1-August-2026
The 155,000 CBM LNG carrier MT GasLog Shanghai has reportedly been damaged and left not under command after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed that Iranian forces struck two commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz on Friday. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps said the ships were moving through the strategic waterway under US air escort when the attack took place. MT GasLog Shanghai, built in 2013, was reported to have lost propulsion after the impact and to be drifting while assistance was requested from the Omani coastguard. No injuries were reported on board MT GasLog Shanghai. The ship is controlled by GasLog Ltd., an Athens-linked international LNG carrier owner, operator and manager with long experience in specialised gas shipping. GasLog Ltd. operates through GasLog LNG Services Ltd. in Piraeus, Greece, and has built a business around LNG carrier ownership, technical management and commercial employment in the global gas transport market. GasLog Ltd. became privately held in 2021 after a transaction involving BlackRock’s Global Energy & Power Infrastructure team, while existing shareholders including Blenheim Holdings Ltd., owned by the Livanos family, and a wholly owned affiliate of the Onassis Foundation retained a significant stake in GasLog Ltd. GasLog Ltd.’s fleet has historically focused on LNG carriers in the 145,000 CBM to 174,000 CBM range, a size segment that remains commercially useful because it can serve a wide range of LNG terminals. MT GasLog Shanghai was delivered on 28 January 2013 and has a cargo capacity of 155,000 CBM. GasLog Partners LP filings have described GasLog Shanghai as operating in the spot market, which makes any interruption to the ship’s availability commercially important in a market where LNG carrier positioning, charter timing and terminal schedules are closely linked. GasLog Partners LP filings have also indicated that GasLog Shanghai was expected to be redelivered to the owners in October 2026 after completion of a sale-and-leaseback arrangement and then leave the GasLog Partners LP fleet. The reported damage to MT GasLog Shanghai therefore affects not only a single ship movement but also a high-value LNG asset with a defined commercial and financing background. The incident comes amid heightened security tension around the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most sensitive energy chokepoints and a critical route for LNG exports from the Middle East. LNG carriers are particularly exposed in such conditions because delays, war-risk premiums, escort arrangements, insurance approvals and emergency response procedures can quickly affect cargo schedules and freight economics. The reported attack also follows another difficult episode for GasLog Ltd., after a GasLog Ltd.-controlled ship was reportedly affected earlier in the week as collateral damage during an attack on an FSRU facility in Egypt. For GasLog Ltd., charterers, insurers and LNG buyers, MT GasLog Shanghai highlights how quickly geopolitical risk can move from a regional security issue to a direct operational threat for gas shipping. Even without casualties, loss of propulsion, drifting status and coastguard assistance create immediate questions over ship safety, repair timing, contractual exposure and future route planning. The case underlines that LNG shipping risk in the Middle East is no longer limited to freight rates or cargo supply. LNG shipping risk now includes war-risk exposure, transit approvals, naval escort questions, AIS visibility, emergency support and the physical vulnerability of specialised ships operating near contested maritime routes.
1-August-2026
Athens-based shipowner and operator JME Navigation SA has expanded JME Navigation SA’s newbuilding relationship with New Dayang Shipbuilding by adding another Crown 63 ultramax bulk carrier to JME Navigation SA’s orderbook. The latest 64K DWT Crown 63 ultramax bulk carrier is expected to be delivered in early 2030, giving JME Navigation SA access to one of the remaining 2030 delivery positions at the Yangzhou-based shipyard. The order has not been formally announced by JME Navigation SA, New Dayang Shipbuilding or Sumec Marine, and the contract price has not been disclosed. The new agreement increases JME Navigation SA’s current New Dayang Shipbuilding orderbook to three ultramax bulk carriers, following one ship ordered in June 2024 for July 2027 delivery and another ship ordered last November for delivery toward the end of 2028. Together with MV Princess Eirini and MV Harilaos Junior, which were ordered in 2023 and delivered in 2025, JME Navigation SA’s recent Crown 63 programme with New Dayang Shipbuilding now totals five ships. JME Navigation SA’s fleet includes MV Mother M, MV Princess Margo, MV Zoitsa Sigala, MV Marigoula, MV Harilaos Junior and MV Princess Eirini, with the ships trading worldwide in dry bulk cargoes such as grain products, minerals, fertilisers, coal and steel. That trading profile makes ultramax bulk carriers a logical focus for JME Navigation SA, because the ship type combines cargo flexibility, onboard cranes, wide port access and strong suitability for agricultural and minor bulk trades. JME Navigation SA also has a longer history with the New Dayang Shipbuilding platform, having previously taken delivery of three bulk carriers from predecessor Yangzhou Dayang between 2013 and 2015. The latest order therefore reflects continued confidence by JME Navigation SA in the yard’s dry bulk construction record and proven medium-size bulk carrier designs. New Dayang Shipbuilding is the core shipbuilding base of Sumec Marine and has built a strong position in the Crown 63 ultramax bulk carrier segment. The Crown 63 design has developed through several upgrades, including hull-form optimisation, energy-saving features, EEDI3 compliance, Tier 3 emissions compliance and improved ship-shore coordination. The design offers practical trading capability with a deadweight of about 63,121 tonnes, a length overall of 199.99 metres, a beam of 32.26 metres and four 36-ton cranes. New Dayang Shipbuilding has delivered more than 160 Crown 63 ships, and production slots now stretch into 2030, making remaining delivery positions increasingly valuable. Recent market pricing also shows the strength of demand for this design, as two similar 64K DWT ultramax bulk carrier newbuildings ordered by Zhejiang Shipping were valued at about $38.5 million each for 2030 delivery. For JME Navigation SA, the latest order is a strategic fleet-renewal move that adds modern ultramax bulk carrier capacity, supports long-term fleet planning and deepens exposure to a ship type well suited to global dry bulk trades. For New Dayang Shipbuilding and Sumec Marine, the order further reinforces the Crown 63 series as a preferred platform among Greek dry bulk shipowners. The 2030 delivery schedule gives JME Navigation SA time to position the ship for future market conditions while securing a modern, flexible and proven ultramax bulk carrier design.
1-August-2026
Hong Kong-based shipowner and operator Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited has added another sale-and-leaseback arrangement to Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited’s fleet-renewal financing programme, securing up to $34 million against two ultramax bulk carrier newbuildings at Jiangsu Hantong Ship Heavy Industry. The two 63K DWT ships, to be named Jin Han and Jin Ming, will be sold to two vehicles controlled by Jiangsu Financial Leasing and then chartered back by Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited for periods of up to seven years. The financing is limited to $17 million per ship or 60% of each ship’s assessed market value, whichever figure is lower. Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited will have the right to repurchase each ship after the second anniversary of delivery, while Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited will be obliged to buy each ship back for $5 million if the purchase options are not exercised before the charter terms expire. Jin Han and Jin Ming were ordered in June 2024 at $34 million per ship and are scheduled for delivery in December 2026 and November 2027. The latest financing follows a separate leaseback transaction arranged one day earlier, when Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited secured up to $36 million against the 64K DWT ultramax bulk carrier newbuildings MV Jin Yao and MV Jin Fu, which are due to be delivered by Jiangmen Nanyang Ship Engineering in early 2028. Together, the two transactions provide Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited with up to $70 million of financing across four ultramax bulk carrier newbuildings. Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited was incorporated in Bermuda in 1994 and has been listed in Oslo under stock code JIN since the same year. Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited is majority-owned by Jinhui Holdings Company Limited and operates as an international dry bulk shipowner with a focus on flexible chartering, disciplined leverage and active fleet management. Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited reported 2025 revenue of $157.489 million and net profit of $12.544 million, while Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited’s 2025 performance also reflected the disposal of older supramax bulk carrier ships. During 2025, Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited sold and delivered eight aging supramax bulk carrier ships as part of a wider plan to modernise Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited’s fleet profile. By the end of Q1 2026, Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited operated 21 ships with total capacity of about 1.68 million DWT and reported 98% fleet utilisation. Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited’s orderbook also showed a clear shift toward larger and more efficient ultramax bulk carrier ships, with eight ultramax bulk carrier newbuildings totaling 513,200 DWT on order by late May 2026. Those commitments included Jin Han and Jin Ming at Jiangsu Hantong Ship Heavy Industry, four ultramax bulk carrier newbuildings at Jiangmen Nanyang Ship Engineering and two ultramax bulk carrier newbuildings at New Dayang Shipbuilding. Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited’s average daily TCE improved to $16,290 in Q1 2026, even though chartering revenue declined because Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited operated fewer ships after the disposal programme. Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited also reported low net gearing of 5% at the end of Q1 2026, making sale-and-leaseback financing a logical tool for supporting fleet growth without placing excessive pressure on the balance sheet. The new Jiangsu Financial Leasing package therefore fits closely with Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited’s broader strategy. Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited can release capital from ships under construction, preserve liquidity, keep long-term commercial control of the ships and continue replacing older supramax bulk carrier ships with modern ultramax bulk carrier ships. For Jiangsu Financial Leasing, the transaction provides exposure to newbuilding dry bulk assets backed by a listed shipowner with an active fleet-renewal programme. For Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited, the transaction is not simply a financing exercise; it is part of a wider reshaping of Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited’s dry bulk platform toward younger, larger and more efficient ships.
1-August-2026
Dry bulk shipping is entering a new phase in which volatility is no longer simply a temporary market condition but a central feature of the business model itself. In earlier cycles, freight markets were easier to interpret because rates generally moved in line with Chinese steel production, grain seasons, fleet growth, port activity and wider global trade. Owners, charterers and traders accepted sharp movements as part of the sector, but those movements were usually connected to identifiable demand and supply patterns. That structure is changing. Freight rates are now being shaped not only by cargo volumes and ship availability, but also by geopolitical conflict, climate disruption, canal restrictions, sanctions, infrastructure bottlenecks and the rapid reaction of financial markets. The first half of 2026 showed this clearly, as dry bulk rates strengthened despite only moderate cargo growth, largely because effective ship supply tightened and capesize bulk carrier demand remained resilient. In other words, the market is increasingly rewarding disruption rather than pure demand expansion. Middle East instability has become one of the clearest examples of this shift. Even though dry bulk cargoes are less directly exposed than container ships or crude tankers, Red Sea security risks have still affected the wider dry bulk market by forcing longer voyages around the Cape of Good Hope. Those diversions absorb ship capacity, increase voyage duration and reduce fleet efficiency without physically removing any ship from service. The Panama Canal has delivered a similar lesson. Water restrictions at one canal can reshape global freight pricing because delays and rerouting affect ship positioning, voyage economics and cargo timing across several regions. Fleet supply can no longer be measured only by the number of ships in the water or the size of the orderbook. The more important question is how efficiently those ships can move when normal trade routes are disrupted. This new environment is also changing the purpose of freight hedging. In the past, swaps and options were mainly used to smooth earnings, manage seasonal risk and reduce exposure to familiar shipping cycles. Today, freight derivatives are increasingly used to protect against unpredictable geopolitical and operational shocks. That is far more difficult because military escalation, sanctions, canal restrictions or port closures cannot be forecast with the same confidence as iron ore exports, coal flows or grain harvests. Freight markets can appear stable for weeks and then reprice within hours after a single security incident or regulatory announcement. Algorithmic and systematic trading has accelerated that process by pushing news into derivative prices almost instantly, leaving less time for traditional judgement-based risk management. This does not make hedging useless; it makes disciplined hedging more important. The objective is no longer to eliminate risk completely, because that has never been realistic. The real objective is to reduce uncertainty enough for commercial decisions to be made with confidence. Technology can improve visibility through AIS data, satellite tracking, port congestion analysis, voyage optimisation and artificial intelligence, but no system can accurately price every political decision, military event, weather shock or infrastructure failure before it happens. The commercial structure of dry bulk shipping is also adapting. Contracts of affreightment remain important for miners, utilities, agricultural exporters and industrial cargo interests that need reliable transport, but a broad return to long multi-year fixed-rate charters is unlikely. Owners do not want to lock in rates when disruption can lift earnings sharply within weeks. Charterers do not want to commit to elevated levels if a disruption disappears and the market falls back just as quickly. This is pushing the industry toward shorter employment, index-linked structures and greater use of financial hedging to separate freight exposure from physical cargo obligations. Freight is therefore becoming more than a transport cost. It is increasingly a financial risk factor that must be priced, traded and managed. Looking ahead, there is little reason to expect dry bulk volatility to disappear. Geopolitical rivalry, environmental regulation, climate-related disruption, changing commodity flows and infrastructure constraints all point toward a market that is faster, tighter and harder to predict. The next decade may be defined less by traditional shipping cycles and more by repeated external shocks. Dry bulk operators therefore need to stop treating volatility as an occasional problem and start treating it as a permanent operating condition. The winners will be the owners, charterers and traders that combine flexible commercial strategy, disciplined risk management, accurate market intelligence and practical hedging. They will not remove uncertainty from the market, but they will be better placed to survive it, respond to it and profit from it.
1-August-2026
Cyprus-based shipping investor Pelagic Credit Plc has expanded into dry bulk shipping through a $47.4 million sale-and-leaseback transaction involving three Hartmann Group-controlled handysize bulk carriers. The Limassol-based and Oslo-listed Pelagic Credit Plc will acquire the 2016-built MV Federal Alster and the 2017-built sister ships MV Federal Mosel and MV Federal Ruhr, each approximately 36K DWT handysize bulk carriers. Following completion, the ships will be bareboat chartered back to a wholly owned Hartmann Group subsidiary for firm seven-year periods. The Hartmann Group subsidiary will have the right to repurchase the ships after five years and will be required to buy the ships back at the end of the charter period. The three handysize bulk carriers are also covered by long-term time charters with an unnamed leading dry bulk shipping company, giving the structure additional contracted revenue visibility. Pelagic Credit Plc expects the transaction to add about $107.1 million to Pelagic Credit Plc’s firm gross bareboat charter backlog, rising to approximately $115.6 million if options are included. Pelagic Credit Plc plans to refinance the acquisition after closing through a senior secured credit facility, reducing Pelagic Credit Plc’s net capital requirement to about $10.5 million. The deal is broadly aligned with Project Holly, one of the investments outlined before the Oslo listing of Pelagic Credit Plc, but the final terms appear more favourable because they include longer employment, a lower capital commitment, and an extension option linked to the underlying time charters. Pelagic Credit Plc listed on Euronext Growth Oslo on 9 March 2026 under ticker PLGC after raising approximately $57 million through a private placement. The listing gave Pelagic Credit Plc a public-market platform for building a maritime credit and leasing business focused on secured ship cash flows. Pelagic Credit Plc is structured as a yield-focused shipowning vehicle, with a business model centred on long-term bareboat and triple-net lease arrangements. That approach is designed to generate predictable income while limiting direct exposure to daily operating costs, crewing, technical management, and voyage-market volatility. Pelagic Credit Plc therefore differs from a conventional shipowner and operator because Pelagic Credit Plc seeks finance-style returns from shipping assets rather than direct freight-market exposure. Before entering dry bulk, Pelagic Credit Plc had already invested in three multipurpose ships and the 2015-built offshore support ship Nautical Singapore. Pelagic Credit Plc has also moved into chemical tankers through $24.7 million of pre-delivery financing for two 10,000 DWT newbuildings scheduled for delivery in 2028. The Hartmann Group transaction adds another asset class to the Pelagic Credit Plc portfolio and improves diversification across multipurpose ships, offshore support, chemical tankers, and dry bulk shipping. For Pelagic Credit Plc, the three handysize bulk carriers provide long-term contracted income backed by modern ships, mandatory repurchase obligations, and underlying time-charter employment. For Hartmann Group, the leaseback releases capital while allowing the Hartmann Group subsidiary to continue using the ships commercially. The transaction shows how specialist maritime finance platforms are becoming increasingly important to shipowners that want liquidity, fleet flexibility, and continued operational control without permanently selling strategic assets.
1-August-2026
Singaporean citizen David Chong Kwok Yong has been charged over the alleged provision of flag registration services to the sanctioned bulk carrier MV Petrel 8, a ship previously designated by the United Nations Security Council for suspected involvement in prohibited North Korean maritime activity. Singapore’s Commercial Affairs Department alleges that David Chong Kwok Yong, 49, abetted Niue Ship Registry in registering MV Petrel 8 under the flag of Niue between May 18 and August 18, 2022. Prosecutors claim that David Chong Kwok Yong had reasonable grounds to believe the ship was connected with the transportation of items banned under sanctions targeting North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programmes. MV Petrel 8 was designated by the United Nations Security Council in October 2017 as part of measures aimed at restricting North Korea-linked shipping and proliferation activity. Singapore corporate records list David Chong Kwok Yong as a director and managing director of Niue Ship Registry, which was incorporated in 2002. Singapore’s sanctions rules prohibit the supply of services to ships when there are reasonable grounds to believe those ships have supported North Korean proliferation-related activities. David Chong Kwok Yong did not enter a plea during Friday’s court hearing and has been released on bail ahead of a further court appearance next month. If convicted, David Chong Kwok Yong could face up to 10 years in prison, a fine of up to $387,000, or both. Niue Ship Registry is also being charged separately in connection with the same alleged registration. The case highlights the growing legal scrutiny facing flag registries, corporate service providers, and maritime intermediaries involved with ships linked to sanctions-sensitive trades.
1-August-2026
The seaborne nickel ore trade is expanding at a rapid pace, creating fresh employment for supramax and ultramax bulk carriers while bringing renewed attention to one of the most hazardous cargoes carried by the dry bulk market. According to Signal Ocean data, global seaborne nickel ore shipments rose by more than 22% year on year to 26.1 million tonnes in Q2. Broker Braemar said nickel ore had been a relatively stable short-haul Pacific trade for much of the 2020s, with volumes usually strengthening in Q2 and Q3 and providing steady demand for supramax and ultramax bulk carriers. That pattern is now becoming more dynamic as stronger Philippine export availability, higher Chinese import requirements and Indonesia’s emergence as a major buyer combine to lift trade volumes. Nickel ore is mainly processed into nickel products used across industrial supply chains. Stainless steel remains the largest end-use market because nickel improves strength, durability, heat resistance and corrosion protection. Lower-grade laterite ore is commonly processed into nickel pig iron or ferronickel for steelmaking, while higher-grade material can be refined into nickel sulphate for lithium-ion battery cathodes used in electric vehicles and energy storage systems. Nickel is also important in superalloys for aircraft engines and gas turbines, as well as in plating, electronics, catalysts and specialist engineering components. As a result, nickel demand is tied not only to construction and manufacturing, but also to transport electrification and the wider energy transition. Braemar data shows that China imported close to 20 million tonnes of nickel ore in the first half of 2026, around 5 million tonnes more than in the same period last year, putting China on track for record annual nickel ore imports. The Philippines remains the leading supplier, supported by improved seasonal mining conditions and stronger demand from processing plants in both China and Indonesia. Indonesia’s role has changed dramatically. Indonesia imported close to 16 million tonnes of nickel ore last year, despite previously being the world’s largest exporter. Indonesian exports reached around 65 million tonnes in 2013 as mining companies built inventories before the raw ore export ban introduced in January 2014. Further export restrictions in 2020 were designed to push investment into domestic processing and reduce the shipment of unprocessed ore. That policy succeeded in expanding Indonesia’s smelting sector, but it has also created a rising need for imported feedstock. Indonesia’s Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry has set a nickel ore production target of around 260 million tonnes for 2026, down from 320 million tonnes last year, as Jakarta tries to protect domestic smelter supply while avoiding oversupply and downward pressure on global nickel prices. Indonesian officials have suggested that mining quotas could be reviewed if individual smelters face shortages, although any increase is expected to be limited. Indonesian mining companies have warned that tighter domestic quotas may drive additional imports from the Philippines, adding further demand to Pacific minor bulk shipping. Another risk sits in the sulphur supply chain. Braemar estimates that Indonesia obtains around 75% of the sulphur needed to produce sulphuric acid for nickel-leaching operations from the Middle East. Any disruption to those sulphur flows could reduce smelter utilisation and affect Indonesia’s demand for imported nickel ore. However, the rapid rise in nickel ore shipments also revives a long-standing safety concern. Nickel ore shipped from the Philippines and other tropical exporters is often loaded with minimal processing and can contain high levels of fine clay and soil particles. These particles retain moisture and may lose strength under the repeated motion of a ship, causing the cargo to shift or behave like a liquid. A cargo that appears reasonably dry during loading can still become unstable during the voyage. Nickel ore is classified as a Group A cargo under the International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code, meaning the cargo may liquefy if shipped above its safe moisture limit. Shippers must provide certificates showing both the cargo’s moisture content and the transportable moisture limit, and the moisture content must remain below that transportable moisture limit at loading. The International Group of P&I Clubs and INTERCARGO issued a fresh warning last month after a sharp increase in nickel ore shipments from the Philippines and the Solomon Islands. Industry bodies continue to highlight concerns over inconsistent sampling, poor protection of stockpiles from rain, unreliable laboratory testing and restrictions that prevent owner-appointed surveyors from fully inspecting cargoes. The latest circular reported that some declared moisture contents differed from independent test results by six to 10 percentage points, with some discrepancies even wider. The danger was illustrated in January when the 56K DWT MV Devon Bay capsized while carrying about 55,000 tonnes of nickel ore from the Philippines to China. Two seafarers died and four were reported missing. Initial crew accounts indicated that liquefaction may have caused the cargo to shift suddenly to port, although the final investigation has not yet been completed. INTERCARGO’s study of bulk carrier losses between 2015 and 2024 found that cargo liquefaction caused 55 of 89 recorded deaths, making liquefaction the largest single cause of fatalities even though grounding accounted for a higher number of ship losses. The growth in nickel ore trade therefore brings a clear commercial opportunity for supramax and ultramax bulk carriers, but it also requires strict cargo testing, careful loading discipline and stronger enforcement of safety standards.
1-August-2026
Black Sea shipping risks have intensified after the Turkish-owned general cargo ship MV ATA 2 was seriously damaged in a drone attack while trading from Ukraine. The 2006-built, 6K DWT Panama-flagged ship had departed Chornomorsk with a cargo of corn when it was reportedly hit by three Russian drones on Thursday. Video footage showed severe structural damage, including a large hole in the upper deck and visible impact around the accommodation block and bridge. All 13 crewmembers were reported safe, and MV ATA 2 was able to continue with limited manoeuvrability using a backup manual control system before heading toward Romania. Repairs are expected to be carried out in Turkey. The attack was one of at least three incidents reported against ships serving Ukrainian ports within 24 hours, showing how quickly the conflict is spreading across commercial maritime routes. Russia’s defence ministry has said recent strikes around Odesa and Mykolaiv targeted ships and port facilities connected with military cargoes, although those claims have often been made without independent evidence. The latest attack has increased concern among Turkish and Azerbaijani seafarers, whose representatives have argued that crews must be fully informed about routes, threats, and war-risk exposure before entering dangerous waters. They have also stressed that higher wages cannot replace the basic right of seafarers to safety. Turkey-linked ships have already suffered heavily during July. The captain of Atlas Bey was killed earlier in the month, while the Turkish-owned Golden Leo later sank after an attack that killed crewmembers and a Ukrainian pilot. At the eastern side of the Black Sea, tanker operations have also come under pressure after the Caspian Pipeline Consortium suspended loadings near Novorossiysk following drone attacks on the Greek-controlled suezmaxes Nissos Sifnos and Marathi. Nissos Sifnos was struck near the cargo manifold during loading operations, causing a fire that was extinguished by the crew and support ships. The ship remained stable and no pollution was reported. Marathi was attacked while approaching the terminal, further raising security concerns around the loading area. At least five tankers later diverted or waited, demonstrating how quickly attacks can disrupt export flows and terminal operations. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium is a critical route for Kazakhstan’s seaborne oil exports and has already faced repeated operational interruptions following drone strikes. Together, the attacks on general cargo ships, tankers, port infrastructure, and energy terminals show that the Black Sea maritime conflict is no longer limited to naval targets. Commercial ships, crews, cargo interests, terminals, and export corridors are now directly exposed to a widening war-risk environment.