, adhering to the Charterer’s directives regarding the route, and the loading and unloading of cargo.
Time Charter: In a Time Charter, the Shipowner provides the ship and crew, and handles operational costs like bunker (fuel) and port fees for a specified period. Time Charterer directs the ship’s movements and bears the costs associated with cargo handling. In this arrangement, the Shipowner plays a significant role in the ship’s operation, ensuring that the crew executes the Time Charterer’s instructions and manages the ship’s performance effectively.
Bareboat Charter: Shipowner leases out the ship without any crew, supplies, or insurance. Bareboat Charterer assumes complete control over the ship’s operation, including hiring the crew, securing insurance, and acquiring necessary provisions. The Shipowner’s main duty is to ensure the delivery of a seaworthy ship that complies with the Bareboat Charterer’s needs.
3- Shipbroker
A Shipbroker is a specialized intermediary who plays a crucial role in facilitating transactions between Shipowners and Charterers in the maritime sector. Acting as agents, Shipbrokers link parties looking to charter ships for transporting cargo or passengers with Shipowners who offer ships for hire. Their main objective is to negotiate and secure favorable terms for both parties, ensuring a profitable and successful deal.
In ship chartering, the Shipbroker serves as a mediator between the Charterer and the Ship Owner, aiming to secure the best agreement for their Principle. With a deep understanding of the shipping industry, Shipbrokers are instrumental in negotiating the terms of the charter party.
Shipbrokers typically earn a commission paid by the Charterer, Ship Owner, or both. They also provide essential market intelligence and advice on the current dynamics of the shipping industry, aiding their clients in making well-informed decisions.
Possessing comprehensive knowledge of shipping markets, ship types, freight rates, and market trends, Shipbrokers leverage their expertise to guide clients through the chartering process. They offer strategic advice on chartering options, shipping routes, and other key aspects that influence chartering decisions. Shipbrokers may specialize in various segments of the shipping industry, such as dry bulk, tankers, containers, or passenger ships.
Their expertise and connections are invaluable in the shipping industry, helping to ensure the efficient transport of goods and passengers globally. Shipbrokers are essential to the success of both Shipowners and Charterers, providing crucial market insights and facilitating smooth chartering operations.
What are the responsibilities of a Shipbroker?
The primary roles and responsibilities of a Shipbroker include:
- Chartering Negotiations: Shipbrokers serve as intermediaries between the Charterer and the Shipowner, negotiating the terms and conditions of the charter on behalf of their clients. They aim to secure the most advantageous rates and conditions for all involved parties.
- Chartering Contract Preparation: After reaching an agreement, Shipbrokers assist in drafting the charter party agreement, a legal document that specifies the terms and conditions of the charter. They ensure that all essential clauses and provisions are incorporated to safeguard the interests of both the Shipowner and the Charterer.
- Market Analysis: Shipbrokers continuously track market conditions, freight rates, and trends to provide their clients with timely and accurate information. This insight helps clients make well-informed decisions and spot opportunities within the market.
- Ship and Cargo Matching: Shipbrokers assess the Charterer’s needs and match them with appropriate ships from their network of Shipowners. They verify that the ships align with the Charterer’s specifications regarding size, type, and cargo capacity.
- Post-Fixture Services: Shipbrokers may also offer post-fixture services, which include monitoring the ship’s performance during the charter, ensuring prompt payments, and addressing any disputes or issues that arise between the contracting parties.
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Types of Ship Chartering
There are three main types of ship charters: voyage charter, time charter, and bareboat charter:
1- Voyage Charter
In a voyage charter, the charterer contracts the ship for a specific voyage or set of voyages. The shipowner provides the ship, crew, and covers operational expenses, while the charterer pays a freight rate based on the volume or weight of cargo transported. Voyage charters are the most common type of chartering agreement in the shipping industry.
A Voyage Charter is the most commonly used chartering type. It involves the chartering of a ship for a specific voyage between two or more ports. Voyage Charterer hires the ship for the voyage, and the Shipowner takes back control of the ship after the voyage is complete. The Voyage Charterparty specifies the laytime, which is the time allotted for loading and unloading the ship. If the laytime is exceeded, penalties are applied by the Shipowner (Demurrage), and if the time taken is less than stipulated, the Voyage Charterer may receive a partial refund (Despatch).
Payment for a voyage charter is generally charged on a per-ton basis, but for some cargo types, the charterer may pay a Lump Sum Freight. A voyage charter can be a one-off contract or part of several consecutive voyages.
Contract of Affreightment (COA): What is Contract of Affreightment (COA)?
A Contract of Affreightment (COA) is a legal agreement between a shipper and a carrier, where the carrier agrees to transport a specified quantity of goods over a certain period of time or across multiple voyages. The contract outlines the terms and conditions under which the carrier will provide transportation services for the shipper’s goods, including the freight charges, payment terms, cargo description, delivery dates, and any other relevant details. This type of contract is commonly used in the shipping industry for bulk cargo or larger shipments that require multiple voyages to transport.
2- Time Charter
In a Time Charter, the Time Charterer rents the ship for a specific period. The Shipowner provides the ship, its crew. Time Charterer covers expenses, such as bunker (fuel) and port charges. Time Charterer is responsible for directing the ship’s movements and covering the costs of cargo loading and unloading. Time charters are usually short to medium-term agreements.
Time Charter allows the Time Charterer to use the ship for an agreed period of time, where they have complete control over the ship’s routes, destinations, and more. Time Charterer is responsible for most of the costs incurred by the ship during the agreed time, including fuel costs (bunkers), cargo handling costs, port charges, and more. The time charter ends when the specified time runs out, regardless of the ship’s location. This type of charter is commonly used for ships that support a specific civil construction or offshore project, such as tug boats, anchor handling tugs, crew boats, and supply ships.
Voyage Charter Vs Time Charter
Responsibilities in Voyage Charter and Time Charter
SERVICE | VOYAGE CHARTER | TIME CHARTER |
Crew Hire and Payment | Owner | Owner |
Bunkers (Fuel) | Owner | Charterer |
Cargo Operations Port DAs | Owner | Charterer |
Ship Maintenance Costs | Owner | Owner |
3- Bareboat Charter
In Bareboat Charter, the charterer leases the ship without any crew, provisions, or insurance. The charterer takes full responsibility for the ship’s operation, including hiring the crew, obtaining insurance, and providing necessary supplies. Bareboat charters are typically used for long-term arrangements.
Bareboat Charter is a type of ship chartering where the charterer leases the ship for a long period, usually for many years, and assumes full responsibility for the ship’s operation and maintenance, both legally and financially. The charterer pays for all the costs associated with the ship during the charter time, including crewing, fuel, and insurance. This arrangement is particularly attractive to ship owners who want to avoid the day-to-day running of the ship. Under a bareboat charter, the charterer may have the option to eventually gain ownership of the ship through a hire-purchase agreement.
What are the advantages of Bareboat Charter?
A bareboat charter offers the advantage of greater freedom and control for the charterer, as they have the ability to determine the itinerary and choose their own crew. Additionally, agreeing to a long-term charter can lower the overall cost and there may be an option for the charterer to eventually take ownership of the ship through a hire-purchase agreement.
Is Ship Chartering insured?
When taking out a charter agreement, it is important to note that the charterer assumes various responsibilities, one of which is the requirement for insurance coverage. This insurance should provide liability coverage for cargo damage, ship damage, environmental damage, and marine salvage. It is essential for the charterer to carefully review the contract and understand their obligations regarding insurance.
Ship chartering typically involves various types of insurance to protect the interests of both the shipowner and the charterer. Insurance is essential in the shipping industry to mitigate potential risks and financial losses that may arise due to accidents, cargo damage, or other unforeseen events. Some common types of insurance involved in ship chartering include:
- Freight, Demurrage, and Defense (FD&D) Insurance: FD&D insurance covers legal costs and expenses arising from disputes related to charter party agreements, such as claims for unpaid freight or demurrage. This insurance is often provided by the same P&I Clubs that offer P&I insurance.
- Cargo Insurance: Cargo insurance protects the charterer or cargo owner against loss or damage to the cargo during transportation. This insurance is typically taken out by the charterer or the cargo owner, as they have an insurable interest in the cargo being transported.
- Hull and Machinery Insurance: This insurance covers the physical damage to the ship itself, including its hull, machinery, and equipment. It is usually taken out by the shipowner to protect their investment in the ship.
- Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Insurance: This type of insurance covers the shipowner’s third-party liabilities, such as crew injuries, damage to third-party property, or pollution caused by the ship. P&I insurance is typically provided by specialized clubs known as P&I Clubs, which are mutual insurance associations made up of shipowners.
- War Risk Insurance (WRI): This insurance covers losses resulting from war-related perils, such as terrorism, piracy, or acts of war. It can be taken out by both the shipowner and the charterer to protect their respective interests.
Insurance Responsibilities in Ship Chartering
In a ship chartering arrangement, the specific insurance requirements may vary depending on the type of charter:
- Voyage Charter: In a voyage charter, the shipowner generally provides hull and machinery and P&I insurance, while the Voyage Charterer or Cargo Owner is responsible for cargo insurance.
- Time Charter: In a time charter, the Shipowner typically provides hull and machinery and P&I insurance, while the Time Charterer may be responsible for cargo insurance and other specific insurance depending on the charter party agreement.
- Bareboat Charter: Bareboat Charterer assumes full responsibility for the ship’s operation and is usually required to obtain hull and machinery, P&I, and other necessary insurance coverage.
The exact insurance requirements and responsibilities for ship chartering should be clearly outlined in the charter party agreement to ensure that all parties are adequately protected and understand their obligations.
What is Charter Party Agreement?
A charter party agreement is a legal contract between the shipowner and the charterer that outlines the terms and conditions of the charter. It specifies the details of the ship, cargo, route, duration, payment terms, and other essential information. It is crucial for both parties to thoroughly review and understand the charter party agreement to ensure a smooth and successful ship chartering process.
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Factors to Consider in Ship Chartering:
a) Type of Cargo – Different types of cargo require different types of ships. For example, dry bulk cargo (such as coal or grains) requires specialized dry bulk carriers, while liquid cargo (such as oil or chemicals) requires specialized tankers.
b) Ship Size and Specifications – The size and specifications of the ship should match the requirements of the cargo being transported. Ship size is usually measured in deadweight tonnage (DWT) or gross tonnage (GT).
c) Route and Distance – The intended shipping route and distance will impact the cost of the charter, as fuel consumption and port charges vary depending on the route.
d) Duration – The duration of the charter agreement will affect the charter rate. Longer charter agreements may lead to lower daily rates, while shorter agreements may have higher daily rates.
e) Market Conditions – The supply and demand for ships in the market will influence the charter rates. Higher demand for ships will result in higher charter rates, while lower demand will lead to lower rates.
In conclusion, ship chartering is a vital aspect of the global shipping industry, enabling the efficient transportation of goods across the world. Understanding the different types of chartering agreements and the factors that influence them is crucial for businesses looking to charter ships for their cargo transportation needs.
Ship Chartering Process
The ship chartering process involves a series of steps that connect shipowners and charterers to facilitate the transportation of goods or passengers across the world. This process is essential to the global shipping industry and international trade. The following is an overview of the key steps in the ship chartering process:
- Identifying Requirements: The charterer begins by determining their specific shipping needs, such as the type and volume of cargo, preferred ship size and specifications, loading and discharging ports, and the desired schedule for transportation.
- Engaging a Shipbroker: The charterer may engage a shipbroker, a professional intermediary with expertise in the shipping market and connections with shipowners. The shipbroker helps the charterer navigate the chartering process and negotiate favorable terms with shipowners.
- Market Analysis and Ship Search: The shipbroker or charterer conducts market research and analysis to gather information on freight rates, ship availability, and market trends. They then search for suitable ships that match the charterer’s requirements, contacting shipowners with ships available for charter.
- Chartering Negotiations: Once a suitable ship is identified, the shipbroker or charterer negotiates the terms and conditions of the charter with the shipowner. This may include the freight rate, laytime (time allowed for loading and unloading cargo), demurrage (penalties for exceeding laytime), payment terms, and other relevant clauses.
- Charter Party Agreement: After reaching an agreement on the charter terms, the shipbroker or charterer drafts a charter party agreement, which is a legal contract outlining the rights and obligations of both parties. This document includes details about the ship, cargo, route, duration, and other essential terms. Both parties review, negotiate, and ultimately sign the agreement.
- Pre-Voyage Preparations: Before the voyage begins, both parties must prepare for the transportation of the cargo. The shipowner ensures the ship is seaworthy, complies with all regulations, and is ready to receive cargo. The charterer arranges for the cargo to be transported to the loading port, and any necessary permits or documentation are obtained.
- Loading and Transportation: The ship arrives at the loading port, and the cargo is loaded onto the ship according to the terms outlined in the charter party agreement. Once the cargo is safely loaded, the ship departs for its destination.
- Discharging and Payment: Upon arrival at the discharging port, the cargo is unloaded, and any inspections or documentation required by local authorities are completed. The charterer pays the freight charges and any other fees specified in the charter party agreement to the shipowner.
- Post-Fixture Services: After the voyage is completed, the shipbroker or charterer may provide post-fixture services, such as monitoring the ship’s performance, ensuring timely payments, and resolving any disputes that may arise between the parties.
The ship chartering process is a complex and essential part of the global shipping industry, requiring cooperation and coordination between charterers, shipowners, and shipbrokers to ensure the efficient and cost-effective transportation of goods and passengers.
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